[2008.09.13] 美国金融：又是福德

American finance
美国金融

Fuld again
又是福德

Sep 10th 2008 | NEW YORK
From Economist.com

Lehman Brothers jolts the market back to grim reality
莱曼兄弟的冲击使市场重回残酷的现实

AS THE Americas endure hurricane season, one storm has hit after another. It is the same in financial markets. Just as they were basking in the dramatic rescue-and effective nationalisation-of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, America’s giant mortgage agencies, a fresh storm was brewing over Wall Street. The already pummelled shares of Lehman Brothers, led by the pugnacious Dick Fuld, lost more than half their value in two days. Suddenly, there was the prospect of another major investment bank buckling six months after the loss of Bear Stearns.

随着美国飓风季节的来临，风暴接二连三地袭来。在金融市场同样也是如此。大家刚刚为一次引人注目的拯救行动–国有化房利美和房地美两个房贷抵押巨头– 而高兴，新的风暴已经笼罩在华尔街的上空。由好战的迪克福德领导的莱曼兄弟的股票，经受连续打击后，在最近两日内又跌去了一半多。贝尔斯登垮台六个月之后，突然间，又有一家主要的投资银行前景黯淡。

Shares of Washington Mutual (WaMu), the nation’s largest savings and loan bank, also slumped, amid fears that banks are running out of rescuers.

由于投资者担心美国银行业已经用尽救援资本，美国最大的储蓄和贷款银行–华盛顿互惠银行的股票也大幅下挫。

Lehman’s latest problems stemmed from the departure of a Korean suitor, throwing into doubt its efforts to raise capital to ride out big losses on property, mortgages and leveraged loans. It sought to limit the damage by pre-announcing a $3.9 billion quarterly loss for the third quarter on Wednesday September 10th, which had been expected, and unveiling a number of strategic moves. These included spinning off up to $30 billion of commercial-property assets into an independent, publicly traded company. It also said it was close to agreeing the sale of a majority stake in its prized fund-management unit, including Neuberger Berman.

莱曼最新的问题是源于一个韩国投资者的离去，因为它怀疑莱曼是否有能力筹集足够的资金来顶住由于房地产，抵押贷款和杠杆贷款而造成的巨大损失。莱曼为了减少损失而于9月10日预先发布公告：它在第三季度损将达39亿美元。这预计着莱曼下一步将有战略性的举动–包括将300亿美元的商业地产资产拆分拆出来成为独立的上市公司。莱曼同时也表示将要售出其备受珍视的基金管理部门的大额股份，包括纽伯格巴曼公司。

This was hardly startling stuff. It has not completed the deals, and as an obviously desperate seller, it has handed the potential buyers of the asset manager all the cards. Its plan to sell more than half of the asset-management division while retaining more than half of its profit smacks of sleight-of-hand. Absent a sale, it is not clear what the alternatives are. Even if it pulls one off, it will still need more capital.

这还不是令人震惊的消息。莱曼并没有完成这些交易。作为一个不顾一切的卖家，莱曼对潜在的买家亮出了所有的底牌。它计划卖出资产管理部门的一多半，而于此同时通过巧妙的手法保持其利润的一大半。莱曼没有表明除了这笔交易外是否还有其它的选择。即使这笔交易能够顺利完成，它依然需要更多的资金。

Lehman’s shares have sunk so low that its market value of $5.4 billion now languishes some way below what it hopes to get from Neuberger Berman. But if anyone sees an opportunity to buy the entire firm for a song, they have yet to reveal themselves. Perhaps with good reason. Market bottoms have already been incorrectly called several times, and there is massive uncertainty over the real value of Lehman’s exposure to illiquid securities. There are still piles of these assets, too. Even after the latest purge, Lehman will have $53 billion of mortgage assets and leveraged loans on its books-almost double its shareholders’ funds.

莱曼的股价已经跌到如此之低–市值缩水至54亿美元–使其从纽伯格巴曼公司获得的收益比其预想的要低得多。如果有人认为现在是个机会能够很便宜地将莱曼整个买下来，那么现在他该显身了。但是如果有很好理性的话就该知道：所谓市场底部的判断已经出错过多次，而且莱曼揭露的非流动性的证券的实际值还有非常大的不确定性。莱曼仍然还有很多这样的资产。即使在最后一次清除后，莱曼帐上还有530亿的抵押贷款资产和杠杆贷款–这大约是其股东基金的两倍。

Mr Fuld has brought Lehman back from the brink before-dramatically so after the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund, in 1998. This time, however, he has done shareholders no favours. While his early handling of the crisis was good, he has balked at selling assets for less than book value, even though the bank’s shares have for some time traded at a steep discount to that measure.

在1998年对冲基金–长期资本管理公司倒台后，福德先生戏剧性地将莱曼兄弟公司从危机的边缘拉了回来。但这次，他没有给股东任何好处。尽管他对这次危机的早期处理是不错的，但是他不敢将资产小于账面价值售出，尽管以帐面价值衡量,一段时间内莱曼的股价已大打折扣他也不愿意这么做。

To some, this brings disturbing echoes of Jimmy Cayne, Bear’s former boss, who refused to sell until it was too late. There are, however, some important differences. Lehman has built up a formidable $42 billion pool of liquidity, and it is far less reliant than Bear on American mortgages. Most importantly, it has access to a Federal Reserve credit line that was opened just after Bear’s sale to JPMorgan Chase.

这是人们想起贝尔斯登的前老板吉米凯恩，他同样也是拒绝卖出直到连卖出也太晚了。然而，二者有些不同。莱曼有令人吃惊的420亿美元的现金储备，它比贝尔斯登对抵押贷款的依赖度要小的多。更重要的是，莱曼可以获取联邦准备信用额度。而贝尔斯登却是卖给摩根大通之后才获得联邦准备信用额度的。

Does this window make a death-spiral inconceivable? Until recently the market thought so. But a sharp jump in the cost of protecting against a Lehman debt default suggests that doubts are creeping in.

这些能够使得莱曼的死亡成为不可能吗？到目前为止市场是这样认为的。但是保护莱曼的债务不受违约的成本在迅速上升，这表明疑虑正在悄然跟进。

Lehman has not suffered the client and counterparty defections that spelt doom for Bear. Indeed, other Wall Street firms, dubbed the “friends of Lehman”, seem determined to keep trading with it. This is not out of altruism (though Mr Fuld’s firm is liked a lot more than Mr Cayne’s us-and-them outfit ever was). Rather, there is genuine fear that a second failure would deal markets a terrible blow, hurting everyone. At some firms, instructions to keep trading with Lehman are coming from the top.

莱曼还没有尝过被客户和对手背叛的滋味，而这正是贝尔斯登垮台的原因。确实，被称为”莱曼的朋友”的其它华尔街公司看来坚决地保持与其交易。这并不是由于利他主义的原因（虽然福德先生的公司比凯恩先生”我们和他们”的团队更令人喜欢）。大家确实害怕第二个公司的垮台会使市场遭受重创，伤害到每个人。在一些公司的操作指南里，与莱曼公司交易是放在最前面的。

That may not go on forever. Standard & Poor’s, a rating agency, said this week it may downgrade Lehman’s debt. If that happened, the bank would be forced to put up billions in extra collateral, eating into its liquidity. That might lead some dealers to rethink the relationship.

但是不可能一直这样。评级机构标准普尔表示这周可能会降低莱曼债务的等级。如果这种情况发生的话，莱曼将会被迫在额外的附属担保上数十亿美元，这会消耗其不少流动资金。这可能会导致某些交易者重新考虑与莱曼的关系。

If Lehman remains in its current rut, or things get even worse, the best solution from a regulator’s standpoint would be a forced marriage. But it is already clear that there would be few enthusiastic takers. Even if Lehman can claw its way back, it is likely to be a shadow of its former self. And the business of investment banking may remain depressed for years.

如果莱曼继续在其老轨道上行驶，或者情况继续恶化，那么从监管者的角度来考虑最佳的解决方法就是包办婚姻。但是现在很明确的是没有热情的婆家。即使莱曼能像很久之前一样自保下来，它不过只是以前莱曼的一个壳子罢了。投资银行业务可能会低靡数年。

译者：rushor   http://www.ecocn.org/forum/viewthread.php?tid=13941&extra=page%3D1