Russia and Georgia
俄-格局势
South Ossetia is not Kosovo
南奥塞梯不是科索沃
Aug 28th 2008
From The Economist print edition
Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia cannot be justified by a bogus comparison to Kosovo 俄罗斯不能偷换科索沃问题的概念来承认南奥赛梯与阿柏克兹亚的独立
WITH a flourish, Russia this week recognised the “independence” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the enclaves that gave it a casus belli for its war on Georgia (see article). The Abkhaz and Ossetians celebrated their reward for living under Russian protection for 15 years. The Russians saw it as a logical outcome of their victory, a further stage in their confrontation with the West-and a copy of what happened in Kosovo. As Russia’s president, Dmitry Medvedev, argued, “you cannot have one rule for some and another rule for others.”
本周俄罗斯大张旗鼓的承认了南奥赛梯和阿柏克兹亚的”独立”，而这两块飞地正是近期格鲁吉亚战争的导火索。苏联解体后这两个地区在俄罗斯的庇护下平安的度过了15个年头，俄国人把该格局看作深层次对抗西方势力取得胜利后必然的结果，就像科索沃战争的再版一样。正如俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫宣称的那样，”必须要一视同仁的对待所有问题”
Yet the West is right to respond firmly to Russia’s new belligerence by refusing to recognise the new states. Never mind that Russia is itself being incoherent in continuing to insist that Kosovo’s independence from Serbia is still illegal (a stance driven in part by its wish to avoid setting a precedent for Chechnya or other restive republics within Russia). Mr Medvedev’s assertion of a parallel between Kosovo and South Ossetia is almost entirely bogus.
西方势力果断的选择了明智的方法来应对俄罗斯新一轮的好战举动：拒绝承认这两个新独立国家的合法性。尽管俄罗斯一再强调科索沃从塞尔维亚中独立出来是非法的，但该立场取决于它不想给车臣和其他有不臣之心的地区开这个先例；俄罗斯在科索沃和格鲁吉亚两个类似问题上的态度却互相矛盾。所以梅德韦杰夫关于科索沃和南奥赛梯的对比主张完全是虚伪的。
This is not to deny the superficial similarities that the West would do well to accept. NATO’s air war on Kosovo and Serbia in 1999 was, like the Iraq war in 2003, conducted without the legal approval of the United Nations. Both wars were aimed in part at regime change. Last February’s recognition by many Western countries of Kosovo’s independence from Serbia again lacked formal UN blessing (thanks to Russia’s threatened veto). All this made it inevitable that Kosovo, like Iraq, would be cited as justification for other adventures. The West knew that Kosovo’s independence, in particular, risked becoming an excuse for Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
但这并没有否认西方势力尽量接受的表面共性。北约1999年对科索沃和塞尔维亚的空战与2003年的伊战一样，都没有经过联合国的批准；都发生在政权更替的时候。去年2月，得益于俄罗斯的否决票，联合国没有正式承认科索沃从塞尔维亚中独立，但西方众国还是认定了独立事实。所有这一切都不可避免的将科索沃和伊拉克树立成典范，被引用来判定其他的类似尝试。西方诸强非常清楚，科索沃独立很有可能会成为俄罗斯承认南奥塞梯和阿柏克兹亚独立的借口。
Yet this is where the parallels run out. In Georgia’s enclaves, Russian forces have acted as self-interested troublemakers, not as neutral peacekeepers. Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic long oppressed the Kosovo Albanians, as well as perpetrating war and ethnic cleansing right across former Yugoslavia. But it was the Georgians who ended up as the bigger victims of ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia in the 1990s, and have been again in South Ossetia in the past three weeks. Unlike Milosevic, Georgia’s Mikheil Saakashvili is a democratically elected president who will surely be held to account by voters for his impetuous decision to invade South Ossetia on August 7th.
俄罗斯的破绽暴露于此，在格鲁吉亚的飞土问题上，俄罗斯军队扮演的角色是自私自利的惹事者，而不是中立的维和者。在塞尔维亚，米洛舍维奇长期压迫生活在科索沃的阿尔巴尼亚人，并且用战争和种族清洗横扫前南地区。但在90年代，格鲁吉亚人却是阿柏克兹亚地区种族清洗中的更大受害者；过去的三周时间里，同样的场景出现在南奥塞梯。与米洛舍维奇不同，萨卡什维利是民选总统，对于他8月7日决定入侵南奥塞梯的一时冲动，选民无疑是有一定责任的。
Motive provides an even clearer difference. Throughout the 1990s the Americans and Europeans were extremely reluctant to get involved in the Balkans. After Milosevic’s withdrawal from Kosovo in 1999, the main role of the UN and NATO forces in the province was to protect the Serb minority and Serb religious sites. The Western powers devoted years to negotiations over the province’s future, culminating in UN-led talks under Martti Ahtisaari, a former Finnish president. Only when these failed, again thanks mainly to Russian intransigence, did Kosovo’s unilateral independence become inevitable.
从动机上分析就可以看出更加清晰的区别。整个90年代，美国人和欧洲人都极不愿意卷入巴尔干地区。1999年米洛舍维奇从巴尔干撤军后，联合国和北约部队的主要任务就是保护当地塞尔维亚族人和宗教场所。西方势力花费了数年的经历协商该地区的未来，该努力终结于芬兰前总统Martti Ahtisaari代表联合国引领的会晤。只有在这些努力全部失败后，加上俄罗斯的强硬态度，科索沃才有把握宣布单方面的独立。
In total contrast, Russia has nakedly pursued its own interests in the Caucasus. It did its utmost to provoke Mr Saakashvili into a fight. Its “peacekeepers” have made no pretence of protecting minorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It has not even tried to promote serious negotiations over the territories’ future. Instead, it has steadily cemented their links with Russia, building up military facilities and giving the local people Russian passports (a transparent ploy to justify a later purported need to “protect” Russian citizens). Although Mr Saakashvili took the catastrophic decision to send in the Georgian army, resulting in many civilian deaths, no evidence has been offered by the Russians to support their wild claims of genocide or ethnic cleansing.
在赤裸裸的追求高加索地区利益的时候，俄罗斯的态度来了个180度逆转。他竭尽全力的煽动萨卡什维利发动战争，然后派驻”维和部队”；并没有打出保护南奥塞梯和阿柏克兹亚少数民族的旗号，甚至都懒得认真商讨一下该地区的未来。取而代之的是稳固的加强格鲁吉亚与俄罗斯之间的联系，在格鲁吉亚构建军事设施，并且向该地区居民发放俄罗斯护照（这个策略明显是为了证明其后所谓”保护”俄罗斯公民的需求是合理的）。尽管萨克式维利作出的这个灾难性决定给格鲁吉亚军队和无数平民带来了死亡，但是俄罗斯无法提出证据支持他们关于格鲁吉亚发生大屠杀以及种族清洗的指控。
Peacekeepers or piece-keepers?
维护和平还是维护分裂？
The difference between Kosovo and South Ossetia has been starker still in the war’s aftermath. In 1999 the Western powers went in as a last resort and quickly internationalised the issue, bringing in the UN and international peacekeepers. Eight years of patient diplomacy preceded Kosovo’s independence. The Russians invaded Georgia in a fever of war enthusiasm; have refused to pull out and rejected attempts to internationalise the dispute; and have now recognised the enclaves’ independence less than three weeks after the war began.
战争的结果使科索沃与南奥塞梯的区别仍然明显。1999年西方势力不得以卷入给地区并迅速使之成为国际化问题，致使联合国以及国际维和人员进驻科索沃；在它宣布独立以前经过了8年耐心的外交斡旋。俄罗斯入侵格鲁吉亚时带着兴奋的战争狂热，拒绝撤出该地区的同时也拒绝使之国际化；战争开始后还不足3周的时间就承认这块飞土的独立。
In principle, sub-national states should sometimes be able to secede, but South Ossetia and Abkhazia clearly do not qualify. Neither enclave has properly consulted its people, including huge numbers of Georgian refugees. Nor has there been a long, hard effort to find a negotiated settlement. Mr Saakashvili should stop promising to regain control of the enclaves, and the West should insist on the case for international peacekeepers. But Russia’s aggression in Georgia must not be rewarded by conceding the enclaves’ independence. That really could set a dangerous precedent, in Ukraine, Moldova and-not least-inside Russia itself.
原则上来说，地方州府有时可以独立出来，但是南奥塞梯和阿柏克兹亚显然不合格。飞土当局没有适当的征求人民的意见，包括为数众多的格鲁吉亚难民；也没有长期艰苦的努力寻求可协商的解决方案。萨卡什维利应该停止夺回控制权的空头承诺，西方势力也应该坚持维和部队的国际化。但是如果用承认飞土独立的退让作为对俄罗斯入侵格鲁吉亚的回报，这是万万不可的；因为这种结果一定会在乌克兰、摩尔多瓦甚至俄罗斯内部树立相当危险的先例。
译者：Tidehunter http://www.ecocn.org/forum/viewthread.php?tid=13665&extra=page%3D1