Pakistan
巴基斯坦
Another Bushman down
又一布什盟友下台
Aug 21st 2008
From The Economist print edition
Pervez Musharraf’s exit should be seen as an opportunity for his Western allies, not a setback
对其西方盟友而言，穆沙拉夫的离职是一个机会而非挫折
HE TOOK a long time going, but at last Pervez Musharraf quit this week as Pakistan’s president (see article). Most Pakistanis seem delighted to see the back of him. But, mirroring the reaction to the coup that brought him to power in 1999-condemned abroad, popular at home-he has been more mourned by his foreign friends.
穆沙拉夫迟迟不肯下台，但最终他还是于本周从总统任上辞职。大多数巴基斯坦民众为其离去欢欣鼓舞。1999年，他发动政变来到了权力中心，此举受到国内的欢迎却遭遇国外的谴责。对比当年，这一次他的外国朋友却更为之感到痛惜。
Western leaders, notably George Bush, saw Mr Musharraf as a loyal ally in the “war on terror”, who had courted domestic unpopularity-and braved repeated assassination attempts-to help America rid the region of the scourge of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Better his finger on Pakistan’s nuclear button, the thinking went, than a flaky, venal civilian, perhaps followed in short order by a mad mullah.
穆沙拉夫为了帮助美国清除基地组织和塔利班在巴基斯坦北部地区的危害，导致自己国内不受欢迎，并招来了多次暗杀。西方领导人，特别是布什，视穆沙拉夫为其”反恐战争”的忠实盟友。按照这种思维，穆沙拉夫的留任要比他褪化成一个古怪贪腐的平民（或许身后还会迅速地跟上一位狂热的毛拉）要好的多。
But the notion that his departure is a victory for the extremists and a setback for their enemies is wrong. The extremists are indeed cheering; but so should Pakistan’s allies. Rather than weakening the forces of moderation, Mr Musharraf’s exit offers the chance to strengthen them.
有种观点认为，穆沙拉夫的离任是极端分子的胜利，对其政敌也是一种挫折。但这是错误的。极端分子确实在为此欢呼；巴基斯坦的盟友也该如此。穆沙拉夫的离任非但不会削弱温和派的力量，反而提供了一个其发展壮大的机会。
There are three reasons to doubt the rosy view of Mr Musharraf as a valiant standard-bearer for liberal, secular decency. First, his support for the war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban was neither as freely given nor as unstinting as it is often portrayed. Far from enlisting with gusto, he maintained Pakistan’s traditional support for the Taliban right up until September 11th 2001. Even then, the choice was made for him. Any Pakistani government would have chosen to be “with” America, given what was happening to those who were “against” it.
乐观的将穆沙拉夫视为自由、世俗准则的英勇领袖是错误的，理由有三。第一，穆沙拉夫对反恐战争的支持并不像通常所描绘的那般自愿和慷慨。他的所作所为远非积极自愿，一直到九一一前，他还维持着巴基斯坦传统上对塔利班的支持。直到那时，他才做出了选择。但鉴于那些反美国家的遭遇，相信任何巴基斯坦政府都会选择与美国站在一起。
Since then Pakistan has played a vital role in capturing al-Qaeda leaders, and has spilt more blood fighting pro-Taliban militants in its tribal areas than America and its allies have in Afghanistan, where this week the bloodletting worsened (see article). But it has never dispelled suspicions that it has played a double game. Some of its soldiers and spooks sympathise with and help the Taliban, out of both ethnic-Pushtun fellow-feeling and strategic intent. America itself is reported to have evidence that Pakistan’s intelligence services were involved in the bombing of India’s embassy in Kabul in July.
自那时起，巴基斯坦扮演了追捕基地组织领导人的关键角色。在与本国亲塔利班部族武装的斗争中，巴基斯坦付出了高于美国及其盟国在阿富汗所付出的代价（本周阿富汗暴力冲突加剧）。但它从未打消人们对于其扮演双重角色的怀疑。出于同为普什图人的种族感情和战略目的，巴基斯坦的一些士兵和间谍同情并帮助塔利班。美国自称证据证明，7月份印度驻喀布尔（阿富汗首都）大使馆的爆炸案牵涉到了巴基斯坦情报机构。
Second, as an unelected usurper of the presidency, Mr Musharraf saw the mainstream political parties as his chief political rivals. He did his best to weaken them. In the process he encouraged the growth of Islamist parties, some of whose leaders are impeccably moderate, but whose wilder fringes extend into armed extremism. In the election he rigged in 2002, these parties fared better than they ever had before. Mr Musharraf presented himself as the alternative to a political Islam that he himself did much to nurture.
第二，做为一个非民选篡位者，穆沙拉夫将国内主流政治党派视为其首要政治对手。他尽其所能去削弱他们。在这个过程中，他鼓励伊斯兰党派的成长。部分伊斯兰党派的领导人温和之致，但其激进派别却变为武装极端主义。在2002年穆沙拉夫操纵的选举中，这些伊斯兰党派表现之好在其历史上前所未有。穆沙拉夫推介自己做为这个他一手培育的政党的政治领导人。
With friends like these
与此类朋友为伍
His lack of democratic legitimacy was a third, more fundamental, handicap in the battle with extremism. Just as his support for the war tarnished him in the eyes of the Pakistani public, so, too, the war became tainted by association with an increasingly disliked leader. It was seen as a price Pakistan as a nation was paying for America’s political support for Mr Musharraf personally.
第三，穆沙拉夫当政缺乏民主合法性，对与极端主义的斗争而言，这是一个更基本的障碍。对反恐战争的支持玷污了他在巴基斯坦公众中的地位，同样的道理，与一位日渐惹人讨厌的领导人的合作，也玷污了这场反恐战争。人们认为，为换取美国对他的支持，穆沙拉夫把巴基斯坦贿赂给了美国。
This newspaper has long argued that America was serving neither its own nor Pakistan’s interests by relying so heavily on Mr Musharraf. Its failure to do more to hasten the restoration of democracy has compounded the undoubted difficulties his departure brings. The campaign along the Afghan frontier is so unpopular that the Pakistani government elected in February has done its best to distance itself from the war’s prosecution. But it is led by two moderate parties, representing the mass of Pakistanis, of whom only a tiny fraction has any hankering for a regime of Taliban-style purity and harshness. The government has a chance to make the case for defeating extremism-not because it is beholden to America, but because when Pakistan’s people elected it, they were voting for a moderate, democratic Pakistan. It would be in the generals’ own interests to give it the support it needs, to help repair the army’s image.
长久以来，本报一直认为，美国如此倚重穆沙拉夫既不符合美国的利益，也不符合巴基斯坦的利益。穆沙拉夫未能进一步加速巴基斯坦民主进程，它带来的负面效应与他的离职所注定会产生的棘手难题混杂在了一起。与阿富汗边境接壤沿线的战争是如此的不受欢迎，以致于诞生于2月份的民选政府正竭力避免染指这场战争。但该政府由两个温和党派领导，它代表着绝大部分巴基斯坦民众，他们之中只有少数人才梦想建立一个塔利班式纯粹的严厉政府。这个政府有机会为打击极端主义正名 –不是因为它欠美国什么，而是因为它是由巴基斯坦人民选举产生的，人民选举它就是希望谛造一个温和、民主的巴基斯坦。军队将领们应给予该政府所需要的支持，帮助恢复军队的形象，这也符合将军们的利益。
Sadly, the dismal record of the two big parties and their leaders in previous governments is not encouraging. But Mr Musharraf was a busted flush, and his successors have at least one ace he never had in his hands: a democratic mandate.
遗憾的是，政府两个主要政党及其领导人在往届政府中的糟糕表现让人无法欢欣鼓舞。但穆沙拉夫已风光不再，他的继任者至少握有一个他从不曾有过的王牌：民主授权。
译者：dgrkl http://www.ecocn.org/forum/viewthread.php?tid=13465&extra=page%3D1