NATO and the invasion of Georgia
北约与格鲁吉亚战争
How to contain Russia
如何抑制俄罗斯
Aug 21st 2008
From The Economist print edition
There is no quick fix, but an over-confident Russia is weaker than it looks
除非过度自信的俄罗斯外强中干，否则格鲁吉亚问题没有什么快捷的解决之道
FROM Brussels this week NATO brandished a fist at Russia, warning it that there could be no “business as usual” so long as Russian forces remained in Georgia. The Russians, oddly, did not quail. If anything, President Dmitry Medvedev and his mentor and prime minister, Vladimir Putin, seem to be enjoying the world’s impotent indignation in the face of their new-found machismo. And why not? They know that the West will not fight for the territorial integrity of Georgia, a trisected statelet of only 4m people in the faraway Caucasus. They also know that they will face no serious economic punishment. As a collective, NATO may huff and puff, but the cold fact is that many of its big members need a lot of business with Russia to continue. Germany and others in Europe need to keep buying Russia’s oil and gas. America needs Russia, too, in order to secure vital foreign-policy objectives of its own, such as preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
北约本周于布鲁塞尔向俄罗斯发出威胁，警告后者如果不撤出驻扎在格鲁吉亚的军队，那么就不会像以前那么好商量了。而俄罗斯人对此毫无胆怯之意，这种反应很不寻常；全世界的义愤填膺在他们最近表现出的雄武气概面前都显得苍白无力，反倒是梅德韦杰夫总统和他的蒙导、普京总理似乎很享受这种形势。俄国人完全有理由如此嚣张，格鲁吉亚处于距离西方势力遥不可及的高加索地区，区区400万人口的小地方本身就已经一分为三了，他们了解西方势力压根就不会为了格的领土完整而发动战争；同时俄国人也明白他们可能面对的经济制裁只会是雷声大，雨点小。作为一个集体，北约也许还可以发发火气，但是冷酷的事实在于很多重量级成员需要继续同俄国人合作。德国和欧洲其他一些国家需要继续购买俄国的原油和燃气，美国为了维护其重要的外交政策目标同样需要俄罗斯，例如防止伊朗获得核武器。
Does this mean that Russia will get away with its smash-and-grab operation? In one sense it does. Russia’s intentions were unclear this week; it drove some tanks here and there for the benefit of the cameras (see article). But if it is determined to keep its forces in Georgia proper despite the ceasefire agreement brokered by France, Germany and America, it is hard to see what any outsider can do about it. Georgia’s dispute with Russia would then once again become a “frozen” conflict, except with different de facto borders.
难道这就意味着俄罗斯可以在堂而皇之的强取豪夺后轻松的离开？从某种意义上来说，他可以。本周俄罗斯所表现出的意图并不明朗，部分坦克的调动只是为了配合媒体的工作；但是如果俄罗斯完全不顾由法德美三国斡旋签订的停火协议，执意决定不撤军，似乎局外人也不便插手其中。那么格鲁吉亚与俄罗斯的争端将会在一次陷入僵持状态，唯一的区别就是实际国界的变化。
The wider aims with which Russia is presumed to have entered Georgia have not yet been achieved, however. They include toppling its pro-American president, Mikheil Saakashvili, and using intimidation to stop Georgia and Ukraine from following the Poles, Czechs, Balts and other former dominions of the Soviet Union into the orbit of the West and thence into NATO. If it pursues sound policies, the West still stands a fair chance, despite its divisions, of thwarting these aims.
然而俄罗斯入侵格鲁吉亚的贪婪目的还没有完全实现：包括推翻亲美的萨卡什维利总统，用恐吓的方式阻止格鲁吉亚和乌克兰走上波兰人、捷克人、波罗的海居民的老路；这些前苏联的主权国家步入了西方的轨道，并且加入了北约组织。尽管有军队的威胁来阻碍这些目标的实现，但是西方势力只有在采取稳妥政策的情况下，才会有一些机会。
Sound policy starts with a sense of proportion. Contrary to some excitable first reactions, Russia’s ability to crush the minuscule Georgian army does not make it a superpower, and its aggression in the Caucasus need not mark the start of a new cold war. To put things in perspective, America’s GDP is ten times bigger than Russia’s and it spends at least seven times more on defence. Russia’s economy would fall off a cliff if energy prices slumped and its population, racked by ill-health and inequality, is shrinking by up to 800,000 a year. Russia can make mischief, but it cannot project military and ideological power all around the world, as the Soviet Union did during the cold war. Although it scares some neighbours (but not the Chinese), its threats make them all the more determined to stay on guard. It is surely no coincidence that after months of prevarication the Poles agreed immediately after Russia invaded Georgia to let America base missile defences (ostensibly against a future threat from Iran) on Polish territory.
稳妥的政策开始于对该事件真正意义的了解。俄罗斯虽有能力在一触即发的事件中只用第一反应就可以摧毁格鲁吉亚的军队，但太过弱小的对手不能证明他是超级大国，同样他入侵高加索地区的行为也不能标志着新一轮冷战的开始。实事求是地看，美国GDP10倍于俄罗斯的产能，同时用于防御的支出也超过俄的7倍。如果能源价格暴跌，那么俄罗斯经济将陷入深渊；同时人口数量受到健康状况和贫富差距的双重打击，每年最多减少80万人。俄罗斯可以小打小闹，但却无法在全球范围内布置军事力量和意识形态，这与前苏联在冷战时的实力完全不同。虽然他可以威胁一些邻国，当然不包括中国在内；但是这些威胁让他们保持更高的警惕。美国希望在波兰境内部署导弹防御基地，但是历时数月的努力都被搪塞过去；但在俄罗斯入侵格鲁吉亚后波兰人立即同意了美国人的提议，很明显这不是简单的巧合而已。
To say that Russia’s strength is exaggerated is not to say that it should be allowed to escape its Georgian adventure unpunished. A weak power can be more reckless than a strong one. Russia needs to learn that in spite of their own enervating foreign wars and economic worries the members of the Western alliance can still unite in front of a challenge. But because Russia is fundamentally less strong than it likes to pretend, the West’s response can afford to be patient as well as principled.
认定俄罗斯的实力被夸大并不代表允许他在格鲁吉亚的行为不受惩罚。光脚的不怕穿鞋的，尽管西方联盟的成员面临着衰弱的海外战争能力以及经济上的压力，但是俄罗斯需要了解，在挑战面前他们还是可以团结一致的。由于俄罗斯根本没有它伪装出来的那么强壮，西方势力做出的反应还是可以同时兼顾耐心和原则的。
One principle the West must insist on is the legitimacy of Georgia’s government. However foolish Mr Saakashvili was to give Russia a pretext for invasion, he should stay in office until Georgians themselves throw him out. Another principle is the right of any country, even if it is a former Soviet vassal in what Russia still counts as its own sphere of influence, to ask to join NATO. Naturally, the alliance should not admit members who are unready, or for whom it is not in the end willing to fight. On this test, Georgia might never get in. But to give Russia a veto would be to mock the sovereignty of small countries.
西方势力必须坚持的一个原则是格政府的合法性。无论给俄罗斯提供借口实施侵略这一举动多么愚蠢，萨卡什维利还是应该呆在总统官邸，直到格鲁吉亚人自己把他从那里扔出去。另一个原则是任何国家应该拥有的主权。即使是过去臣服于前苏联，目前纳入俄罗斯势力范围的国家，也有申请加入北约的权利。联盟自然不会同意那些还没有做好准备的国家加入，还有那些不值得联盟为之发动战争的国家。在上述原则的考量下，格鲁吉亚似乎永远拿不到入场券；但是为了向俄罗斯的主张行使否决权，西方可以支持小国的主权完整。
Just wait
静观其变
As to patience, suspending business as usual should not be pushed to the point that drives Russia into the sort of sulk that will make its behaviour worse. Finding the line between disapproval, pressure and continued engagement will be hard. Too much concern for the hurt feelings of a fallen empire could be misread as weakness and so encourage further bullying. But there is vital work to be done-on nuclear proliferation and arms reduction, for example-in which the need for co-operation with Russia simply outweighs the need to punish it.
说到耐心，暂停日常合作的程度要控制好，做过头就会惹恼俄罗斯，而他的行为将会更加令人担忧。在拒绝、施压和交战中寻求平衡必然非常困难；对这个没落王朝难过心情的过多关注有可能被曲解为软弱，其结果必然是鼓励俄罗斯继续威吓周围国家。有一些重要的工作需要完成，在这些事情上需要同俄罗斯合作，而不是惩罚；例如裁军和核扩散问题。
So Russia will keep its tanks in Georgia if it wants to. But the longer it does so, the less Europe will want to rely on Russia for its energy, the longer it will wait to join the World Trade Organisation, the more hostile the next American president will be and the more its nervous neighbours will be tempted to turn to the West for safety. The job now is to explain to Russia that this may not have been such a victory for machismo, after all.
所以只要俄罗斯愿意，他的坦克就可以继续行驶在格鲁吉亚境内；但是这个时间越长，欧洲对俄罗斯能源的依赖就会越少，俄加入世贸的进程也就会越慢，下一任美国总统就会更加敌对，更多惊恐的邻国会向西方势力寻求保护。现在的工作是要让俄罗斯明白，上述结果并不是这个再度崛起大国的胜利。
译者：Tidehunter http://www.ecocn.org/forum/viewthread.php?tid=13472&extra=page%3D1