[2008.05.22] Reconstructing Afghanistan 重建阿富汗

Asia.view
亚洲观察

Reconstructing Afghanistan
重建阿富汗

May 20th 2008
From The Economist print edition

The lessons of earlier Asian nation-building efforts
早期亚洲国家重建的教训

AP/美联社

A big tent would be better
大点的帐篷都比这好

NEARLY seven years after the toppling of the Taliban, Afghanistan’s future is still up for grabs. Despite tens of thousands of foreign troops, and billions of dollars in aid, the country remains stricken by poverty and insurgency.
推翻塔利班已近七年了,可阿富汗依旧前途未卜。数以千计的外国军队和几十亿美元的援助也于事无补,这个国家仍深受贫困与叛乱之苦。


Kabul seems like the capital of an occupied country. Foreign diplomats and United Nations (UN) officials are forbidden to walk the streets alone, because of the risk of kidnap; so they cruise behind the tinted windows of their four-wheel-drives. Many big roads are concrete anti-terrorist obstacle courses. After recent suicide-bombings in the capital, it too is a front line.
喀布尔看起来像个被占国的首都。由于存在绑架风险,外国外交官和联合国官员被禁止在街上单独行走,因此他们只好躲在车里,隔着有色防护玻璃进行巡视。还有许多主要公路都筑有混凝土反恐路障。就这样,在经历了最近几次自杀式爆炸袭击后,连首都也成了前线。

Afghanistan’s troubles are, of course, unique, especially in the viciousness and extent of its continuing insurgency, most often compared with Iraq’s. But this is in fact only one of four foreign interventions in conflict-ridden states in Asia in recent years. The others—in Cambodia, Timor-Leste and Nepal—offer revealing parallels with Afghanistan.
当然,阿富汗的问题有独特性,特别是其持续不断的叛乱程度很深,范围甚广。阿富汗的这一点常常被拿来与伊拉克做比较。事实上,这只是近些年来外国干预的四个冲突频仍的亚洲国家之一,除了阿富汗,还有柬埔寨,东帝汶和尼泊尔,将这三个国家与阿富汗作比较可以得到很多启示。

Perhaps the clearest of all is that, despite the huge difficulties it presents—in Afghanistan above all—holding an election is the easy part.
或许最清楚的一点启示就是,尽管阿富汗和上述三个国家都存在许多巨大的困难—尤其是阿富汗,但是举行选举相对来说是比较容易的部分。

Voters have consistently surprised observers with their enthusiasm, their maturity and their refusal to be cowed by the threat of violence. This was movingly so in a parliamentary election in Cambodia in 1993; in a referendum on independence in the then East Timor in 1999 and in its constituent-assembly and presidential elections in 2001-02; and in this year’s constituent-assembly election in Nepal.
选民们总是让观察人员感到惊讶。在1993年的柬埔寨议会选举,1999年的东帝汶独立公投,01-02年的东帝汶制宪国会以及总统选举和今年的尼泊尔制宪国会选举中,选民们充满热情,他们的成熟和对暴力威胁的无所畏惧让人深受感动。

But the losing party in Cambodia’s election responded by threatening the future of the peace process and then muscled its way back into government, where it still sits. The referendum in East Timor was followed by an orgy of Indonesia-inspired arson, looting and violence. The elections there led to an unstable government and to renewed violence in 2006. Following Nepal’s election, to the surprise and alarm of many observers, the Maoists have emerged as the biggest single party.
但 是在柬埔寨选举中失败的政党以破坏和平进程相威胁,然后依靠武力强行进入政府,并且至今还留在那里。东帝汶的公投伴随着受印尼唆使的纵火,抢劫和暴力事 件。通过这次选举产生的政府也不稳固,而且在2006年再次爆发骚乱。在尼泊尔选举中,马列主义(毛派)出人意料地一举成为国会最大党,这让许多观察人员 深感不安。

In Afghanistan, parliament houses many of the warlords who have wreaked such havoc in the country. As one veteran observer laments, a crucial mistake was made at the outset: not allowing the government and its foreign supporters a monopoly on the means of violence.
在阿富汗,议会中有太多的军阀,他们曾给这个国家带来浩劫。正如一位经验丰富的观察家所哀叹的,关键错误在一开始就铸成了:没有允许政府和其外国支持者完全主导对暴力的整治。

Another point in common to all four places is made by a senior UN official: that, in these rebuilding exercises, the outside world always tends to neglect the importance of “justice”. Understandably, in the interests of reconciliation and peace, there is a reluctance to countenance a confrontational settling of accounts.
一个联合国官员指出了这四个国家的另外一个共同点:外部世界在重建过程中常常忽视“公平正义”的重要性。但这也是人之常情,为了和解与和平,人们不太愿意针锋相对地把“账”算清楚。

In Cambodia it was only last year, after most of the Khmer Rouge leaders had died, that trials began of those who survived. In Timor-Leste, enquiries into past atrocities have not been allowed for fear of jeopardising relations with Indonesia; it has been deemed better to forget than to forgive. In Nepal, both the Maoists and the former royal army have strong reason to want to avoid any probe into their past behaviour.
在柬埔寨,对红色高棉领导人的审判去年才刚刚开始,可其大部分领导人都已经去世了。在东帝汶,对过去暴行的质询不被允许,因为东帝汶害怕危及与印尼的关系,人们相信忘记比原谅更好。在尼泊尔,毛派和前皇室军队都强烈希望不要追究彼此过去的行为。

Similarly in Afghanistan, there has been no accountability for past crimes. Nor can there be: the government relies on the support of some of those who stand accused of war crimes.
阿富汗也是这样,过去的罪行没有得到彻底清算。其实罪行也不可能被彻底清算,因为政府还要依靠那些人的支持,尽管他们应对战争负责。

That is in part a consequence of the government’s most glaring weakness: the shortage of literate, capable, honest people to staff an administration. The lament repeated by every section of the foreign community is about the lack of “human capital”, or, if the speaker is feeling self-accusatory, about the failure of “capacity-building”.
之所以如此,部分原因是阿富汗政府最明显的弱点——它缺乏有文化有能力和诚实的公务人员。外国团体的每个部门在都在不断抱怨阿富汗“人力资本”不足,或者说这些外国团体也在为“能力建设”失败自责。

This too is a problem familiar from, for example, Cambodia and East Timor—warfare and hardship wreck education systems and send millions into exile. If they come back at all, after peace returns, there is little financial or other incentive for the talented ones to work for the government.
这也是柬埔寨和东帝汶面临的问题。战争和艰苦的环境破坏了教育体系并使数百万人流离失所。当和平重新降临,人们重返家乡时,政府却缺乏财力或是其他激励措施吸引有才能的人。

Most find it more attractive to work for the UN, or foreign governments and charities—and so it is easier for the foreigners to do the jobs themselves. But they risk leaving behind them a dangerous vacuum, or perhaps worse: never being able to leave at all.
大多数人发现为联合国或外国政府和慈善组织工作更有吸引力,可话说回来外国人自己做这些工作更容易(既然如此何必用本地人呢),但是外国人这样做也有风险,他们可能留下一个危险的与世隔绝的阿富汗,或许更糟糕,什么都留不下。

译者:jason http://www.ecocn.org/forum/viewthread.php?tid=11602&extra=page%3D1

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