[2008.11.22] 朝鲜：前进，前进，前进进

North Korea
朝鲜

Going, going, going again
前进，前进，前进进

Nov 20th 2008
From The Economist print edition

The deal to disarm North Korea is unravelling
解除朝鲜武装的协议正在瓦解

HE MAY be a few pixels short of a picture these days, but as an auctioneer North Korea’s nuclear-capable Kim Jong Il is without peer. Back in 2005 he accepted a generous bid of all sorts of goodies, for a second time, to shut down his plutonium-producing reactor at Yongbyon (an earlier deal had foundered when North Korea was caught cheating). Now Mr Kim seems to be preparing to auction off Yongbyon for a third time: to Barack Obama’s incoming administration in America.
这些天他的相片上可能是少了一些像素，但是作为一名拍卖师，拥有朝鲜核能力的金正日是无人可比的。2005年，当时他第二次接受了一个报价，包括各种各样的商品，以关闭他在宁边生产钚元素的反应堆（之前的一个协议因为朝鲜被抓到有欺骗行为而中止了）。现在看来金先生正准备第三次将宁边拍卖出去：卖给美国正要上任的奥巴马•巴拉克政府。

North Korean officials are putting it about that they will not honour a verification deal painstakingly negotiated as part of six-party talks that also include South Korea, Japan, China and Russia. Just a try-on? Or does this mark the failure of the six-party marathon? Under way for five years now, this effort aims not just to dismantle Yongbyon, where North Korea made the plutonium for its much-boasted bombs. In 2005 Mr Kim agreed in principle that he would give up his other nefarious nuclear activities and eventually his weapons too.
朝鲜的官员们正在散布消息，说他们将不会遵守作为六方会谈（也包括韩国、日本、中国和俄罗斯）的一部分而艰难达成的核查协议。这只是一个把戏？或者这标志着六方马拉松会谈的失败？现在经过五年的努力，大家的目标不仅仅是拆除宁边的核设施，朝鲜在此生产为其过分吹嘘的核弹而准备的钚元素。2005年金先生原则上同意他将放弃其它邪恶的核活动并最终也放弃他的武器。

In order to keep him edging in the right direction this time, the pay-off was to be carefully sequenced as disarmament milestones were reached. It includes: generous energy supplies and other rewards, a lifting of sanctions, diplomatic relations with America, negotiation of a peace treaty to replace the armistice that has endured bad-temperedly since the Korean war, a transformed relationship with the outside world that could help lift North Korea out of its abject poverty and even, at an “appropriate” time, the provision of modern, less proliferation-prone nuclear reactors.
这一次，为了使其沿着正确的方向缓慢前进，回报的次序被精心安排：只有在裁军目标达到之后才会给他。它包括：慷慨的能源供应和其它回报，取消制裁，与美国的外交关系，商谈一份和平协议以取代从朝鲜战争以来那份饱受煎熬的停战协议，改良了的与外部世界的关系以使朝鲜摆脱其极度的贫困，甚至，在”合适” 的时候，提供现代的、不易引发军备竞争的核反应堆。

So far Mr Kim has had around half the promised 1m tons of fuel oil and been struck off America’s list of states that sponsor terrorism. In return for this and the rest of the oil, he was to put Yongbyon out of action and provide a verifiable list of all his nuclear activities. And there the trouble started.
至今为止金先生已经得到承诺中的1百万吨燃油中的大约一半，并且将朝鲜从美国支持恐怖主义国家的名单上抹去。作为对这些事情和剩下的石油的回报，他应该停止宁边的活动并提供一份可以验证的其所有核活动的清单。而这正是问题的开始。

Mr Kim admits to a plutonium stash, though there is a dispute about its size. He refuses, however, to own up to known imports of equipment for enriching uranium (another potential route to a bomb) that scuppered the very first Yongbyon deal. He will say nothing about nuclear help he is accused of giving to Syria and others. So the other five persuaded themselves that the plutonium count would do for now. But Mr Kim’s is blocking that too: his officials say that inspectors will not be allowed either to take reactor samples essential to a proper plutonium accounting, or to stray beyond Yongbyon.
金先生承认藏了一些钚，但是有关其数量存在争议。然而，他拒绝承认自己知道铀浓缩（制造核弹的另一个潜在途径）设备进口的事情，这就使宁边协议一开始就完蛋了。对于被指责向叙利亚和其它国家提供核帮助，他什么也不会说。因此其它五方说服自己现在搞清楚钚的数量就可以了。但是金先生也把这条路堵上了：他的官员们说，调查人员将既不允许取得反应堆样本（这对计算钚的数量很重要），也不允许到宁边之外的地方游荡。

The Delhi gambit
德里兵法

Mr Kim enjoys acting up. The six-party process was meant to make it harder for him to play his neighbours off against each other. But that is true only if he gets the same agreed message from all. Lately, that hasn’t been happening. China refuses to lean on him except in direst times (such as after his 2006 bomb test). Some Democrat voices in America suggest he needs more generous offers, in faster sequence.
金先生使坏使得很高兴。六方进程意味着他更难利用他的邻居们来相互牵制。但这只有在他从所有人那里都得到同样的信息时才是这样。最近，这种事情并没有发生。中国拒绝依靠他，除了在最凶险的时刻（比如其在2006年的核试验之后）。美国的一些民主党人认为他需要更慷慨的帮助，以更快的次序。

To Mr Kim it thus makes sense to await a new bidder in the White House. But there is a more troubling possibility: that he has never had any intention of giving up his bombs. Call it his Delhi gambit. With America’s help, India has not only kept its nukes, but has been accepted for all practical purposes, and with extra benefits, as a nuclear power. Why settle for less?
然而对金先生来说，等待一个新的白宫出价人是有道理的。但是也存在更糟糕的可能性：即他从未想过要放弃他的核弹。把这称作他的德里兵法吧。在美国的帮助下，印度不仅保留了它的核武器，而且实际上已经被接受，而且作为一个核大国，享有了额外的好处。为什么要降低目标呢。

East Asia will never be secure with Mr Kim’s finger on the nuclear trigger. Prising it off will take firmer insistence on real disarmament than America, China and the rest have lately been able to muster. At the very least, they should stop pretending that he is living up to the bargain he made in 2005.
只要金先生的手指放在核扳机上，东亚就永远不会安全。将这根手指撬开需要更坚定地坚持真正的裁军，其坚持的力度要比美国、中国和其它国家最近所能表现出的更大。至少，他们应该停止假装他正在实践他2005年达成的交易。

译者：7colorwolf   http://www.ecocn.org/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=15574&extra=page%3D1