After Georgia
后格鲁吉亚时代
Europe stands up to Russia
欧洲直面强俄
Sep 4th 2008
From The Economist print edition
The European Union has wobbled woefully, yet Russia too will pay dearly for its Georgian adventure
欧盟对俄的摇摆态度过于严重，然而俄罗斯同样要为格鲁吉亚的战局付出沉重的代价
IT IS now close to a month since the reckless Georgian effort to retake breakaway South Ossetia by force sparked off what Russia is now calling its August war. There is no new iron curtain descending across Europe, no ideologically based “new cold war”; but there is a deep, wounding division that stretches far beyond wrecked Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, from Tallinn on the Baltic to Tbilisi and beyond, the violence of the past month, along with Russia’s assertions of its “privileged interests” in its far-flung neighbourhood, has done more damage to relations between Russia and the West than Russia’s leaders think they need to care about and many Europeans care to admit.
近一个月以前，格鲁吉亚冒然采取武力手段，试图重新占领企图脱逃的南奥塞梯；此举导致的战争被俄罗斯称为”八月战争”。虽然目前铁幕还没有降临在欧洲上空，”新一轮冷战”的形成也缺乏意识形态基础；但根本分歧的散布远不止满是瓦砾的格鲁吉亚，南奥塞梯和阿布哈兹。借用温斯顿.丘吉尔的话说，从波罗的海的塔林到第比利斯以及更远的地方，过去一个月中发生的暴力事件连同俄罗斯在其遥远邻邦宣布的”特有利益”，对其同西方关系造成了伤害。而这种伤害要大于俄罗斯领导人需要担心的，或者欧洲人不甘心承认的。
That was the background against which Europe’s squabbling leaders met on September 1st. The talk the day before was that it would be impossible for the hawks (such as Britain and the Baltics) to agree on anything with the gas-swilling Russophiles (such as Italy and Germany). A day later they had united enough to condemn Russia’s actions and produce a punishment of sorts: there will be no talks on a new partnership agreement between Russia and the EU until Russian troops leave Georgia proper and resume their positions of August 6th (see article). Yet a smirking Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev do not seem to be quaking in their boots-indeed they think they have triumphed diplomatically as well.
这也是欧洲那些喋喋不休的领导人在9月1日会晤的基础。而在前一天的会谈中，英国及波罗的海的鹰派国家同德意这样为了原油供应的而亲俄的国家没有在任何问题上达成一致。仅一天之隔，他们又团结一致的谴责俄罗斯的所作所为，并且采取了一系列的惩罚措施：停止所有欧盟与俄国之间针对新伙伴合作协议的会谈，直到俄罗斯军队完全撤离格鲁吉亚并且回到8月6日以前驻扎的位置。然而自鸣得意的普京和梅德维耶夫似乎并没有受到冲击，实际上他们也自认为取得了外交上的胜利。
Like a chocolate fireguard
形同虚设的对抗
In fact both Europe and Russia have lost. The European response has been weak. No doubt, it was a little tougher than some predicted a week ago, but jump back a month. In early August Mr Putin would not have dared imagine that Russia could invade and partially occupy a neighbour for the first time since the cold war, let alone recognise South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states-and meet such a wobble. It is not just that the partnership talks matter little to the Russians. The Europeans have not even insisted on formal restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity before they start; merely a withdrawal of troops, which Mr Medvedev promised anyway. EU leaders have in effect condoned Russia’s smash and grab.
实际上俄罗斯和欧洲处于两败俱伤的境地：欧洲的反应一直很羸弱，虽然比一周前预测的结果强硬了不少，但是根本无法与一个月前相比。8月初的时候，普京都不敢想象俄罗斯可以在冷战后首次入侵并且部分的占领邻国，更不用说承认南奥塞梯和阿布哈兹的独立；真是世事多变化。现在的问题不仅仅是俄国人不在乎伙伴合作，欧洲人甚至没有在格鲁吉亚开始分裂之前坚持其领土的完整；只是要求俄国人撤军，反正这点梅德维耶夫会答应。欧盟的领导人实际上已经用行动宽恕了俄罗斯的入侵和掠夺。
Thus the second casualty, after wretched Georgia, is the idea of a common European foreign and security policy. This was supposed to be a morally superior combination of the soft power of Europe’s economic attraction (morally superior, of course, to trigger-happier America) with an occasional harder edge only in the lawless bits of the world beyond Europe’s shores. After Georgia’s folly, not even the United States was proposing to take on Russian tanks as they rolled in. Yet how quickly talk of sending EU troops to uphold the ceasefire that Russia was flouting died away. Instead, civilian EU monitors-not even the paramilitary police Europeans claim to be their speciality and who might protect Georgian villagers from South Ossetian militias-may eventually, if Russia agrees, join those from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, a body to which Russia belongs.
倒霉的格鲁吉亚战争之后还有第二个变故：欧洲共同外交安全政策这一理念。按照设计，这一在精神层面上非常出众的政策包含两方面的内容：一个是欧洲经济吸引力的软手腕（精神超众当然是对好战的美国人而言），另一个是在欧洲以外的无序地区使用的铁腕。经过格鲁吉亚的闹剧，美国人也没有表示在俄罗斯坦克入侵时进行打击，更谈不到欧盟军队在俄罗斯违反停火协议后应该以何种速度进驻。甚至号称有专业技能保护格鲁吉亚平民不受南奥塞梯武装人员的袭击的辅助军警也没有出手。在俄罗斯的首肯下，只有欧盟民间观察员会最终加入欧洲的安全合作组织，而俄罗斯也是这个组织的成员之一。
Such a collective Euro-shrug only stores up trouble, since there are other places where Russia enjoys fomenting bother. NATO needs to reassure all its members, including places like Estonia and Latvia with large Russian minorities, that they are protected by the alliance’s mutual defence guarantees. Harder to help will be Ukraine, genuinely divided over whether its closest ties should be with the West or with Russia, and with plenty of ethnic Russians. But the EU can do more to encourage economic reform and the fight against corruption.
欧洲国家的全线退缩只会带来更多的麻烦，因为这样使俄罗斯还可以在别的地方可以享受惹麻烦的快乐。北约组织需要保证所有的成员受到联盟共同防御的保障，包括拥有很多俄罗斯少数民族的爱沙尼亚和拉脱维亚；而保护乌克兰的难度就比较大，区别在于国家和哪边建立最紧密的联系，西方势力还是俄罗斯，以及大量的俄罗斯族人民。不过欧盟确实可以在鼓励经济改革和抗击腐败方面做更多的工作。
In fact the most useful cure for the Eurowobbles over Russia lies not in diplomacy but in Europe’s internal market: liberalising the EU’s energy markets and where possible connecting up its internal supply lines. It makes economic sense and does not involve picking a needless fight with Russia. As long as governments like Germany’s prefer to cut separate deals with Russia, Europe’s inevitable dependence on Russian oil and gas will always offer a tempting way for an opportunistic Kremlin to exert pressure on this country or that, by turning off the taps for “pipeline repairs”. Recent promises that Russia will remain a reliable energy supplier should be viewed warily.
实际上在俄罗斯问题上治疗”欧洲摇摆症”的疗法存在于欧洲的内部市场，而不是外交手段：实现欧洲能源市场自由化，达到自给自足。这不仅有利于经济发展，而且不会引发同俄罗斯之间毫无必要的战争。只要像德国这样的政府愿意结束单独同俄罗斯签署的协议，欧洲必然会摆脱对俄罗斯原油和天然气的依赖；否则这恰恰给投机派的克林姆林宫诱惑来向这个国家施压，比如假借”修理管道”的借口关闭能源阀门。虽然俄罗斯近期保证稳定的提供能源，但是对该承诺必须小心谨慎。
Imperious follies
霸权罪恶
Mr Putin once described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. That is not a view shared by Georgia, Ukraine, the Baltic states or the Central Asian countries that escaped the Soviet empire to win their independence. Yet his aim is to restore Russia as a great power, not to bring back communism as a global ideology. His officials insist that Russia wants more respect, not more territory. Thus, after what many Russians see as years of slights from the West, NATO’s suspension of co-operation has been swatted aside. So has the unprecedented rebuke from Russia’s G8 partners in the world’s premier political club.
普京曾经用”20世纪最大的地理政治灾难”来描述前苏联的解体。但是有些国家却不这样认为，包括格鲁吉亚、乌克兰、波罗的海各国以及因为从苏联帝国中脱逃出来而赢得独立的中亚国家。普京的目标是为了重振俄罗斯的雄风，而不是为了实现共产主义全球化这个理念。他的官员坚持俄罗斯需要的是更多的尊重，而不是更多的领土。因此，很多俄罗斯人经过多年西方的冷眼后，北约组织中断合作的决定已经不被人注意了；在世界各国总理参加的政治俱乐部–八国峰会的时候，对俄罗斯空前的非难同样也被忽视了。
Yet the limits of Russia’s August “victory” are becoming clear. Its erstwhile friend China, struggling to keep a grip on its restive regions, has expressed “concern”. None of Russia’s other friends-bar, belatedly, Belarus and Venezuela-has volunteered support. And while the Georgia adventure may have scared the neighbours, Russia’s support for separatists in South Ossetia and Abkhazia risks emboldening its own would-be breakaway regions, notably in the north Caucasus.
然而俄罗斯八月胜利的局限性越来越清晰：中国对他表现出”关注”，他的昔日好友目前正在努力的管控着动乱的疆土。白俄罗斯和委内瑞拉不是被阻碍了就是来晚了，总之俄罗斯没有任何的朋友主动提供帮助。虽然格鲁吉亚事件对他的邻邦有威慑作用，但是俄罗斯对南奥塞梯和阿布哈兹分离主义者的支持很可能加深他自身的分裂风险，最明显的就是北高加索问题。
Ordinary Russians will bear the cost. Russia’s stockmarket has taken a knock and the costs of doing business there have shot up. Russian companies seeking to invest or list abroad ought now to face the closer scrutiny of their finances that earlier dodgy ones didn’t, but should have. And Mr Medvedev’s supposed plans for reform and strengthening the rule of law are in about the same shape as Georgia’s beaten army.
而买单的却是俄罗斯的普通民众：股票市场受到重创、经营成本飞涨；在海外投资或准备上市的公司目前正面临着更加仔细的财务审查，而以前这是应该做却不用作的环节。梅德维耶夫计划的旨在对法律进行强化的改革也是境况不佳，一如格鲁吉亚被打垮的军队。
But what Russia may come to regret losing most is something Mr Putin longs for: the opportunity to become an accepted European power. He likes to skip over communism’s mistakes and dwell on Russia’s tsarist grandeur. But what did for both was imperial overstretch, a rotten economy and, like Russia’s today, a mostly unaccountable ruling caste that led a proud country to disaster.
然而在所有失去的东西中，俄罗斯最会为之后悔的却是普京最渴望得到的：有机会成为被接受的欧洲大国。他喜欢跳过共产主义的失误，专注于沙皇俄国的伟大辉煌。但是这两个时期的共同点是：权力的过渡延伸、糟糕的经济以及俄罗斯的现状–毫无责任心的管理阶层，他们把令人自豪的国家领入灾难。
译者：Tidehunter http://www.ecocn.org/forum/viewthread.php?tid=13805&extra=page%3D1