[2008.08.23] 经济聚焦：从”失去的十年”中学习

Economics focus
经济聚焦

Lessons from a “lost decade”
从”失去的十年”中学习

Aug 21st 2008
From The Economist print edition

Will America follow Japan into a decade of stagnation?
美国是否会步日本后尘，进入十年停滞？

AS FALLING house prices and tightening credit squeeze America’s economy, some worry that the country may suffer a decade of stagnation, as Japan did after its bubble burst in the early 1990s. Japan’s property bubble was also fuelled by cheap money and financial liberalisation and-just as in America-most people assumed that property prices could not fall nationally. When they did, borrowers defaulted and banks cut their lending. The result was a decade with average growth of less than 1%.
随着美国国内房价的下跌和信贷紧缩的持续加强，一些人开始担心美国可能经历像日本上个世纪90年代早期经济泡沫破灭后那样的十年滞胀。低息贷款和金融自由化加速了日本资产泡沫化，就像现在的美国，大部分人都认为房地产价格不会出现全国性下跌。然而当它发生时，借债人逃债，银行断供。结果就是十年平均不到1%的经济增长率。

Most dismiss the idea that America could suffer the same fate as Japan, but some of the differences are overstated. For example, some claim that Japan’s bubble was much bigger than America’s. Yet average house prices nationwide rose by 90% in America between 2000 and 2006, compared with a gain of 51% in Japan between 1985 and early 1991, when Japanese home prices peaked (see left-hand chart). Prices in Japan’s biggest cities rose faster, but nationwide figures matter more when gauging the impact on the economy. Japanese home prices have since fallen by just over 40%. American prices are already down by 20%, and many economists reckon they could fall by another 10% or more.
大部分人都不太在意这样的观点：美国可能经历像日本一样的命运，但是一些区别被夸大了。例如，一些人认为日本的泡沫要比美国的大很多。然而，从2000年到2006年，全美房屋价格上涨了90%，而日本房价从85年开始到91年初达到顶峰，六年间只上涨了51%（如左表）。日本那些大城市的房价上涨要更快，但是对测定房价对经济影响更重要的则是全国的房价数据。日本房价从高点下落以来跌去仅 40%多，而美国房价已经下跌了20%，并且很多经济学家预计房价还会跌去10%或者更多。

What about commercial property? Again, average prices rose by less in Japan (80%) than in America (90%) over those same periods. Thus Japan’s property boom was, if anything, smaller than America’s. Japan also had a stockmarket bubble, which burst a year earlier than that in property. This hurt banks, because they counted part of their equity holdings in other firms as capital. But its impact on households was modest, because only 30% of the population held shares, compared with over half of Americans.
那么商用物业又如何呢？同样如此，在上述时期内，日本的平均价格上涨了80%，要少于美国的90%。因此如果说日本的房地产泡沫与美国相比有什么区别的话，那就是它要比美国的小。日本在股票市场上同样存在泡沫，它是先于房地产泡沫一年破灭。这使得银行业严重受损，因为银行把在其它公司持有的股份算作资本。但是它对普通人的影响是饿不限的，因为只有30%的日本居民持有股票，而在美国却有一半人以上。

Nor were Japanese policymakers any slower than American ones to cut interest rates and loosen fiscal policy after the bubble burst, contrary to popular misconceptions. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) began to lower interest rates in July 1991, soon after property prices began to decline. The discount rate was cut from 6% to 1.75% by the end of 1993. Two years after American house prices started to slide, the Fed funds rate has fallen from 5.25% to 2% (see right-hand chart). A study by America’s Federal Reserve concluded that Japanese interest rates fell more sharply in the early 1990s than required by the “Taylor rule”, which establishes the appropriate rate using the amount of spare capacity and inflation.
与通常的误解相反，在泡沫破灭后，日本的政策制定者迅速地采取降低利率和宽松的财政政策措施，这一点不比美国慢。房地产价格一开始下降，日本银行就于 1991年7月开始降低利率。到1993年末，日本的贴现率从6%下降到1.75%。而美国在房价下跌两年之后，联邦基金利率从5.25%下降到了2% （如右图）。美联储的研究表明，日本的利率水平在上个世纪90年代早期下降的要比泰勒规则所要求的多很多，泰勒规则是通过闲置生产能力的数量和通胀的情况来确定出适当的利率水平。

Japan also gave its economy a big fiscal boost. The cyclically adjusted budget deficit (which excludes the automatic impact of slower growth on tax revenues) increased by an annual average of 1.8% of GDP in 1992 and 1993-similar to America’s budget boost this year. Japan’s monetary and fiscal stimulus did help to lift the economy. After a recession in 1993-94, GDP was growing at an annual rate of around 2.5% by 1995. But deflation also emerged that year, pushing up real interest rates and increasing the real burden of debt. It was from here on that Japan made its biggest policy mistakes. In 1997 the government raised its consumption tax to try to slim its budget deficit. And with interest rates close to zero, the BoJ insisted that there was nothing more it could do. Only much later did it start to print lots of money.
日本也通过积极的财政政策来促进经济的发展。周期调整预算赤字（它排除了经济缓慢增长对税收收入的自发影响）在92年和93年间平均每年增长约为GDP的1.8%，这点与美国今年的预算增加差不多。日本的货币和财政政策刺激确实有助于日本经济走出泥潭。在经历了93到94年度经济的衰退后，日本2005年GDP增长率达到了2.5%。但是通货紧缩也在那年显现，这推高了实际利率，同时也增加了真实的还贷压力。自此日本在通货紧缩问题上犯下它最大政策错误。1997年，日本政府通过提高消费税来试图减少其财政赤字，并且使利率水平接近于0，日本银行坚信除此之外并无其它可做的。在那很久以后，日本银行开始增发了大量钞票。

America’s inflation rate of above 5% is an advantage. Not only are real interest rates negative, but inflation is also helping to bring the housing market back to fair value with a smaller fall in prices than otherwise. But in another way America is more exposed than Japan was. When its bubble burst in 1991, Japan’s households saved 15% of their income. By 2001 saving had fallen to 5%, which helped to prop up consumer spending. America’s saving rate of close to zero leaves no such cushion.
美国高于5%的通胀率是对自身有利的。在美国不仅实际利率是负的，而且通胀有助于把美国的房地产市场带回到一个公平价值水平，而这仅需要使价格小幅下降。但从另方面讲，美国比日本更危险。在91年经济泡沫破灭后，日本居民将其收入的15%用于储蓄。到2001年时，这个比例已经下降到了5%,这有助于支撑日本消费支出。而美国接近0的储蓄率却不能提供这个缓冲。

The perils of procrastination
拖延的危险

John Makin, at the American Enterprise Institute, a think-tank, argues that monetary and fiscal relief were necessary but not sufficient to revive Japan’s economy. The missing ingredient was a clean-up of the banking system, on which Japanese firms were more dependent than their American counterparts. Japanese banks hid their bad loans beneath opaque corporate structures, and curtailed new lending to profitable businesses. A vicious circle developed, whereby banks’ bad loans depressed growth which then created more bad loans.
一智囊团–美国企业研究所的John Makin认为货币和财政上的调节是必要的，但不足以使日本经济复兴。日本最缺失的要素是银行系统的大清理，这也使日本企业比他们的美国同行更加依赖银行。日本银行把他们的坏账隐藏于不透明的公司治理结构下，并缩减了对那些利润丰厚业务的贷款。一个恶性循环就这样开始了，银行坏账拖累经济增长，而反过来又产生更多坏账。

In another new report Richard Jerram, at Macquarie Securities, concludes that America “will not come close to repeating the experience of Japan”, because its regulatory system, financial markets and political structure will not let it procrastinate for so long. America has a more transparent regulatory structure which presses banks into recognising losses and repairing their balance-sheets-even if regulators were slow to recognise that the banks were shifting risky securitised assets off their balance-sheets in the first place. But Japan’s regulators for a long while were in cahoots with banks over hiding their bad loans.
麦格理证券Richard Jerram的一份新的研究报告表明：美国不会重走日本的老路。因为美国的监管体系、金融市场和政治结构不会像日本拖延的那么久。美国有着更加透明的监管组织，它会迫使银行发现损失并弥补修复资产表–即使监管当局可能会稍晚发现银行将那些有风险的证券资产转移出资产负债表外。而日本的监管者很长一段时间以来则与银行狼狈为奸，共同隐藏坏帐。

Over the past year, American banks have been quicker than those in Japan in the 1990s to disclose and write off losses and raise new capital. In Japan it took a long while before the political will was there to use taxpayers’ money to plug the banking system. A big test for America’s Treasury will be how quickly it recognises the need to nationalise Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the teetering mortgage giants.

在过去的几年，相比上个世纪90年代的日本银行业，美国银行已经很快地批露并核销了那些损失，同时补充了资本金。而在日本，政府很长时间以后才动用纳税人的钱来修补银行体系。对于美国财政部来说最大的考验是需要多长时间才能认识到将那两个摇摇欲坠的住房抵押贷款巨头房利美、房地美国有化的必要性。

One advantage over Japan, says Mr Jerram, is that America is spreading the costs of its housing bust across other countries. Foreigners hold a large slice of American mortgage-backed securities. Sovereign-wealth funds have provided new capital for American banks. And America’s booming exports have helped to support its economy, thanks to the cheap dollar. In contrast, the yen’s sharp appreciation after Japan’s bubble burst hurt exports at the same time as domestic demand was being squeezed.

Jerram先生表示，相对于日本，美国的一个优势是他可以把房地产的损失转移到其它国家。外国人持有大量美国的有抵押贷款证券。国家主权基金也已经为美国银行提供了新的资金。同时美元贬值使得出口商迅速发展，这有助于支持美国经济。相比之下，日本泡沫破灭之后，日元的急剧贬值在导致国内需求萎缩的同时，又严重伤害了出口商。

By learning from Japan’s mistakes, America can avoid a dismal decade. However, it would be arrogant for those in Washington, DC, to assume that Japan’s troubles simply reflected its macroeconomic incompetence. Experience in other countries shows that serious asset-price busts often lead to economic downturns lasting several years. Only a wild optimist would believe that the worst is over in America.

通过吸取日本的教训，美国可以避免一个低落的十年。然而，如果认为日本的经济困境只反映了它宏观经济的无力，那么无疑华盛顿特区那帮人是傲慢的。其它一些国家的经历已经告诉我们：严重的资产价格泡沫经常会导致经济长达几年的低迷。也只有那些疯狂的乐观者才会相信美国最坏的时期已经过去。

译者：jyjnl   http://www.ecocn.org/forum/viewthread.php?tid=13473&extra=page%3D1
对比阅读：http://www.ecocn.org/forum/viewthread.php?tid=13466&extra=page%3D1