Trade talks
贸易谈判
The Doha round…and round…and round
多哈回合，一轮又一轮
Jul 31st 2008
From The Economist print edition
After another failed summit, seven years of trade talks may become nine or ten
又一次峰会无果而终，七年的贸易谈判可能变成九年或者十年
LIKE “watching paint that never dries” is how Sheila Page of the Overseas Development Institute, a London think-tank, describes the experience of following the Doha round of global trade negotiations. Launched in 2001 by the members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the talks seek to cut tariffs and farm subsidies, as well as liberalising trade in services. On July 25th, hopes of an unlikely deal, brokered by Pascal Lamy, the WTO’s relentless director-general, at a summit in Geneva, briefly rose. But on July 29th, after nine days of negotiations, the mix turned gloopy once again.
海外发展研究所（一家伦敦的智囊机构）的Sheila Page 将追踪全球贸易谈判多哈回合的经历描述成”看一幅永远不干的油画”。世贸组织成员在2001年发起多哈回合谈判，旨在削减关税和农业补贴，实现服务贸易自由化。7月25日，日内瓦峰会看到了达成一个似乎不可能的协议的希望，世贸组织总干事Pascal Lamy一直在为此做出不懈地努力。但是在7月29日，经过九天的谈判后，这个希望再次成为泡影。
From the start, the round’s chief ambition was to straighten out some of the kinks in agricultural trade. This ancient activity, which accounts for only 8% of world merchandise trade, is the most heavily distorted by misbegotten policies. It is, therefore, in agriculture that an agreement could do the most good. But it was also in agriculture that the agreement came unstuck.
自始，谈判的主要目标是理顺农业贸易内的不合理因素。农业贸易自古以来即有，如今仅占全球商品贸易的8%，却是被各种保护性政策扭曲得最严重的贸易。因此，在农业领域达成一个协议能够发挥显著作用。但也正是在农业领域，这个协议的达成却失败了。
The failure of this round was rooted in the success of the last. The 1994 Uruguay round, named after its country of launch, required countries to convert their farm quotas and other barriers into straightforward tariffs. Nervous about unanticipated floods of imports, countries were allowed to impose “special safeguard” duties to protect themselves in the event of a surge.
本次谈判的失败源于上次谈判的成功。1994年乌拉圭回合谈判（以发起国的名字命名）要求各成员将其农业配额及其他壁垒转变成直接的关税。由于担心进口的大规模涌入，允许各国征收”特别保护”关税，以在进口大量涌入时保护自身利益。
Intended as a temporary fix, these duties soon became a long-term crutch for politically touchy commodities, such as sugar. Hungary, for example, clung to them for almost five years. Rather than drop these safeguards altogether, the Doha negotiators agreed to reform them, but they could not agree on how to do so. India wanted the right to raise farm tariffs far above agreed ceilings in response to a modest increase in imports. China was equally adamant. It seems to have concluded that the best response to high food prices is to move closer to agricultural autarky than to free trade.
这些关税本来是作为一项临时性的措施，不久后却成为一些政治敏感的大宗商品（比如糖）的长期拐扙。比如，匈牙利就坚持征收这项关税将近五年。多哈回合的谈判者们同意，不完全消除这些保护性措施，而是对此进行改革，但却不能就如何改革达到一致意见。印度希望有权将农业关税提高，远高于已设定的最高关税，以应对其进口的小幅上升。中国也同样的固执。他们似乎已得出结论，认为应对高粮价的最佳手段是更加趋向于农业上的自给自足，而不是自由贸易。
America insisted that its farmers be allowed to sell more produce in countries like China, which buys around 40% of its soyabeans. Otherwise it could not win support for tighter limits on its subsidies.
美国坚持其应向中国等国家销售更多农产品，目前，中国购买大约40%的美国大豆。否则，紧缩其补贴的作法将不会在国内获得支持。
The shadow of the Uruguay round arguably extended beyond this nettlesome detail. Many developing countries believe that the earlier round was lopsided, doing little to constrain the farm policies of the rich world even as it placed heavy obligations on the poor in areas such as intellectual property (IP). In the Doha round, they wanted to get their own back, by asking more of the rich world than they offered in return. As a result, this round was if anything too narrow, not too sprawling. Had IP rights still been on the table, for example, it is harder to imagine rich countries allowing talks to fail on behalf of their farmers.
乌拉圭回合谈判的阴影不止在于这些烦人的细枝末节。许多发展中国家认为，以前的谈判不公平，几乎未能限制富裕国家的农业政策，却要穷国承担沉重的义务，比如知识产权。在多哈回合谈判上，他们想扳回一局，要求富裕国家比他们做出更大努力。结果是，谈判不是面铺得太宽，而是太窄。比如，如果知识产权也列入谈判议程，富国为了其农民的利益，也可能不会让谈判破裂。
And yet fail they did. The deal ministers left on the table was full of loopholes and loose ends. But two economists at the World Bank, Will Martin and Aaditya Mattoo, have tried to size up its rough dimensions (see chart). Their calculations help to quantify what might have been.
然而，谈判却破裂了。各国部长离开了谈判桌，留下一个满怀着漏洞和分歧的结局。世界银行的两名经济学家Will Martin 和 Aaditya Mattoo进行了大概的评估（见图表）。他们的评估有助于量化本可能发生的事情。
The chart shows the proposed cuts in the maximum tariffs countries are allowed to apply (averaged across products, and including various exemptions). In agriculture especially, the cuts seem impressive. But because these negotiated ceilings are so much higher than the tariffs countries actually impose, even quite big cuts can make only a modest difference to trade.
图表显示了各国的最大关税削减幅度（各产品的平均值，包括各种豁免）。特别是在农业领域，削减幅度似乎可观。不过，因为商定的最高关税比各国实际征收的关税额要高很多，因此，即使是大幅削减，对贸易的影响也不大。
In rich countries, for example, the farm tariffs actually imposed would have fallen from 15% on average to 11%, according to the two economists. In India, on the other hand, the average (59%) would not have budged at all. Set against this are some less tangible but still worthwhile boons. By binding tariffs near to the prevailing rate, a Doha agreement would have stopped policies taking a dramatic turn for the worse. South Korea, for example, had farm tariffs averaging just 7% in the 1960s. Some have since reached triple digits.
比如，两位经济学家估计，富国的农业关税可能从15%削减到11%。印度的关税平均值是59%，将不会做出削减。此外，还有一些优惠虽不这么实际，但也值得一看。把关税限制在通行的水平，如果达到多哈协议的话，将能够避免政策出现每况愈下的局面。比如，韩国，上个世纪六十年代的农业关税平均为7%。其中有些关税已升到三位数字。
What about subsidies? Before the breakdown, America had contemplated limiting its trade-distorting subsidies to $14.5 billion. That limit was far more than it actually spent last year, but less than it spent in four of the last seven years, when farm prices were lower. So according to Kimberly Elliott of the Centre for Global Development, a think-tank in Washington, DC, the developing countries had won a modest but not meaningless concession from the world’s most powerful country. Some also believe America would have offered an ambitious cut in its cotton subsidies, which are of particular concern to West African exporters. Africa’s spokesman in Geneva was as disappointed as anyone by the breakdown of the talks.
那么补贴情况如何？谈判破裂前，美国曾打算将其贸易扭曲补贴限制在145亿美元。这个限额比其去年实际发放的补贴额要多得多，但却比过去七年中四个年度的补贴额少，当时农产品的价格还比较低。全球发展中心（华盛顿的一个智囊机构）的Kimberly Elliott说，发展中国家赢得了世界上最强大国家的让步，这个让步虽然不大，但也并不是毫无意义。有些人认为美国提出大幅削减其棉花补贴，西非的出口国尤其关注这一点。谈判破裂令在日内瓦的非洲发言人非常失望。
That disappointment might prove to be corrosive. In the wake of this failure, will the WTO remain useful enough to the big powers to retain their support and patronage? Will Mr Lamy himself stay beyond his four-year term, which ends in September 2009? Without his dogged persistence, the Geneva summit might never have taken place and would certainly have ended four days (and sleepless nights) earlier. Some exhausted negotiators might count that a jolly good thing. But according to Pascal’s wager, a director-general who keeps faith in the round has little to lose. One without faith is sure to fail.
这种失望情绪可能具有腐蚀性。谈判破裂后，对大国来说，世贸组织是否还有用？这些大国是否还会支持并赞助这个组织？ Lamy先生四年期满（2009年9月）后是否能连任？如果没有Lamy先生的积极斡旋，日内瓦峰会可能都不会召开，即使召开也会提前四天（及四个不眠之夜）结束。有些筋疲力尽的谈判者可能认为这是一件好事。但按照Pascal的说法，一位对谈判充满信心的总干事总不会失败，而缺乏信心将注定失败。
译者：王乙任 http://www.ecocn.org/forum/viewthread.php?tid=13068&extra=page%3D1