[2008.01.31]China’s fear of inflation闻“胀”色变

China’s fear of inflation
闻“胀”色变
Jan  31st 2008
From the Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire

Efforts to cool the economy may undo crucial reforms进退维谷！

Faced with rising consumer prices and signs of runaway growth, the Chinese Communist Party in November issued a strongly worded statement vowing to stem inflation and slow investment. At the time market players paid scant attention to it. But as the State Council’s increasingly stringent policies show no signs of letting up even in the face of global financial turmoil, players in China’s property and equity markets are at last waking up to the harsher reality. In recent weeks both housing and stock prices have started to retreat from their irrationally exuberant highs. Chinese policymakers, however, should be careful of what they wish for. Falling asset prices could bring back an old problem that many thought had been conquered: bad debts in the banking system. Meanwhile, inflation is reviving throwback elements of state economic planning.
面对不断攀升的物价水平和增长失控的迹象，中国政府于去年11月份发布了一份措辞“强硬”的通告，指出务必要抑制通货膨胀，防止投资过热。当时，市场并没有太过在意。不过，随着国务院再三从紧（即使面临全球性金融恐慌时也未见松动）的政策，中国房地产和证券市场终于觉醒。近几周，中国的房价和股价已开始从“非理性繁荣”向合理区间调整。不过，中国的当局者还应该小心谨慎。资产价格下跌说不好会让许多人认为业已医好的旧病―银行系统呆坏账―复发。同时，通货膨胀也正在“抵消”中央的经济政策。

Deflating housing prices was not an explicit goal of the party’s November statement. But Chinese leaders were clearly worried about the froth in the market. For five years housing prices enjoyed average annual growth of more than 5% nationally, according to Liu Shiyu, a deputy governor of China’s central bank. In 2007 the pace picked up even more, with prices rising 10% year on year through October. There were other unwelcome trends. For example, in December Mr Liu revealed that nearly 80% of new housing investment in the first ten months of 2007 went into units bigger than 90 sq metres. These flats are well beyond the means of most ordinary Chinese households. So why were developers building them? The obvious answer was that they were focusing on “investment grade” luxury housing targeted at speculators.

虽然在11月份的工作会议上没有明确要紧缩房价，但中国的领导人对市场泡沫是担心无疑的。据央行副行长刘士余透露，从全国范围来看，近五年，房价年均上涨超过5%。而去年，增速加快，前十个月就达到了10%。此外，还有一些不良的迹象。譬如说，去年12月份，刘士余发现，前10个月新增住宅投资总额中有近80%流向面积大于90平方米的户型。这些户型绝对超过了普通中国家庭的承受能力。但开发商为什么还乐此不疲呢？原因很明显：他们的客户是投资高档公寓的“炒房一族”。

To cool the property market, the government began tightening on all fronts. It raised both interest rates and banks’ reserve requirements. It also stiffened administrative controls. In December the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) declared that the large state-owned banks’ lending in 2008 could not exceed the total amount they lent in 2007. In fact, in the case of Bank of China, it was told to extend Rmb20bn (US$2.8bn) less in loans than it did in 2007. For borrowers, authorities imposed higher down-payment requirements. At the same time, the central government and local governments of major cities rolled out aggressive plans to provide various grades of subsidised housing at below average market prices. A new regulation also required property developers to pay fully for leased land before obtaining the deed. The central government sent roving inspection teams to make sure local officials were implementing its myriad decrees.
为了给房地产市场降温，政府可谓多管齐下。央行一方面提高了利率，另一方面提高了准备金率，还加紧了行政控制。去年12月份，中国银监会做出规定，大型国有银行2008年的贷款总额不得超过2007年。仅中国银行一家就需要比去年少放贷200亿元。对于贷款者来说，相关部门提高了首付比重。同时，中央政府与重点城市的地方政府则出台了惠民政策，以低于市场的价格为百姓提供不同档次的廉租房（补价房）。另外，新近颁布的政策规定，开发商在开发之前需全额缴纳批租土地的租金。中央还派出流动监察组，以确保政策实施到位。

These measures are having a noticeable impact. National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) figures on housing prices in December revealed tepid month-on-month growth for much of the country and a decline in formerly hot markets such as Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Wenzhou. As the number of transactions has dwindled, prices in the key markets of Shanghai and Beijing have also stagnated. Investors are now holding their breath to see if these two bellwether cities will witness drops in property prices.
这些措施收效明显。据国家发展改革委员会调查显示，去年12月份，全国大多数城市的房价月环比小幅微量上涨，而从前热得发烫的广州、深圳和温州则出现下跌。随着交易量下降，一线市场如北京和上海的房价也开始下挫。现在，投资者全都屏住了呼吸，静观这两座前导性城市的房价是否会跳水。

 Victims of their own success因福得祸？
Chinese policymakers are, in a way, victims of their own success. During the past few years China has enjoyed record current-account surpluses, which have allowed the central government to use ballooning foreign-exchange reserves to recapitalise sickly state-owned banks. Flush with cash, the banks have fuelled spectacular rallies in both property and stocks, which have sent even the prices of their own newly listed shares into the stratosphere.
中国的当局者可谓因福得祸。过去几年，中国的经常账户盈余屡创新高，中央政府得以利用日渐庞大的外汇储备注资病入膏肓的国有银行。资金洪流倾泻而出的过程中，银行点燃了楼市和股市热情，甚至将自己新发的股票价格也吹上了天。In heated competition with each other to lend money, banks have flouted both basic risk-management practices and government regulations. They looked the other way when borrowers did not have all the paperwork. Since September buyers have had to make a 40% down payment for a second mortgage. But most banks interpreted the rule as applying only to individuals, and not to households. Thus, a large number of borrowers simply had their spouses or children take out mortgages and kept speculating in the property market. In other instances, CBRC officials discovered that local bank branches accepted false documentation showing proper down payments where none existed. Such lax lending has led to a Rmb1trn increase in housing loans in the first ten months of 2007, or nearly one-third of all new bank loans made during that period. Bank regulators have publicly raised alarm about these highly leveraged mortgages, which look uncomfortably like their sub-prime counterparts in the US.
在如火如荼的“放贷比赛”中，银行早已将风险管理和政府规定置之脑后。即使贷款者手续不齐，银行还是能够将款放出去。去年9月份，中央出台文件，规定购买第二套住宅需缴纳40%的首付。但是，大多数银行将这一政策“错误”地解读为只针对个人购房者，而非针对家庭。这样一来，大批贷款者“委托”自己的配偶或是子女，以家庭的名义到银行拿到更多的贷款，继续在房地产市场中翻云覆雨。另外，银监会还发现，银行的地方支行对虚假的首付证明视而不见。如此宽松的环境使得住房贷款在去年前十个月中便激增1万亿元，占同期新增贷款总额的三分之一。监管者早已提醒业内，要高度警惕这些极具杠杆效应的住房贷款，避免重蹈美国次级房贷的覆辙。 On the stockmarket front, the CBRC has long-standing regulations forbidding the purchase of shares with bank loans. In reality, though, it is all but impossible to enforce how the money is spent once it leaves bank vaults. And in the great Chinese bull market of 2007, it did not really matter anyway because most people were making a killing on stocks and promptly repaying their loans. Indeed, Chinese banks were indulging their own speculative urges by investing in junk US mortgage-backed securities.
尽管银监会三令五申，严禁用银行贷款购买股票，然而，现实情况却是，贷款一出，驷马难追。在2007年的大牛市里，多数人都能轻易捞上一笔，随后马上还贷，因此，违反规章制度似乎无足轻重。通过投资美国的垃圾按揭证券（住房抵押贷款证券），中国的银行向世人彰显着自己的投资冲动。As the sub-prime crisis deepens in the US, the Chinese euphoria is beginning to evaporate. Bank of China,one of the country’s largest commercial banks, recently admitted that it would need to write off a substantial amount of its investment in US sub-prime mortgages. Although the evidence is far from conclusive, a senior CBRC official admitted at a meeting in mid-January that non-performing loans (NPLs) were showing initial signs of reversing their decline of recent years.
随着美国次贷危机加剧，中国人的幸福愉悦感正在灰飞烟灭。近日，中国最大的商业银行之一中国银行承认正在考虑冲销一笔数额巨大的美国次级房贷投资。银监会的一位高级官员在1月中的一次会议上坦言，尽管证据尚不明晰，银行业逐年下降的呆坏账问题大有死灰复燃之势。Should China’s housing and share prices follow a sustained downward trajectory, a serious NPL problem would no doubt rear its ugly head again. To be sure, China does not seem in danger of plunging into a bank-liquidity crisis. Unlike many developing countries that have suffered such financial emergencies in the past, China has more than enough bank reserves and foreign exchange to thwart a similar fate. Still, a sudden spike in NPL ratios would reveal to the world that China’s economic reform is far from complete. It would show that, despite their record market valuations, Chinese banks are not in much better shape than their Western counterparts.
如果楼市和股市持续下挫，曾经极为严重的不良资产问题无疑会卷土重来。但可以肯定的是，中国倒不会陷入流动性危机，因为，与其它经历过金融灾难的发展中国家不同，中国拥有超乎想象的银行存款和外汇，足以应对类似的挑战。不良资产率突然提高，一方面说明，中国的经济改革还远未结束，另一方面说明，即便拥有创纪录的市值，中国的银行和西方的银行也是同病相怜。