[2008.12.20] 经济聚焦：格林斯潘署名文章

Economics focus
经济聚焦

Banks need more capital
银行资本，尤显不足[1]

Dec 18th 2008
From The Economist print edition

In a guest article, Alan Greenspan says banks will need much thicker capital cushions than they had before the bust
艾伦·格林斯潘在一篇客串文章中写道，银行所需的资本缓冲将远远高于危机前的水平

Greenspan Associates Alan Greenspan was the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board from 1987 to 2006. He is now president of Greenspan Associates
格林斯潘联合会 艾伦·格林斯潘曾于1987至2006年间担任美国联邦储备委员会主席，现在则是格林斯潘联合会的总裁。

GLOBAL financial intermediation is broken. That intricate and interdependent system directing the world’s saving into productive capital investment was severely weakened in August 2007. The disclosure that highly leveraged financial institutions were holding toxic securitised American subprime mortgages shocked market participants. For a year, banks struggled to respond to investor demands for larger capital cushions. But the effort fell short and in the wake of the Lehman Brothers default on September 15th 2008, the system cracked. Banks, fearful of their own solvency, all but stopped lending. Issuance of corporate bonds, commercial paper and a wide variety of other financial products largely ceased. Credit-financed economic activity was brought to a virtual standstill. The world faced a major financial crisis.

全球金融中介（的链条）业已断裂。作为引导全球储蓄流向生产性资本投资的重要机制，这个错综复杂且紧密相联的系统在2007年8月遭到了严重削弱。对高杠杆运作的金融机构当时正持有有害的美国次级按揭证券化产品的披露，使市场参与者备受震惊。一年以来，银行业努力加强资本缓冲以满足投资者的要求。然而该努力尚显不足。紧跟雷曼兄弟在2008年9月15日破产之后，整个系统陷入了瘫痪。由于担心其自身的偿付能力，银行几乎停止了信贷活动。企业债券，商业票据以及种种其他金融产品的发行亦大面积终止。依靠信贷融资的经济活动被带入了一个实质上的停滞状态。整个世界所面对的，是一场重大的金融危机。

For decades, holders of the liabilities of banks in the United States had felt secure with the protection of a modest equity-capital cushion, allowing banks to lend freely. As recently as the summer of 2006, with average book capital at 10%, a federal agency noted that “more than 99% of all insured institutions met or exceeded the requirements of the highest regulatory capital standards.”

几十年来，仰赖适度的股本缓冲的保护，美国各银行的债权人大有高枕无忧之感，从而放任了银行的信贷活动。近至2006年夏，鉴于（平均占资产）10%的账面资本，一家联邦机构评论道，”超过99%的入险机构达到或者超过了最高的资本监管要求。”

Today, fearful investors clearly require a far larger capital cushion to lend, unsecured, to any financial intermediary. When bank book capital finally adjusts to current market imperatives, it may well reach its highest levels in 75 years, at least temporarily (see chart). It is not a stretch to infer that these heightened levels will be the basis of a new regulatory system.

今天，在无担保地借钱给任何一家金融中介的时候，忐忑不安的投资者所明确地要求的，是一个远高得多的资本缓冲水平。如果银行的账面资本最终调整到现行的市场要求，它或将–至少是暂时的（见图）–达到75年来的最高水平。不难推断，这个上升的水平将成为新监管体系的基础。

The three-month LIBOR/Overnight Index Swap (OIS) spread, a measure of market perceptions of potential bank insolvency and thus of extra capital needs, rose from a long-standing ten basis points in the summer of 2007 to 90 points by that autumn. Though elevated, the LIBOR/OIS spread appeared range-bound for about a year up to mid-September 2008. The Lehman default, however, drove LIBOR/OIS up markedly. It reached a riveting 364 basis points on October 10th.

3月期伦敦银行间同业拆借利率（LIBOR）对隔夜指数掉期利率（OIS）的价差[2]–一个衡量市场对潜在银行破产亦即额外资本需求预期的指标–仅在07年的夏秋之间，就从一个长期保持的10个基点水平越升至90个基点。虽是有所上升，LIBOR/OIS息差在随后大约一年中的浮动依旧相对稳定。然而，雷曼在9月中旬的倒闭，致使LIBOR/OIS再度飙升。10月10日，它更是达到了戏剧般的364个基点。

The passage by Congress of the $700 billion Troubled Assets Relief Programme (TARP) on October 3rd eased, but did not erase, the post-Lehman surge in LIBOR/OIS. The spread apparently stalled in mid-November and remains worryingly high.

10月3日，价值7000亿美元的”问题资产援救计划”（TARP）在国会的通过减缓了–却没有消除–LIBOR/OIS在后雷曼时期的飙升趋势。利差（大幅）波动在11月中旬明显终止，但水平之高，依然令人担忧。

How much extra capital, both private and sovereign, will investors require of banks and other intermediaries to conclude that they are not at significant risk in holding financial institutions’ deposits or debt, a precondition to solving the crisis?

那么作为解决这场危机的前提条件，投资者究竟需要银行和其他金融机构增持多少资本–无论是私人的还是政府的–才能使他们确信持有金融机构的存款或负债不会处于巨大的风险之下呢？

The insertion, last month, of $250 billion of equity into American banks through TARP (a two-percentage-point addition to capital-asset ratios) halved the post-Lehman surge of the LIBOR/OIS spread. Assuming modest further write-offs, simple linear extrapolation would suggest that another $250 billion would bring the spread back to near its pre-crisis norm. This arithmetic would imply that investors now require 14% capital rather than the 10% of mid-2006. Such linear calculations, of course, can only be very rough approximations. But recent data do suggest that, while helpful, the Treasury’s $250 billion goes only partway towards the levels required to support renewed lending.

上月通过TARP对美国银行业2500亿美元的股本注入（为资本资产比率增添了两个百分点）促使后雷曼时期飙升的LIBOR/OIS利差回落了一半。假定进一步的适当勾销，简单的线性推断表明：要把该利差带回到接近危机前的水平，仍需2500亿美元。该计算意味着投资者现在所要求的资本比率是14%，而不是2006年中的10%。当然，这样的线性推算只能提供粗略参考。不过最近的数据的确表明：，财政部的这2500亿美元尽管有所助益，却远未达到足以支持重启信贷活动所要求的水平。

Government credit has in effect acted as counterparty to a large segment of the financial intermediary system. But for reasons that go beyond the scope of this note, I strongly believe that the use of government credit must be temporary. What, then, will be the source of the new private capital that allows sovereign lending to be withdrawn? Eventually, the most credible source is a partial restoration of the $30 trillion of global stockmarket value wiped out this year, which would enable banks to raise the needed equity. Markets are being suppressed by a degree of fear not experienced since the early 20th century (1907 and 1932 come to mind). Human nature being what it is, we can count on a market reversal, hopefully, within six months to a year. Click here to find out more!

政府信贷实际上扮演着一个与大部分金融中介系统相对等的角色。但是由于一些超出了本文讨论范围的原因，我确信利用政府信贷必然是暂时性的。那么，允许政府贷款最终撤出的新的私人资本将来自何处呢？归根结底，最可靠的来源是今年彻底蒸发了30万亿美元的全球股票市值的部分回升，他将使银行能够筹集所需资本。压抑市场的恐慌情绪达到了20世纪初以来的最高水平（1907与1932浮现脑中）。人性使然，我们可以指望市场在未来的6个月到一年中重新复苏。但愿如此！

Though capital gains cannot finance physical investment, they can replenish balance-sheets. This can best be seen in the context of the consolidated balance-sheet of the world economy. All debt and derivative claims are offset in global accounting consolidation, but capital is not. This leaves the market value of the world’s real physical and intellectual assets reflected as capital. Obviously, higher global stock prices will enlarge the pool of equity that can facilitate the recapitalisation of financial institutions. Lower stock prices can impede the process. A higher level of equity, of course, makes it easier to issue debt.

尽管资本利得无法对实体投资提供资金，他们却可以补充资产负债表。在一个合并全球经济的资产负债表的背景下，这点尤为突出。所有对债务与衍生品的求偿权都会在全球的帐务合并中被一一抵消，但资本却不会[3]。这留下了与资本相对应的全球实际有形与无形资产的市场价值（这使得全球实际有形与无形资产的市场价值得以与（自有）资本相对应）。显然，全球股票价格的上升会扩大权益积累，而后者将会减轻金融机构资本重组的困难。股票价格的下降则会妨碍这一过程。当然，权益水平的上升会使发债变得相对容易。

Another critical price for the return of global financial stability is that of American homes. Those prices are likely to stabilise next year and with them the levels of home equity-the ultimate collateral for global holdings of American mortgage-backed securities, some toxic. Home-price stabilisation will help clarify the market value of financial institutions’ assets and therefore more closely equate the size of their book capital with the realities of market pricing. That should help stabilise their stock prices. The eventual partial recovery of global equities, as fear inevitably dissipates, should do the rest. Temporary public capital injections into banks would facilitate this process and arguably provide far more benefit per dollar than conventional fiscal stimulus.

另外一个对于恢复全球金融稳定至关重要的价格指标是美国的房价。这些价格很可能在明年趋于稳定，房屋净值[4]–全球持有美国按揭支持证券的最终抵押品（一些是有害的）–亦会随之平稳。房价稳定将有助于使金融机构所持资产的市场价格更加明朗，并因此使其账面资本的规模更接近于市场定价的现实状况。这将有助于稳定他们的股票价格。随着恐惧的必然消失，全球股价最终的部分回升会解决剩下的问题。政府资本对银行业的暂时性注入将对该过程的顺利进行有所助益；比起传统的财政刺激，它可能还会提供更多回报。

Even before the market linkages among banks, other financial institutions and non-financial businesses are fully re-established, we will need to start unwinding the massive sovereign credit and guarantees put in place during the crisis, now estimated at $7 trillion. The economics of such a course are fairly clear. The politics of draining off that much credit support in a timely way is quite another matter.

甚至在银行、其他金融机构以及非金融事业之间的市场联系完全恢复之前，我们就必须考虑慢慢撤出那些在危机之中投入的政府贷款与担保–现在估计已经达到7万亿美元。此类考量的经济意义是相当清楚的。而及时撤出大量信贷支持的策略就完全是另一回事了。
For a discussion of this article, see www.economist.com/freeexchange

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[注释]：

[1] 这篇文章翻得很别扭，凸现自己水平低劣。格林斯潘的文章让我想起市场对他老人家的一度评价：”废话大师”–话怎么难懂，怎么讲！

[2] LIBOR/OIS 是格林斯潘十分钟爱的一个指标。隔夜指数掉期(OIS)，是一种将隔夜利率交换成为若干固定利率的利率掉期。它是衡量市场对于中央银行利率预期的指标。国际清算银行在今年3月表示，”在正常的市场情况下”，隔夜指数掉期往往低于Libor(英国银行间同业拆借利率)。Libor往往也是衡量银行融资成本的一个重要指标。看看下面两个图表，对比一下，可以知道他们之间的利差在过去一年发生了怎样的变化。

[3] 熟悉会计的同学知道，集团性企业都要制作合并的财务报表，就是把下面子公司的报表整合在一起。这里将假设整个集团是一家企业，所以子公司与子公司之间的交易产生的负债和债权就会一一抵消–因为你不能成为自己的债主或者欠债人。这里的道理也是一样，把整个世界经济想象成一个大公司。那么里面所有的金融产品的求偿权在合并时就可以抵消，不会对整个蛋糕的大小产生任何影响，资本水平也不会升高。有意思的是，格林斯潘这样等于承认这些金融产品不过是零和游戏，没有任何生产性价值。
[4] 也就是住房价格与相应贷款金额的差额。

译者：弓长贝恩  http://www.ecocn.org/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=16157&extra=&page=1