[2008.12.06] 储蓄：杀鹅取卵

Savings
储蓄

When the golden eggs run out
杀鹅取卵

Dec 4th 2008
From The Economist print edition

A decade of poor returns and the onset of recession are likely to make investors cautious. That would be understandable, but mistaken.
一个投资低回报的时代和突然来临的经济衰退可能使投资者们谨小慎微。可以理解，但却是个大错误。

Illustration by Brett Ryder

IT IS the envelope they dare not open. When this year’s statement from the financial adviser or pension plan lands on the doormat, many people will not want to know the bad news. They would rather put the envelope in a drawer and forget all about it.

这个是大家都不敢拆开的信封。当今年理财顾问和退休金计划的结算单终于出现在门口的垫子上时，大部分人都不会希望知道里面的内容是什么。人们情愿把这个信封锁进抽屉然后当作什么都没发生。

This year has been a disaster for savers. The value of stockmarkets around the world has fallen by almost half and is now about $30 trillion below its peak. The prices of corporate bonds and commercial property have plunged. Anyone who diversified into commodities, hedge funds and private equity has also lost out. Even those shrewd enough to stick their money in a savings account have had to worry about the safety of the banks.

今年对于存钱的人来说是场灾难。全球的股市市值已经缩水了近一半，现在比它最高峰时低了30万亿。公司债券和商业地产的价格一落千丈。把钱组合投资在商品期货，对冲基金和私募股权的人也赔得血本无归。即使那些精明谨慎懂得把自己的钱锁在储蓄帐户的人也一直在担心银行会不会在某天关门溜之大吉。

Worse still, the value of many people’s main source of wealth-their houses-has fallen sharply, as The Economist’s house-price indicators continue to show (see article). On a quarter-on-quarter basis, residential-property prices are dropping in 23 of the 45 countries surveyed by Knight Frank, an estate agent.

更糟糕的是，大多数人财富来源–他们的房子的价值–大幅跳水，详情见本报关于房价指数的文章（见文章）。房地产经济公司Knight Frank的调查表明，按季度环比计算，在全球45个国家中23国的住宅不动产价格持续下降。

The damage will vary from one person to the next, depending on where they have put their money, so figures on pooled portfolios are pretty much the only way of estimating savers’ pain. The Investment Company Institute, the national association of American mutual funds, says the value of assets in such funds was $9.6 trillion at the end of October, $2.4 trillion less than at the end of 2007. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) calculated in October that American pension funds had dropped in value by $2 trillion in the previous 18 months. And these American losses are just a portion of the global whole.

不同的人，取决于投资方式，损失程度也各不相同。因此集成投资工具的统计数字大概是估量储蓄人损失的唯一办法。美国投资公司协 会（The Investment Company Institute）–美国共同基金公司的联盟，证明共同基金到今年10月底为止总值为9万6千亿美元，比2007年底缩水2万4千亿。国会预算办公室（The Congressional Budget Office）计算10月美国退休基金在18个月以来损失了2万亿。而这些美国人的损失也仅是全球的冰山一角而已。

By way of comparison, the Bank of England estimates that $2.8 trillion has been lost in credit-related instruments, the devices that dragged the financial system down in the first place. The blow to savers in pooled investments thus easily exceeds the direct damage to the arcane area of the banking system where the crisis began.

相比较而言，英格兰银行估计已经有2万8千亿美元损失在与借贷相关的金融产品身上，这些产品正是把整个金融系统拖入深渊的始作俑者。储蓄者投资金融产品组合中遭受的打击因此轻而易举的超越了银行系统核心业务遭受的直接损失–危机开始的地方。

Indeed, the stockmarket’s decline this year has been so steep that it has erased all the gains made in the rally from 2003 to 2007. In late November, the S&P 500 index dipped to its lowest level in 11 years. The extravagant claims made for equities in the late 1990s, when there was talk of the Dow Jones Industrial Average hitting 36,000 (or even 100,000) have proven to be hollow. Lately the Dow, which was at about 13,000 at the end of last year, has been trading between 8,000 and 9,000.

实际上，今年股市的损失之惨烈，直接导致2003年至2007年这 4年间的积累付之东流。11月末，S&P500 指数触到11年来的最低点。九十年代末关于股票价格的夸夸之谈–其中不乏吹捧道琼斯指数挑穿36000点（甚至100，000点）的妄言–最终证明不过是黄粱一梦罢了。最近的道指，去年底还有13000点左右，一直在八九千点附近摇摆。

A good deal of these losses will have fallen on the very wealthy, who can cope. Many others, though, are not so well placed. And one class of investor will be especially badly hit: workers in defined-contribution, or money-purchase, pension schemes. These people’s retirement income depends solely on the return generated by their pension funds; their employers are not liable to top up their pots if things go wrong. And the CBO reckons that defined-contribution plans are more exposed to equities than final-salary plans, in which the employer bears the risk.

这些损失将会落一些大富豪头上，但是他们有能力处理。然而，其他许许多多损失惨重的人就没有这个福气，能淡然处之了。而有一类投资者将受到特别严重的打击：参与养老金固定缴费计划（注1），基金购买计划（注2）和各种退休金计划的工人们。这些人将来的退休收入完全系于他们养老基金的收益；如果那些出了问题，他们的老板可不负责向他们钱包里补钱。CBO认为养老金固定缴费计划，相对雇主承担风险最终薪金计划（注3）而言，更加直接的暴露在股市的风险动荡之下。

A possible consequence of this is that workers will feel frustrated or let down, and thus be discouraged from saving for their old age-or at least from buying shares for the purpose. They were told that saving would pay in the long run. But those who have been methodically putting money into pension plans (often known in America as 401(k) schemes) must be wondering why they bothered.

由此而生的一个非常可能的后果是工人们会感到沮丧和失望，于是乎不愿意存钱防老–或者不愿意为这个目标投资。别人告诉他们储蓄是百年大计。但是那些一直在有计划的向养老金计划（在美国通常是401K计划）里存钱的人一定会很奇怪为什么自己也深受影响。

Figures from Morningstar, an investment-research firm, show that an American who put $100 a month for the past ten years into the average equity fund would have accumulated just $10,932-$1,068 less than he invested (see chart 1). Even a balanced fund (one that mixes government bonds and equities) would have lost money. A European who invested a flat amount every month for the past decade would have lost almost 25% of his money, according to Lipper, another research firm.

投资调研公司晨星（Morningstar）的数据表明过去10年如果一个普通美国人每个月拿出100美元放进股市最后将会拿回10932美元– 比投资 总数还亏损1068美元（见表1）。即使把钱放进平衡基金(国债和股票的混合体)也是亏钱。根据另外一家研究公司理柏( Lipper )的数据，对于欧洲人而言，如果在过去10年每个月投资同样的数目最后可能已经亏掉几乎四分之一之多。（上图依次是股票基金，混合基金，床底下，国债）

It is hard to get individuals to defer gratification: retirement seems a long way off for someone in their 20s or 30s. So, faced with the returns from past thrift, the temptation for many will be to opt out of the system altogether. Already, the American Association of Retired People estimates that 37% of workers lack a pension plan.

让人们推迟享乐确实很难：退休对于二三十岁的年轻人来说遥遥无期。所以，面对靠节衣缩食抠出养老钱的苦楚，很多人无法抵御今朝有酒今朝醉的诱惑。实际上， 美国退休人士协会（American Association of Retired People）估计37%的劳动者缺乏一个退休计划。

Spend, spend, spend
花，花，花

For a decade or more, American households in particular have seen little need to save out of income at all (see chart 2). The household savings ratio (the proportion of disposable income that is not spent) has been below 2.5% since 1999. Asset markets-first for shares, then for housing-were doing households’ saving for them.

最近十几年来，特别是美国的家庭几乎不需要把自家收入储蓄起来（见表2）。自1999年以来，家庭储蓄率（未支出的可支配收入的比例）一直低于2.5%。资产市场–首先是股票，之后是房地产–实际上在帮助普通家庭做储蓄。

Calculating the savings ratio is an inexact business, because it is the residual between measures of income and consumption and so tends to be revised a good deal. It also excludes capital gains on existing investments, although the taxes on those gains are deducted from the income measure. You might imagine that a low ratio was nothing to worry about: add in capital gains-the savings a rising asset market bestows-and the ratio looks healthier.

人们无法精确的计算储蓄率，因为它是计算收入和消费之间的剩余产品，所以需要大幅度的修改。而且它也把从投资上得到的资本收益排除在外，虽然这些收益带来的税额已经在计算收入时被扣除了。你可能认为一个比较低的比率无需大惊小怪：把资本利得（注5）加进去–资本牛市带来的储蓄–这样这个比率看起来就漂亮多了。

Some economists accepted this argument. A paper from the American government’s Bureau of Economic Analysis in 2002 argued that capital gains “can be as important as personal saving in determining the future consumption possibilities of households” and pointed out that the ratio of household wealth to income had rocketed in the late 1990s.

一部分经济学家认同这种说法。美国政府经济分析局（Bureau of Economic Analysis）的一篇报告认为资本利得”与个人储蓄在决定未来消费可能性上是同等重要的”而且指出九十年代末家庭财富收入比率增长迅猛。

But should this really have been reassuring? Financial assets are simply a claim on goods and services. If their value rises a lot faster than GDP, that either suggests investors expect the GDP growth rate to rise substantially (unlikely in a mature economy), or that the assets are overvalued.

但是这样真的就让人高枕无忧么？金融资产简言之即对产品和服务的求偿权。如果它们升值的速度比GDP快很多，或者意味着投资人预期GDP增长率将显著提高(发生在成熟的经济体的可能性极低)，或者意味着这些资产被定价过高。

Similarly, if people borrow to buy houses, the immediate effect will be to push prices up higher and make personal balance-sheets look healthy. But as the past couple of years have demonstrated, that can push prices too far, prompting consumers to overextend themselves. As the economy deleverages-ie, borrowers are obliged to repay debt-balance-sheets then deteriorate sharply.

相似的，如果人们举债买入房产，直接的影响将会是推高房价从而使个人财务状况看起来很健康。但是过去几年证明，价格已被推离实际太远，这导致消费者盲目无节制的做超越自身能力的投资决定。当经济的杠杆效应减小时（注6）–例如，借贷人被要求清还债务时–财务状况将会严重恶化。

All this looks particularly pertinent today. Americans and Britons may have been living in a fool’s paradise for a decade, saving less than they should because they thought share and house prices would stay high for ever. Now they have learnt the awful truth, they may decide to save a lot more, making the recession even worse than expected. Economists at Lombard Street Research estimate that the American savings ratio, which turned negative in one quarter of 2005 (ie, consumers spent more than their incomes), may rise to 10% over the next year and a half.

今天看来这点恰好正中要害。美国人和英国人可能近十多年来一直住在自欺欺人的乌托邦里面，他们不太存钱因为大家都觉得股市和房价永远只涨不跌。现在他们已 经见识到惨痛的现实，他们于是决定要多存些很多钱，这将使经济衰退的幅度比预期更糟。伦敦朗伯德街研究公司(Lombard Street Research)的经济学家估算2005年某一极度为负值（即消费者花钱比赚钱多）的美国储蓄率有可能在下个一年半内达到10%。

Changes in the savings ratio are driven as much by borrowing as by saving habits. The ratio is a net figure. Many consumers spend more than they earn, borrowing or dipping into savings to make up the difference. Indeed, David Owen, an economist at Dresdner Kleinwort, an investment bank, points out that during this decade British households have generally saved more of their income than German households have. But they have borrowed more too: so much more that their savings ratio is much lower than the Germans’.

储蓄习惯对储蓄率变化的驱动力与借贷是相同的。储蓄率的比值是净数值。很多消费者入不敷出，需要靠举债和动用积蓄来填沟。实际上，投行德累斯顿-克莱沃特( Dresdner Kleinwort )经济学家David Owen指出这十年中英国家庭通常比德国家庭从收入中拿出更多钱存起来。但是他们借得更多：以至于他们的储蓄率比德国人的低很多。

If the savings ratio is going to jump, it is most likely to be driven by the reluctance or inability of consumers to borrow. That was what happened in Britain in the recession of the early 1990s. According to Capital Economics, a research firm, borrowing (including mortgage equity withdrawal) fell by nearly £22 billion ($38 billion) between 1988 and 1992; conventional saving rose by just £14 billion in the same period.

如果储蓄率骤增，最大的原因是消费者不愿意或者没有能力借贷。九十年代初期的英国经济衰退时曾发生过这样的事情。根据研究机构Capital Economics称，在1988到1992年间，借贷（包括抵押股票赎回）下降了近220亿英镑（380亿美元）；而传统意义上的储蓄同期仅增长140 亿英镑。

Many economists might regard a marked increase in saving as a bad thing just now. With rich economies all around the world in recession, governments would rather people spent, not saved. That will not happen without a push-when workers are worried about the outlook for their jobs, they usually save more if they can. The same tends to be true when their existing wealth, including their houses, falls in value. So governments are loosening fiscal policies to try and maintain spending power.

很多经济学家会把目前储蓄的明显增长认为具有负面效应。随着世界范围的发达经济体陷入衰退，政府更愿意人们消费，而不是储蓄。但是没有外在的推动力这样的事情很难发生–当员工们为自己的工作前景忧虑的时候，他们通常尽量存钱。当他们手头的财产，包括房子贬值的时候尤其如是。所以政府正在放松财政政策并且竭力保持消费力。

Recklessly conservative
因噎废食

That said, saving could be good news for companies. In the long term, saving gives companies the funds to invest in new equipment and in research and development. In the short term, companies would be grateful for any equity capital they could raise from retail investors, so they could bolster their balance-sheets.

一般认为，储蓄对公司方面是利好消息。长期看，储蓄给公司增加了用于投资新设备和研究发展的资金。短期看，公司会为从散户那里筹集的股票资产感到欣慰，所以他们可以强化他们的资产负债表。

Alas, that looks unlikely. The problem is that investors do not regard financial assets as they do other goods; lower prices do not encourage them to buy more, but simply reduce their confidence. Past returns are the main determinant of flows into the stockmarket; investors buy when prices have gone up, not down.

唉，可惜上面的事情不太可能发生。问题在于投资人并不把金融资产当作其他产品一样对待；他们并不逢股价低廉而买进，股市低迷只会打击信心。历史回报率是股市资金流向主要决定因素；投资人追捧高价而不问低价。

Net retail sales of British mutual funds were £14.1 billion in 1999 and £17.7 billion in 2000, the two years at the peak of the dotcom bubble. Investors were happy to pay price-earnings ratios of 20 or 30 for the market, and more than 100 for some technology stocks. By 2003, the FTSE 100 index had fallen by more than half; net retail sales of mutual funds were only £8.1 billion. In the first ten months of this year, which have seen price-earnings ratios fall into single digits, net sales have slumped to just £1.3 billion.

英国共同基金的净销售额在1999年是141亿英镑和2000年的177亿，恰逢互联网泡沫顶峰的两年。投资者乐于为市盈率20或者30，和一些高达 100的科技公司大掏腰包。到了2003年，英国金融时报指数（FTSE 100 index）大跌过半；而共同基金的净销售额仅为81亿镑。那一年的头十个月，市盈率曾经跌进个位数字，净销售额跳水至仅仅13亿镑。

British investors have been relatively stoic. In America, equity mutual funds saw net outflows of $195 billion in the first ten months of the year. In some European countries, the picture is a lot worse. According to Huw Van Steenis, an analyst at Morgan Stanley, the annualised pace of mutual fund outflows in Italy and Spain this year has been 24% and 26% respectively. Across Europe as a whole, about $200 billion has been withdrawn from mutual funds in the past 12 months.

英国的投资人还能表现的相对坚韧克制。在美国，股权共同基金在当年的前十个月见证了1950亿美元的资金外流。在一些欧洲国家，状况更惨不忍睹。根据摩根 斯坦利分析师Huw van Steenis所说，按年折算的共同基金资本外流增速，在意大利和西班牙分别为24%和26%。欧洲作为整体，在过去一年内有近2000亿美元从共同基金里被取走。

Indeed, continental European savers’ appetite for equities never recovered from the bursting of the dotcom bubble. A shareholder culture was being created in the late 1990s, thanks to privatisations and the creation of the German rival to the NASDAQ, the Neuer Markt, which collapsed spectacularly after the dotcom bust. But now investors want only the safest kind of mutual fund. European money-market funds received euro 95 billion ($120 billion) of inflows in the first nine months of the year, according to Morgan Stanley.

实际上，欧洲大陆的储蓄者对于股票的胃口迟迟未从互联网泡沫破裂后恢复过来。在90年代末期产生了一股投资股市的风气，需要感激私有化和与纳斯达克（nasdaq）同样风格的德国的新市场（Neuer Markt），后者在泡沫破裂后就惨烈的倒闭了。但是现在投资这只想要最可靠的共同基金。摩根斯坦利称今年前9个月，欧洲货币市场基金净流入950亿欧元（合1200亿美元）。

A focus on cash has its advantages. In the short term, the banks themselves will be very glad of a flood of retail deposits: that will leave them less dependent on jittery wholesale markets. And politicians will also be happy if cautious investors are willing buyers of government debt; many countries are moving into heavy deficit in the face of the recession.

把精力放在现金上有一定益处。短期看，银行自身会为大笔的个人存款大量流入而不亦乐乎：这将降低他们对批发融资的依赖性。而且政客们会因为胆小的投资者愿意为政府欠债买单而欢欣雀跃；很多国家在衰退当前正亦步亦趋的进入严重赤字时代。

But it does not look helpful to companies. If they want to raise equity, who will buy it? Not the big corporate pension funds, which have been moving into bonds and alternative assets (like property) in recent years. And not the hedge funds, which are being forced to sell assets to return money to clients.

但是现金对公司而言帮助甚微。如果他们希望增发股票集资，谁掏钱呢？不是大公司的养老基金，在近些年他们已经移情别恋，更钟情债券和另类资产（比如不动产）。也不是对冲基金，他们需要卖掉手里的资产应对临客户提款的压力。

Nor is it good, in the long run, for savers. Cash generates very low long-term real returns, of around 1% a year. Roger Urwin of Watson Wyatt, a firm of consultants, describes an overconcentration on cash as “reckless conservatism”.

对于普通储户而言，长远看也不是好事。现金的长期真实回报率超低，大约1%一年。咨询公司华信惠悦（Watson Wyatt）的Roger Urwin把这种现金的过度集中形容为”不计后果的保守主义”。

Even low interest rates may not put them off. Having become used to (nominal) rates of 4-6% in recent years, savers may initially suffer from “sticker shock” if rates fall to 1% or so, as they already have in America and may well do in Europe. But the example of Japan suggests that nervous savers may be happy to receive nothing at all from their accounts if they think that is the only safe option: the return of capital becomes more important than the return on it.

即使低利率也无法拖延这种潮流的发展。对于渐渐习惯了近年来（名义）利率在4%-6%左右的储户而言，他们在见到利率跌至1%时，可能会感到阵阵的 “贴纸休克”（注7）。这个情况在美国已经发生了，欧洲也相差不远。但是日本的先例已经证明了一件事，当心里没底的储户们认为把现金存进银行是唯一安全的时候，他们即使什么利息都不赚心里也特别高兴：资金是否能有回报比资金是否有回报重要的多。

What investors may be missing to their cost is that financial markets tend to revert to the mean. On the one hand, high past returns are an indicator of low future returns: that has certainly proved true for those who bought equity mutual funds at the turn of the decade. On the other hand, the converse is also true: low past returns (and low valuations) create an opportunity for the stout-hearted investor.

投资者可能忽视的事情是金融市场总趋向回归平均指数。一方面，过去的高回报率是未来低回报的指标：对于那些在这十年交替中购买股权共同基金的人们而言，这点已经证明是真理了。另一方面，反之亦真：过去的低回报（低估价）为铁了心的股市勇者们创造了一个淘真金的良机。

James Montier, a strategist at Société Générale, a French bank, has calculated that when American shares have traded on a low cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio (a measure that smooths profits over the previous ten years), returns over the next decade have averaged 8% a year in real terms. When the initial valuation was high, the subsequent average was just 3%.

法国兴业银行(Societe Generale) 的策略师James Montier计算出当美国的股票在较低的周期性调整市盈率，（一个衡量过去十年平均收益的指标），后面十年实际的年收益平均为8%。当初始估值偏高的时候，随后的收益平均值仅为3%。

Risky assets look more attractive now than they have in ages. Corporate-bond spreads are sufficient to compensate for the kind of default levels seen in the Depression. Stockmarkets in America and Europe now offer a dividend yield that is higher than the yield on government bonds, something that has happened only rarely in the past 50 years.

高风险的财产比以前有更大吸引力。即使违约率水平和大萧条时期一样高，公司债券的利差也足以补偿违约风险。（注11）目前美国和欧洲的股市提供比政府债券收益高的股息分红，这可是50年难得一遇的事情。

Unfortunately, savers do not seem to take account of these long-term factors. When the stockmarket is falling, they tend to view the idea of investing more money into equities as sending good money after bad. And the average diversified American equity fund is down 41% for the year, according to Lipper.

很不幸的是，储蓄人并不看重这些长期的要素。当遭遇熊市的时候，他们认为再继续投资股票是拿钱打水漂。基金评级机构理柏(Lipper)的数据称各类美国股票基金今年平均跌掉41%。

Falling stockmarkets mean that, without doing much, a lot of savers are less exposed to equities. A recent survey by Hewitt Associates, a consulting firm, found that the proportion of 401(k) plans invested in equities was at an all-time low of 53.8%, compared with 74.2% in 2000. Arguably, workers were overexposed to shares at the turn of the decade. But they may be underexposed now.

做自由落体运动的股市意味着，无须多劳，很多储户暴露在股市风险的机会大大降低。翰威特咨询公司（Hewitt Associates）一份最近的调查发现401（k）（注8）计划中股票投资的比例达到空前的低位53.8%，相比2000年的数字是74.2%。基本可以认定的是，劳动者们在十年交替的时候参与股市投资有些过度。但是他们现在参与度又有些低。

Whatever their asset allocation, savers ought to be putting more money into their pensions, given their nest-eggs have taken such a beating. But there is little sign of that; employees subscribed just 7.8% of their salaries to 401(k) plans this year, according to Hewitt. Even if you add in the average employer’s contribution of 4.4%, the amount is nowhere near sufficient to match the 20% of pay needed to fund the equivalent of a final salary pension.

无论资产分配的情况如何，考虑到他们养老救急的钱（注9）近况堪忧，储蓄者都应该把更多的钱投放到自己的养老金里。但是目前这点几乎让人看不出来：根据翰威特的数据，企业员工们仅仅把自己薪水的7.8%投入401（k）计划中。即使把雇主平均贡献的4.4%增加进去，数量也远远不足以与占据收入20%比重的最后薪资养老金计划相匹敌。

Indeed, it was the realisation of how expensive that promise had become that led to many employers abandoning final-salary pension schemes in recent years, thereby passing the risk on to workers.

事实上，正是因为意识到对于员工承诺的代价过于昂贵才导致近年来老板们渐渐放弃采用最后薪资养老金计划，而把风险完全转嫁到普通的员工身上。

The generational challenge
世代的挑战

Many people-especially the baby-boomers born between 1946 and 1964, who will be retiring over the next 20 years or so-will be asking themselves whether they will have enough to keep them comfortable in their old age, even if they save a lot. After all, it is generally accepted that they cannot rely on the state. The burden on the taxpayer would be too great.

很多人–特别是生于1946到1964年间婴儿潮的普通人，将在未来20年内退休–需要扪心自问：即使他们有很多存款，是否足以使自己过上一个体面的晚年。毕竟，人们都基本接受不能依赖国家的事实。否则纳税人肩上的负担就太重了。

But, as already noted, financial wealth is just a claim on the assets produced by the economy. Making pensions a claim on the private sector rather than the public purse does not change the problem. Will businesses in 20 years’ time be producing enough income to pay the dividends and bond interest to pay baby-boomers their private-sector pensions? And what will happen to asset prices if the boomers try to cash in their portfolios?

但是，如上文所述，金融财富仅仅是对经济体产出资产的拥有权。把养老金划归私人部门负责而取代从公家钱包掏钱的转移支付并不能解决问题。在未来20 年的时 间里商业机构是否能创造出足以支付股息和债券利息的收入来落实婴儿潮一代的养老金问题？如果他们决定取现，那么资产的价格会发生何种变动？

In demographic terms, asset markets could be seen as a pyramid scheme, in which each generation aims to sell its accumulated savings to the next. Provided the next generation is larger than the one that preceded it, the savers can sell their assets at higher prices. That was the case for much of the 20th century.

从人口密度层面讲，资产市场可以被看做是一个”传销”机制，一代人着眼于向下一代人出售积蓄。如果新一代人口比前一代数量多，储蓄者就有机会以较高的价格使自己的财产变现。这大体 上是20世纪的操作方式。

Illustration by Brett Ryder

The baby-boomers will upset the pattern. If they retire at 65, they will start offloading their assets in 2011. And even in America, which has fewer demographic problems than Japan, there are not enough new savers coming along to replace them. Some hope that emerging markets will solve the problem, by acting as buyers of developed market assets and a source of higher returns for investors in rich countries, but the theory is unproven.

但是婴儿潮一代将会颠覆这种模式。如果他们在65岁退休，可能会从2011年就开始卖掉股票等投资型资产寻求现金。然而即使是在美国，面临着比日本小得多的人口缩减问题，仍然找不到足够的新储蓄人代替老一代成为市场的主力。如果新兴国家可以扮演成熟投资市场资产的买主和发达国家投资人的更高受益来源的角色，一部分人寄望于他们来解决问题。但是这点目前还是纸上谈兵。

In a 136-page report, “The Business of Ageing”, John Llewellyn and Camille Chaix-Viros of Nomura, a Japanese bank, examine the potential effect on financial markets of ageing Western populations. As the baby-boomers run down their savings to fund their retirement, you would expect, other things being equal, real interest rates to rise (because the supply of savings will fall, relative to demand). As a consequence of this, the valuation of assets such as bonds and equities should come under pressure.

在一份长达136页的报告”老龄化时代的商机”（The Business of Ageing）中，就职于日本野村证券（Nomura）的作者John Llewellyn和Camille Chaix-Viros详细的研究了逐渐老龄化的西方人口对于金融市场的潜在影响。当婴儿潮一代为自己的退休时光逐渐花光自己的积蓄时，你可以想见，保持其他条件相同，实际利率会增加（因为相对需求，储蓄的供给下降了）。这样趋势的结果是，像债券和股票之类的资产价值将面临相当大的压力。

Evidence partly backs up this theory. For example, economists can plot a relationship between the proportion of the population aged between 35 and 59 (when people save most) and the level of real interest rates. The relationship has been negative, as theory would predict, since the 1980s (lots of savings kept interest rates low). The strong Western stockmarkets of the 1990s coincided with the boomers’ peak savings years. In Japan, the population aged sooner; some commentators have blamed this for the poor performance of the country’s equity market since the end of the 1980s.

这个理论是有一定事实根据的。比方说，经济学家可以画出35岁至59岁人群（存最多钱的一部分人）的比例与实际利率水平的关系曲线。从上世纪80年代开始，当时大量的银行储蓄使利率很低，两者开始呈负向关系，与理论预测相符。90年代中西方国家的股票牛市恰逢婴儿潮一代存款的最高峰。在日本，人口迅速老化；一些评论人把于从80年代末期开始出现的股市疲软归咎于此。

Indeed, although the Japanese have a reputation of being a nation of savers, this has long since ceased to be true. Although the corporate sector has a surplus, the household savings ratio plunged from 11.3% in 1998 to 3% last year. One of the main reasons seems to be that the ageing population is running down its investments. For Japanese equity investors, it has not just been a lost decade, it has been a lost quarter-century; the Nikkei 225 average recently touched a 26-year low.

实际上，虽然日本素来有勤俭之国的美誉，但这已经是老黄历了。尽管企业部门有盈余，普通家庭的储蓄率已经从1998年的11.3%大幅跌至去年的 3%。其中一大原因可能是步入老年的人群正在逐步减少他们的投资。对于日本的投资者来说，不仅仅是迷失的十年，而是迷失的四分之一世纪；日经225平均指数（Nikkei 225）最近触到26年来的最低点。

The worry is that the baby-boomers in Europe and America may be about to repeat the Japanese experience. They will react to the recession by saving more and thereby make the recession worse.

担忧在于欧洲和美国的婴儿潮一代有可能即将重蹈日本的覆辙。他们会采取加紧存钱来应对经济衰退，而加剧经济衰退
的幅度。

Nor will their savings earn a decent return if they invest the money in the wrong place. Keep the money in the bank and the returns could be paltry and the capital eroded by inflation. Put the money in equities and the risk is that developed stockmarkets suffer the same long slow, grinding bear run as Japan.

如果他们把钱投资在错误的地方也不会为他们带来可观的回报。把钱存在银行，那点儿利息微不足道而且通货膨胀让资产缩水。把钱放进股市，看看日本吧，发达国家的股市都会遭受同样的漫长而且熬人的熊市。

Dangerous as it might be, the second of these options looks the better. The time for investors to take financial risks is when risky assets offer a sizeable long-term return, not when risk premiums are low. Savers need to save themselves.

即便风险如斯，第二种选择看起来仍然好许多。投资者承担金融风险的合适时机是当高风险的资产可以提供丰厚的长期回报的时候，而不是股票风险溢价（即股市回报率）（注10）很低的时候。天助自助者。

鸣谢：majer 和 弓长贝恩 两位认真专业的点评和润色。

译者后记：本文实属近期TE的精品妙文，在这样一个信心低迷的时代，作者的冷静和充满洞察力的文章，让人们似乎看到了一丝光明。至少对于译者而言，看完本文，有两件事儿要做：认真考虑拿出一点钱买股票；开始为养老金未雨绸缪。

译注：

1. 按积累与支付方式区分，企业补充养老保险可分为给付固定型（Defined－benefit，DB）和缴费固定型（Defined－contribution，DC）两大类。DB计划是事先确定职工退休后每月可享受的退休金，再根据基金的运营情况、职工年龄、服务年限等因素，逐年计算雇主的缴费额。DC计划中，雇主和雇员按规定比例出资，计入个人账户；雇主的缴费是固定的，但必须提供一系列投资选择供雇员投资时参考；雇员自行决策，自担风险，养老金给付取决于缴费额和投资收益的高低。其优点是简单明了，雇主的负担比较稳定，而且个人账户可以转移，方便职工调动；如果投资得当，还有较高的回报率。

2. 现金购买计划(Money purchase plan)：指雇主每年提出一笔提拨金作为退休基金，累积的提拨金依精算上的各种预测，以决定员工在退休时可以领取之退休给付。一般而言，提拨的标准乃是依「最低提拨标准(率)」来决定，以提拨一定的金额至员工个人退休账户中。

3. 确定给付制又可称为「最后薪资计划」(final salary schemes)，乃是指劳资双方预先约定在工作一定期间后，受雇者于退休时可依其服务年资或最后工作薪资，依一定的计算标准领取一定的给付。至于给付标准的计算方式，可以依考虑退休时通货膨胀的指数、目前薪资与退休时的薪资差异及完全不考虑方式来设定。

4. 资本利得（Capital gain也有译为资本收益，这里取常用的翻译）：这里要解释capital asset的概念。

5. 什么是资本资产(CAPITAL ASSET)
CAPTIAL ASSET 是指能够产生商业利润,利息,股息,专利版税,租金等的资产,并且持有这类资产目的在于这类资产本身能产生收入,而并不是靠买卖这类资产产生收入.
什么是资本利得CAPITAL GAIN)
是指纳税人在实际出售或被视为出售上述CAPITAL ASSET 时所产生的收益.

资本利得的计算方法:
资本利得=出售所得-可调整的成本-出售时所产生的费用.
Capital gain=proceed-adjusted cost base-disposal cost.

6. Leverage是”杠杆化”，也就是”借钱投资，放大收益（风险）”，deleverage就是”去杠杆化”，也就是”减小杠杆效应”，最直接的做法就是注资偿还负债。

7贴纸休克(sticker shock)指的人们看标签上价钱太贵而大吃一惊的意思，但今天却经常用来形容价钱太低而让人不敢相信。

8. 401K：尽管美国有比较完善的社会保障制度，职工在工作之年交纳社会保障税后，到退休时就可以领取养老金，但由于美国人没有储蓄的习惯，政府为了全面解决养老问题，鼓励职工个人和企业为职工的养老金进行储蓄。美国《国内税收条例》在1978年增加了”第401K条款”，对养老金存款给予特定的税收优惠。因此，养老金计划在美国又称”401K计划”。

401K条款(计划)规定：职工可为养老设立专门的”401K账户”，职工在领取工资时自动将一部分工资存入账户，由雇主按照职工存款比例拿出一定资金存入职工401K账户。户上的存款，职工自己选择投资方式，可以购买股票、债券或进行专项定期存储等。

拨入此类账户资金在一定限额内可列入企业和员工税前项目，抵免所得税，职工到59岁半时允许提取帐户上的款，在提取存款时交纳个人所得税。401K帐户存款如在退休年龄前提前支取，需要支付较高的税额；而到退休年龄时领取则不需交税或税率很低。这样，除非有特殊情况，人们一般不会在退休前动用这笔钱。由于所投入的资金用于投资证券，因此它被理解为：允许纳税人通过特定证券投资账户进行证券投资时，不缴纳所得税。

9. nest-egg：《牛津英语大词典》将其解释为”放在巢中以引诱鸟继续在此产蛋的人工蛋或真蛋”。但自1700年起，人们开始使用其比喻意，指用于养老或应变的储蓄金。

10. risk premiums：股票风险溢价（回报率）是投资者因投资股票所承担的额外风险所要求或预期的额外回报，其与无风险收益率的和组成投资股票的预期回报（收益）率。

股票投资者要求风险溢价的理由是公司业绩及股价增长受经济、行业、商业、经营和财务等因素影响充满不确定性，投资者必须要能获得额外的回报才愿意承担这些风险、购入股票。股票风险溢价是CAPM和DCF这些估值模型的重要环节，确定股票风险溢价回报率可以根据整个市场、行业的平均水平或具体公司的业绩成长性（成长性越高要求的风险溢价越高）来定度。

11.
这个违约是公司违约，就是没有根据债券条款还本付息，这样的话债券持有人会有损失，于是公司债券利率要比国债高，之间的差额就是spreads。现在说这个spreads高到足以补偿公司违约风险的程度，也就是高过投资者的风险升水了。

译者：simurgh http://www.ecocn.org/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=16057