[2008.11.22] 苏丹：废墟上的微光

Sudan
苏丹

A gleam among the ruins
废墟上的微光

Nov 20th 2008 | ABYEI, JUBA AND KHARTOUM
From The Economist print edition

After years of civil war, three new factors may bring hope to Africa’s biggest country
多年的内战之后，三个新的因素也许能给非洲最大的国家带来希望

WITH his outstretched arms shaking in gestures of anger and bewilderment, John stands in the charred remains of his little family compound in the central Sudanese town of Abyei. The four tukuls, or traditional huts, that used to house his wife and nine children have been incinerated. His pickup truck, too, has been overturned and burned. The attack happened only five months ago, but already the weeds and brush of the surrounding swampland are covering the last traces of a happy family life.
约翰站在他位于苏丹中部城镇阿卜耶伊（Abyei）小家院子的废墟上，伸直的双臂因为愤怒和迷惘而颤抖。四间tukuls，也就是传统小屋，曾是他妻子和九个孩子的安身之所，如今已化为灰烬。他的敞篷小货车，也被掀翻并焚毁。这场攻击仅发生在5个月前，可是低湿地周围的杂草和灌木正在覆盖一个幸福家庭生活的最后一丝遗迹。

Abyei was once a thriving market town. But it is also the capital of a region that straddles the bloody fault-line in Sudan between the Muslim Arab tribes of the north of the country and the African, mainly Christian and animist, tribes of the south. In May heavy fighting broke out in Abyei between the northern government’s army and the southern Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), which are supposed to have stopped fighting each other since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in 2005, ostensibly ended more than 40 years of north-south war.
阿卜耶伊曾是一个茁壮成长的集镇。但它也是一个地区的首府，这个地区跨越了该国北部穆斯林阿拉伯部族和南部非洲人部族（主要是基督徒和万物有灵主义者）之间那条血腥的断层线。五月份阿卜耶伊爆发了北方政府军与南方苏丹人民解放军（SPLA）之间的激烈战斗，二者在2005年签署了全面和平协议（CPA），表面上中止了40余年的南北战争，自此就应该停止了相互间的战斗。

The firefight that destroyed John’s compound was bad enough. But the whole town was looted, and then burned to the ground, in the days that followed the fighting. The culprits were the traditional enemies of the Dinka people, the armed militias of the Arab Misseriya tribe. All John’s most valuable possessions were taken: his generator, the two small television sets that it powered and the family’s cooking utensils. By all accounts, much of this has been put up for sale in the Misseriya town of el-Muglad, about 150km (93 miles) to the north. The market there has been nicknamed “Abyei” after the plentiful supply of goods on sale from the looted town.
这场摧毁约翰家园的枪战已经够糟糕了。但是战斗发生后的第二天，整个集镇都被洗劫了，然后一把火夷为平地。凶手是丁卡（Dinka）族的老敌人，阿拉伯米塞里亚部族武装部队。约翰所有最值钱的财产都被拿走了：他的发动机，由它供电的两台小电视机，以及这个家庭的烹饪设备。大家都说，这些东西已经被拿到往北去150公里（93英里）el-Muglad的米塞里亚镇出售。因为大量供应来自被洗劫城镇的商品，那里的市场因此被人戏称为”阿卜耶伊”。

At least John has a good job, as a driver for the United Nations. He may be able to rebuild his life. Thousands of his fellow Dinka in this impoverished region are not so lucky. Forced to flee Abyei, they now live in a sprawl of hastily erected huts about 40km south, at Agok, where they survive largely on help from foreign aid-workers. In the jargon of international relief agencies, they have become “Internally Displaced Persons”. And like many other millions of Sudanese who are refugees in their own country, these Dinka have no plans to return to the little that is left of their old way of life until security improves-which may take a long time. The charred remains of John’s former home are virtually opposite the front entrance to the UN military base in Abyei. Those soldiers could do nothing to help him.
作为联合国的一名司机，至少约翰有一份好工作。也许他能够重建自己的生活。他的成千上万生活于这一贫瘠地区的丁卡族同胞们就没有这么幸运了。被迫离开了阿卜耶伊，他们现在住在往南40公里Agok匆忙搭建、凌乱四散的小屋里，大部分依靠外国救援人员的救助来生存。用国际救援机构的行话来说，他们已经成为” 国内流离失所者”。就像其他在他们自己的国家成为难民的几百万苏丹人一样，这些卡丁族人没有重返家园–那儿只留下过去生活的一点点东西–的计划，除非安全问题极大改观–这可能需要很长时间。约翰过去家园的焦黑残骸几乎正对着联合国驻阿卜耶伊军事基地的前门。那些士兵不能做任何事情来帮他。

The story of Abyei is stark proof that the underlying causes of north-south conflict in Sudan have not changed. Much of it is sparked by feelings of marginalisation. Just to the east of the town, for example, are the Chinese-run oilfields around the town of Heglig. These supply the northern government in Khartoum with most of its substantial revenues and help to fund a building and consumer boom in the capital. But the local Dinka derive no benefit from this money. They are not even allowed into the area around Heglig, though it is part of their old homeland.
阿卜耶伊的故事是苏丹南北冲突的背后起因仍未改变的明显证据。这些起因许多是由于边缘化的感觉而被激起的。例如，就在该镇东边，是中国人运营的位于 Heglig镇周围的油田。这些油田给喀土穆的北方政府提供了一大笔重要收入并为首都的一场建筑和消费热潮提供了资金。但是当地的丁卡族没有从这笔钱中获益。他们甚至被禁止进入Heglig周围地区，尽管这是他们古老家园的一部分。

Mistrust also continues between the largely nomadic Arab tribes of the north, like the Misseriya, supported and armed by the northern Islamist government for its own political purposes, and the settled African farmers of the south, both Christian and Muslim. Migrations of heavily armed Arab cattle-herders into the lusher wetlands of the Dinka at the beginning of each dry season have caused violence for decades. This year’s migrations south have already started, and, especially after the torching of Abyei, everyone is preparing for more trouble.
北方像米塞里亚一样主要过游牧生活的阿拉伯部族，被北方的伊斯兰政府出于自己的政治目的所支持和武装。南方定居下来的非洲农民，包括基督徒和穆斯林。他们之间的不信任也在继续。每年干燥季节一开始全副武装的阿拉伯牧牛人就迁移进入牧草更丰美的丁卡湿地，这导致了几十年的暴力冲突。今年往南的迁移已经开始，尤其因为阿卜耶伊的大火之后，每个人都在为更多暴力做准备。

Yet the fighting between northern and southern Sudan is only one part of it. The western province of Darfur is also riven by a war between the government and rebel forces that erupted in 2003. At first this was a straightforward battle pitting the Sudanese army, together with the Arab militias, the infamous janjaweed, against two main rebel groups, the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudan Liberation Army. Now, however, the nature of the conflict in Darfur has mutated, making the violence more unpredictable and widespread and the task of getting a lasting peace deal that much harder. The janjaweed militias have fragmented, fighting among themselves and occasionally against the Sudanese army, especially when they have not been paid. The rebels, too, have fractured into about 30 groups of varying size and seriousness. These roam around the province, and several are kidnapping and killing the very aid-workers who help their own people.
然而苏丹北部和南部之间的战斗只是问题的一部分。达尔富尔的西部省份也被2003年爆发的政府和叛军之间的战斗撕裂着。最初这只是苏丹军队，包括阿拉伯民兵、声名狼藉的”马枪队”（janjaweed）与两个主要的反叛组织正义与平等运动以及苏丹解放军之间的战斗。然而，现在达尔富尔的这场冲突的性质已经改变，使得这场暴力活动更加难以预测、蔓延得更宽，而签订一份持久的和平协议也变得如此困难。”马枪队”已经分裂，内部相互攻击，且偶尔反对苏丹军队，尤其当他们没有得到报酬的时候。反叛者也分裂成了大约30多个组织，规模不一，威胁程度不一。这些人在该省周围游荡，有些正在劫持并杀害帮助他们自己的人民的援助工作人员。

The continuing violence has produced, according to the UN, 300,000 internal refugees in Darfur since January alone, the highest rate of displacement for several years. About 2.7m people are now crowding into overflowing makeshift camps in Darfur itself, and about another 300,000 are in camps over the border in Chad. In all about 5m Darfuris, out of a population of 6m at the last official count in 2002, are either in camps or are relying on aid to survive. And as many as 300,000 have probably died as a result of the conflict.
根据联合国的数据，从一月份以来，持续的暴力在达尔富尔一个地区就产生了30万国内难民，这是几年来流离失所的人数比例最高的一年。大约有270万人现在正往达尔富尔的临时营地里挤，而另外大约有30万人在边界之外的乍得境内。2002年最后一次官方统计达尔富尔的人口数是600万，其中总共有500万现在要么在难民营，要么依靠救助生存。可能已经有30万人因为这场冲突而丧命。

With 17,000 or so local and foreign aid-workers in Darfur trying to help the victims, the relief operation is still the largest of its kind in the world. But the work is more and more hazardous, and access to the refugees has become increasingly restricted. Eleven humanitarian workers have been killed this year and 179 kidnapped. Some 237 aid vehicles have also been hijacked this year, already double the number for 2007. The UN in Darfur has moved to its highest level of alert before full evacuation. All non-essential staff have left.
达尔富尔有大约17000名当地和国外援助人员试图帮助这些受害者，这场救援仍然是世界上规模最大的。但是这份工作越来越危险了，而接触难民也越来越受到限制。今年已经有11名人道救援工作者被杀害，179名被绑架。同时今年有大约237辆救援车辆被劫持，已经是2007年的这一数字的一倍。在完全撤离之前，联合国驻达尔富尔机构已经将其警戒等级提到最高。所有非必需的人员都已经离开。

The United Nations African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the peacekeepers who have been mandated by the Security Council and the African Union to prevent the violence, remain based at el-Fasher, the capital of Darfur. But with only about 10,000 often ineffectual troops and police, well short of the 26,000 that were promised by the end of this year, UNAMID remains pretty impotent. As a result, it is already losing the respect of Darfuris. They had hoped that this force, unlike the previous pathetic outfit provided by the African Union, would finally give them protection from the marauding janjaweed and bandits who kill and rape them. They were wrong.
联合国驻达尔富尔非洲使团（UNAMID），是由安理会和非盟任命的阻止暴力活动的维和人员，仍然驻扎在达尔富尔的首府埃尔-法舍尔（el- Fashe）。但只有大概10000名通常是无能为力的部队和警察，比今年年底达到26000名的承诺数字低很多，UNAMID仍然非常无能。结果，它正在失去达尔富尔人的尊敬。他们曾经希望这股力量，不像之前由非盟提供的无能机构，将最终保护他们免受四处流窜的”马枪队”和土匪的奸淫掳掠。他们错了。

Breaking the stalemate
打破僵局

These trend-lines in Darfur have become depressingly familiar over the past few years. The various “peace processes” to try to resolve the conflict have repeatedly foundered on a mixture of government intransigence and intrigue, rebel divisions and foreign meddling, notably by Chad. For all the vast international effort put into improving the situation in Darfur, the thousands of UN and diplomatic man-hours and the hundreds of millions of dollars in aid, little has changed.
过去几年来达尔富尔的这种趋势变得令人沮丧地熟悉。各种试图解决这一冲突的”和平进程”一再在政府的顽固和阴谋诡计，不同的反叛派别和外国干涉（尤其是乍得）面前碰壁。对所有这些为了改进达尔富尔的情况而付出的巨大的国际努力，对为此耗费的数千小时的联合国和外交上的努力以及数百万的援助金额而言，几乎没有什么改变。

The same stagnation and sense of helplessness is evident elsewhere in Sudan. The peace agreement of 2005 between north and south agreed, for example, to share the wealth, integrate the two sides’ armies and settle the boundary between them. All these proposals were designed to create the New Sudan that southerners dream of: an integrated, federal and multiethnic nation that, for the first time in decades, could live at peace with itself. In fact, progress in all these areas has been slow or almost non-existent. Neither the northern government nor the Government of South Sudan, which now runs the semi-autonomous south, has invested much in making unity “attractive”, as the CPA demands. The peace agreement gives southerners the right to hold a referendum to secede from Sudan in 2011. At the moment, this is what many southerners are really preparing for.
同样的停滞不前和无助感在苏丹其它地方也很明显。2005年南北之间的和平协议已经同意，例如，分享财富，合并双方军队并且划定边界。所有这些计划是为了建立一个南方人梦寐以求的新苏丹：一个统一的、联邦制的和多民族的国家，几十年来第一次，能够建立在内部的和平上。实际上，所有这些领域的进展要么很慢要么几乎没有。无论是北方政府还是南方苏丹政府（它现在掌控着半自治的南方），都没有按照全面和平协议的要求在使统一事业变得”有吸引力”方面花太多功夫。

But in the past few weeks three newish factors have coalesced to create a set of circumstances that could shake the country up: for better, if matters are handled carefully, or for much worse. The first is the prospect of national elections next year; the second is the beginning of proceedings against President Omar al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges of genocide over Darfur; and the third is the election of Barack Obama as the next president of the United States. Each of these factors, on its own, would not bother Mr Bashir much. But the three together are now putting considerable pressure on him to change course in Darfur and get serious about peace with the south.
但是过去几周里三个新的因素联手创造了一些可能改变这个国家的新情况：如果小心行事则这是些好消息，否则就会比现在还要糟糕得多。第一个是明年将要举行的全国选举；第二个是国际刑事法庭（ICC）对奥马尔•巴希尔总统启动司法程序起诉他在达尔富尔的种族灭绝行为；第三个则是巴拉克•奥巴马当选下届美国总统。所有这些因素，单独地，都无法撼动巴希尔先生多少。但是三个加在一起，现在就给他施加了相当的压力，要求他去改变达尔富尔的状态并且认真对待与南方的和平相处。

Elections were forced on the northern government and the SPLM, the political wing of the SPLA, by foreign donor governments as their price for giving billions of dollars-worth of money to rebuild Sudan after the 2005 peace deal. These elections have always offered the best chance of ending Mr Bashir’s repressive government, which came to power by overthrowing Sudan’s last democratic government in a coup in 1989.
2005年和平协议之后，外国的捐赠政府提供了几十亿美元来重建苏丹，作为条件，要求北方政府和苏丹人民解放运动（苏丹人民解放军的政治组织）举行选举。这些选举永远提供了终结巴希尔先生的高压政府（它是在1989年的一场政变中推翻了苏丹最后一届民主政府之后掌握权利的）的最佳机会。

Mr Bashir and his henchmen in the National Congress Party (NCP) are genuinely fearful of elections. They know that if even vaguely free and fair ballots were to take place throughout Sudan, they would lose heavily. Salva Kiir, the leader of the SPLM, might well win instead if he ran as the candidate promising to stand up for the marginalised people of all Sudan, in the south, the east and Darfur; there are plenty of them. Such an alliance might at last create the New Sudan, the vision of John Garang, the first leader of the SPLM, who died in a helicopter crash in 2005. A census, albeit an imperfect one, has already taken place to form the basis of voter registration, and under the terms of the CPA an election should take place by next summer.
巴希尔先生和他全民大会党（NCP）中的追随者是真的害怕选举。他们知道，只要整个苏丹的投票稍微自由和公平一点，他们将损失惨重。Salva Kiir，苏丹人民解放运动的领导人，如果他作为候选人，承诺为南方、东方和达尔富尔的所有被边缘化的苏丹人民（他们数量很多）说话，他可能将赢得选举。这种联盟可能最终会建立一个新苏丹，就像John Garang所预见的那样，他是苏丹人民解放运动的第一任领导人，2005年死于一次直升机坠机事故。一次人口普查，尽管不完善，已经开始为选民注册打基础，而且按照全面和平协议的规定一场选举将于明年夏天举行。

The Obama factor
奥巴马因素

If Mr Bashir loses, it may also be easier for the ICC to haul him off to The Hague. Again, despite what they say in public, not only Mr Bashir but the entire government is anxious about the ICC. The regime’s hardliners-the heads of the army, the intelligence and the internal security services, all directly responsible for much of the mayhem in Darfur-know that they could be next on the indictment list. Many people in Sudan, and almost everyone in Darfur, would be delighted if they were. The whole country is waiting to see whether the ICC judges act on the chief prosecutor’s recommendation, made in July, to issue a warrant for Mr Bashir’s arrest. A decision is expected towards the end of December.
如果巴希尔先生输了，对国际刑事法庭来说，要将他带到海牙受审也更容易一点。而且，不管他们在公开场合怎么说，不仅仅只有巴希尔先生，而是整个政府都对国际刑事法庭感到焦虑。该政权的强硬派–军队、情报机关和国内安全机构的头头们，都对达尔富尔的许多惨案负有直接责任–知道他们将会是起诉书名单上的下一个。如果他们被起诉，苏丹的许多人，以及达尔富尔的几乎每个人，将会很高兴。整个国家都在等待，看国际刑事法庭的法官们是否会按照主检察官7月份提出的建议，颁布逮捕巴希尔先生的通缉令。预计11月底会做出一个决定。

And now there is President-elect Obama to contend with. Sudan may be the only country in the world where President George Bush is popular and the Democrats loathed and feared, at least by the regime. Mr Bush gave huge political backing to the peace between the north and south, but the Sudanese also remember that it was President Bill Clinton who launched an attack on Sudan in 1998. He fired cruise missiles into a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum North (mistaking it for a bomb-making factory) in retaliation for al-Qaeda attacks on American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The present regime was the incubator for Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda in the mid-1990s.
现在要处理的还有一个当选总统奥巴马。苏丹可能是世界上唯一一个欢迎乔治•布什总统而厌恶和恐惧民主党人的国家，至少对这个政权来说是这样。布什先生对南北之间的和平事业给予了巨大的政治支持，但是苏丹人也记得，是比尔•克林顿总统在1998年发起了对苏丹的一次攻击。他对北方喀土穆的一家制药厂发射了巡航导弹（错把它当做了一家制造炸弹的工厂），为了报复基地组织对美国驻肯尼亚和坦桑尼亚大使馆的攻击。现任政权在1990年代中期曾是奥萨玛•本拉登和基地组织的保育箱。

The Sudanese government knows that a new Obama administration will probably be full of former Clintonites who have spent the past eight years furiously organising campaigns against Sudan over what they call the “genocide” in Darfur. These people, like Gayle Smith, tipped to be Obama’s senior diplomat in charge of African affairs, all have long experience of Sudan and are fierce critics of the Sudanese government. They are less likely than their Republican predecessors to go softly on Mr Bashir’s government for the sake of the titbits of intelligence on al-Qaeda that the Sudanese intelligence services like giving to the Americans.
苏丹政府知道，一个新的奥巴马政府可能会挤满前克林顿政府成员，他们过去8年来一直在他们称作达尔富尔的”种族灭绝”这个问题上想方设法猛烈地反对苏丹。这些人，像Gayle Smith，据说将会成为奥巴马掌管非洲事务的高级外交官，都拥有很长的苏丹事务经验并且是苏丹政府的强烈批评者。与他们的共和党前任们相比，他们不大可能因为苏丹情报机构喜欢给予美国人一点情报就对巴希尔先生的政府手下留情。

This matters tremendously to the Sudanese. The government’s priority has always been to come off the American list of state sponsors of terror, to repair its severed relations with the West in general and to see the end of the economic sanctions against it. America can deliver all this in return for improvements in Darfur, elections and much else. The Obama factor is already at work here. The argument to the Sudanese is: “Cut a deal now-or expect much worse come January.” The result is, as one Western diplomat puts it, “a government in full conciliation mode”, firmly on the back foot.
对苏丹人来说这意义巨大。一直以来，这个政府的首要任务是将自己从美国人的支持恐怖活动的国家名单上拿下来，大体上修复与西方国家已经割裂的关系，并且终结对自己不利的经济停滞情况。美国能提供所有这些，只要达尔富尔、选举和其它许多情况得到改善。奥巴马因素已经在这里产生效果。苏丹人的选择是：”现在就达成协议–否则更糟糕的预期将在一月份来到”。结果，就像一位西方外交家说的那样，”一个完全处采取怀柔政策的政府”，坚定地处于防守状态。

Appeasement and threats
安抚与威胁

So Mr Bashir has been striking all the right notes recently. The government has been slightly less obstructive to UNAMID, for example. And last week, at a posh forum on Darfur in Khartoum, with foreign diplomats, ministers and even the odd head of state present, Mr Bashir endorsed, in a general way, a document that could give the Darfur rebels most of what they want. Compensation, the return of refugees to their homes and the appointment of a new vice-president for Darfur are all, apparently, on the table. The Qataris, fresh from success in Lebanon, have volunteered to mediate with the rebels and to host a peace conference. There is a vague hope that Qatar will fork out the hundreds of millions of dollars in compensation that may be needed to win the rebels over.
因此巴希尔先生最近做出了所有的正确决定。例如，政府为UNAMID设置的障碍更小了一点。上个礼拜，在喀土穆一个时髦的达尔富尔论坛上，参加人员包括外国的外交官、部长甚至难得一见的政府代表，巴希尔先生宽宏大量地签署了一份几乎能够满足达尔富尔叛军所有要求的文件。补偿问题、难民重返家园以及为达尔富尔任命一名新的副总统，至少看起来，都被提交讨论。卡塔尔人，才从黎巴嫩成功斡旋归来，已经自愿出面与叛军协商并组织一次和平会议。现在存在模糊的希望：为了争取反叛者的支持，希望卡塔尔能够提供数亿美元的补偿款。

The president even announced, dramatically, a ceasefire by government forces in Darfur. This grabbed the headlines, but he has announced a ceasefire several times before and nothing has ever happened. This makes many people sceptical of his real intentions. The rebels, who were unrepresented at Mr Bashir’s forum, immediately rejected his ceasefire call.
总统甚至突然宣布了政府军队在达尔富尔的停火。这件事占据了新闻头条，但之前他也曾几次宣布停火却什么也没有发生。这让许多人怀疑他的真实动机。反叛者们，他们没有出席巴希尔先生的论坛，立即回绝了他的停火呼吁。

Indeed, as the same Western diplomat points out, all Mr Bashir’s recent promises to reform his ways are, as usual, “easily reversible”. He is trying to do just enough to persuade countries at the UN to vote for a deferral of the ICC case against him, as they have the power to do. Most African and Arab countries support him on this. But he needs to convince some Western countries, and preferably America as well, while the going is relatively good.
实际上，正如前面那位外交官所指出的那样，巴希尔先生最近所有改变自己行事方式的承诺，像往常一样，都”很容易逆转”。他正在企图做些事情，刚好说服联合国成员为延迟国际刑事法庭对自己的起诉投上一票，他们拥有这个权力。大多数非洲和阿拉伯国家在这件事情上支持他。但是他需要说服一些西方国家，尤其是美国，当情况相对不错的时候。

And if no one is persuaded by Mr Bashir’s promises of future good behaviour, foreign countries certainly have to think hard about the Sudanese government’s likely response if the ICC does issue its arrest warrant. Most opposition politicians presume that, at the very least, full elections will never happen. A lot of semi-plausible excuses will be trotted out: an incomplete census, a long rainy season, the lack of voter education. But ultimately, as Adam Madibu, the deputy chairman of the opposition Umma party, says: “The election is the best way to get the transformation of Sudan, and we will have lost it.” And the SPLM leadership, unfortunately, may well collude in that. They fear the schisms and divisions that elections could open up in their own ranks. An unaccountable SPLM would be perfectly happy to get through to its own referendum in 2011 without elections.
如果没有人被巴希尔先生未来行为端正的承诺所打动，其它国家当然必须认真考虑一旦国际刑事法庭颁布逮捕通缉令后苏丹政府的可能反应。大多数反对派政治家认为，至少全面选举是不会发生的。许多半真半假的借口将会出现：不完全的人口普查，长长的雨季，选民缺乏教育。但是最终，就如Adams Madibu，反对派Umma党的副主席所说：”这场选举是改变苏丹的最好途径，而我们将失去它。”他们担心这些选举会给他们自己的阵营带来宗派分裂。一个不用对谁负责的苏丹人民解放运动将非常乐于进入2011年它自己的全民投票而不进行选举。

Losing the opportunity to vote Mr Bashir out of power would drive many Sudanese to despair. There are dark mutterings of a coup against him by moderates in his own party. They could at least get a new, more palatable figurehead for international consumption and then shield Mr Bashir from the ICC. But this would hardly “transform” Sudan. Another, more remote, possibility is a popular uprising. There have been two against unpopular military rulers in the years since Sudan’s independence in 1956. But the security apparatus is more pervasive and onerous now than it has ever been, especially in Khartoum.
失去用投票剥夺巴希尔先生权力的机会将会使许多苏丹人绝望。他自己政党内部的温和派就抱怨说要搞一场政变来反对他。至少，他们可以拥有一个新的、更容易被国际社会接受的傀儡领导，从而保护巴希尔先生免遭国际刑事法庭的的制裁。但是这样做很难”改变”苏丹。另外一个更遥远的可能是全民起义。从1959年苏丹独立以来已经发生了两次全民起义。但是与以前相比，现在的安全机构更加无处不在，更加危险，尤其是在喀土穆。

Bashir at bay
走投无路的巴希尔

Already, NGOs on the ground in Darfur are suffering from a government backlash prompted by the ICC charges against Mr Bashir. Harassment by security officials has got much worse. The goons have spent days in NGO offices haranguing staff to hand over sensitive documents and computer files which, they suspect, could have been used as evidence against Mr Bashir. In particular, officials have been targeting projects that help women recover from sexual violence. The massive use of rape as a weapon in the army’s counter-insurgency war is a critical part of the ICC case. If a warrant is issued, the harassment will surely worsen to the point where many counselling projects will be shut down, as at least one has been already.
由于国际刑事法庭对巴希尔先生的起诉，达尔富尔地区的非政府组织已经正在遭受政府的强烈反应。安全官员们的骚扰变得更加严重。受雇佣的暴徒们多日来呆在非政府组织的办公室内，要求员工们交出敏感文件和计算机文档，他们怀疑这些可能会被当做反对巴希尔先生的证据。官员们尤其瞄准了帮助妇女从性暴力中康复的项目。军队在打击叛乱的战争中大规模地将强奸作为武器，这是国际刑事法庭案件的一个关键部分。如果通缉令颁布，这些骚扰肯定会加剧，将导致许多咨询项目被关闭，至少有一个已经关闭了。

Mr Bashir could also turn on his former enemies in the south by simply reducing the share of oil money they get. Already, there is concern about the incompetence of the government there and the lack of economic and social development. A large proportion of the SPLM’s small revenue goes on new weapons, such as, it is widely assumed, the T-72 tanks now stuck off the Somali coast. If a weak south does move towards secession against a surly, hostile north, diplomats fear that the resulting conflict would create a whole swathe of instability in Africa, from Somalia across south Sudan to eastern Congo-another place where a peace agreement has unravelled with awful consequences.
只要减少他们分享的石油收入，巴希尔先生就能够依靠他以前的敌人。人们已经注意到那儿政府的无能和经济及社会发展的缺位。苏丹人民解放运动微薄收入中的一大部分都用到了新武器上，比如，大家都说，困在索马里海岸的T-72坦克。如果虚弱的南方的确要脱离乖戾、敌对的北方，外交家们担心接下来的冲突将在非洲产生一系列不稳定，从索马里到南部苏丹到东部刚果–另一个和平协议已经瓦解并带来可怕后果的地方。

Among Mr Bush’s first orders to his National Security Council in January 2001 was the drawing up of a new policy on Sudan. Mr Obama, who will be taking office more or less at the moment when the ICC is expected to issue its warrant, needs a new policy even more badly. But at least he will not be short of advice.
布什先生2001年1月对国家安全委员会发布的第一批命令中，就要求制定对苏丹的新政策。奥巴马先生，将于国际刑事法庭颁布通缉令前后走马上任，更是需要一个新政策。但至少他不会缺少建议。

译者：7colorwolf  http://www.ecocn.org/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=15591&extra=page%3D1