[2008.11.29] 孟买恐怖袭击：印度恐怖事件

The Mumbai attacks
孟买恐怖袭击

Terror in India
印度恐怖事件

Nov 27th 2008
From The Economist print edition

A dangerous new front-line in the global war against terrorism
全球反恐新前线

TERROR has stalked Mumbai, India’s commercial capital, all too many times before. In 1993 more than 250 people died in a series of bomb attacks, seen as reprisals for the demolition by Hindu fanatics of the mosque at Ayodhya. In 2003, more than 50 people were killed by two car bombs, including one just outside the Taj Mahal hotel, next to the monumental tourist attraction, the “Gateway of India”. And in 2006 over 180 people were killed in seven separate explosions at railway stations and on commuter trains. But the latest atrocity-or rather co-ordinated series of atrocities (see article)-is something new to the city. It has alarming implications not just for India, but for the entire international fight against terrorism.
孟买是印度的商业中心，至今为止该地区已经数次笼罩在恐怖气氛中。在1993年，作为对印度教狂热份子在阿约迪亚拆毁清真寺的武装报复，超过250人在连环炸弹袭击中罹难；2003年，超过50人丧命于两起汽车炸弹袭击，其中一个就在新德里泰姬陵饭店门外、紧邻”印度门”这一具有历史意义的旅游胜地；2006年，180多人被7起分别发生在火车站和通勤列车上的爆炸杀害。但最近的这类暴行–或者一系列有组织的暴行，在这个城市却鲜有发生。该事件不仅对印度有很好的预警含义，整个世界的反恐斗争都应该有所借鉴。

It differs from most previous attacks in two important ways: in the sophistication of the operation’s planning and the terrorist manpower that must have been involved; and in selecting foreigners as targets: hostage-takers seem to have sought out American, British and Israeli victims. As The Economist went to press, the crisis in Mumbai was still unfolding. Hostages were still held, fires still smouldering at the Taj Mahal hotel and occasional gunfire and explosions still to be heard. It was uncertain who was responsible, though a previously unknown group calling itself the Deccan Mujahideen had contacted television stations to claim credit.
此次暴力行为在如下两方面区别于以往的袭击：第一，行动计划的复杂性和恐怖份子投入的人力；第二，将外国人锁定为袭击目标，绑匪似乎在刻意挑选美国人、英国人和以色列人。本期经济学人付梓的时候，孟买危机仍在延续。人质还被扣押在烈焰腾腾的泰姬陵饭店，间或还有枪声和爆炸生从酒店传出。尽管自称为”德干圣战”的组织联系电视台宣称对恐怖袭击负责，但这个在此之前不为人知的组织是否为真凶还有待确认。

Whether or not such a group really exists, suspicion will inevitably fall on Islamist extremists. Moreover, the tactic-familiar from New York’s twin towers to the London Underground-of simultaneous assaults on “soft” targets, designed to kill large numbers of civilians, suggests an al-Qaeda involvement, or at least that the group has provided an inspiration. This is deeply worrying for India, which until recently thought itself immune from that particular scourge. Introducing Manmohan Singh, India’s prime minister, to Laura Bush a few years ago, George Bush reportedly noted that India was a country of 150m Muslims and not a single al-Qaeda member.
无论这样的团体是否真正存在，怀疑不可避免的落在了伊斯兰极端主义者的头上。还有，针对数个”温和标靶”发动同步突袭的战术与纽约双塔事件以及伦敦地铁事件极为相似，目标是杀害大量市民，带有明显的基地组织印记；至少是受到基地组织的启示与鼓励。这让印度当局深感忧虑，因为不久之前印度还认为自己不会受到恐怖主义的影响。据说包括印度总理辛格和布什夫妇都指出，虽然印度是一个拥有1.5亿穆斯林的国家，但没有任何基地组织成员藏身其中。

Home-grown poison
本土弊病

In the past, terrorist attacks in India were routinely blamed on foreigners. This usually meant Pakistan, either as part of deliberate government policy or as the work of rogue elements of the state apparatus, or occasionally Bangladesh, also suspected at times of tolerating terrorist training camps on its soil. But in recent months a series of attacks in Delhi, Jaipur, Bengalooru (Bangalore) and Ahmedabad have been claimed by the “Indian Mujahideen”. Indeed, this group, which the government since claims to have dismantled, had explicitly threatened to carry out “deadly attacks” in Mumbai.
过去印度会习惯性的把恐怖袭击事件归咎于外国人，而且通常就是指巴基斯坦人；这种固定思维方式的产生有两个原因，一个是印度政府制定政策时候的蓄意行为，一个是国家机构工作中的欺诈因素，偶尔孟加拉也会受到怀疑，因为他们默许恐怖分子训练营的存在。不过近几个月发生在德里、斋普尔和阿默达巴德的系列恐怖袭击均被”印度圣战者”组织认领。尽管印度政府宣称已经彻底清剿了该组织，但实际上”印度圣战者”曾明确的威胁准备对孟买实施”致命袭击”。

India’s Muslim population does indeed look like fertile ground for those sowing hatred. Although there is a general impression that the two-decade-long insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir-the country’s only Muslim-majority state-is in remission, it still festers. Last year the conflict killed more than 800 people. This year more than 30 unarmed demonstrators were killed in mass protests against Indian rule. Tension there is again high as a state election, which separatist leaders want boycotted, is under way. Elsewhere in India, the Muslim minority is economically disadvantaged. A report the government commissioned in 2006 found Muslims across the country faring, on average, worse than the Hindu majority in education, jobs and income. And Muslims have occasionally been subject to hideous communal slaughter. More than 2,000 died in a pogrom in the state of Gujarat in 2002, for which the perpetrators have never been brought to justice.
印度巨大的穆斯林人口数量对于希望散播仇恨的人来说无异于一块沃土。尽管人们笼统的认为印控克什米尔地区长达20年的叛乱开始缓和，但这个唯一以穆斯林为主的省份依然是千疮百孔。去年有800人死于冲突，今年超过30个手无寸铁的示威者在主题为反对印度统治的示威中被杀。在地区选举即将开始的时候，该区域分离主义领袖表示拒绝参选，致使紧张形势再度高涨。在印度的其他地区，穆斯林少数民族处于经济劣势。根据政府部门2006年进行的调查结果，印度境内穆斯林人群总体来说在教育、就业和收入方面的情况不及占人口多数的印度教人群；同时穆斯林人权偶尔还会遭受到恐怖的宗教屠杀。2002年发生在古吉拉特邦的集体迫害导致2000多人死亡，而犯罪者至今仍然逍遥法外。

That pogrom followed allegations that a Muslim mob had been responsible for the deaths of Hindu activists. This highlights one of the dangers facing India now: of a rise in communal tension and tit-for-tat violence. A general election is due by next May, which adds to the risks. One of India’s two biggest parties, the Bharatiya Janata Party, now in opposition, champions the rights of India’s Hindus. Accusing the Congress-led government of being “soft on terrorism” is a campaign tactic it has often used. In this it may now be constrained by the recent arrest of alleged Hindu bombers, seeking to avenge the attacks by the Indian Mujahideen. But the emergence of that new phenomenon-Hindu terrorism-is scarcely a comfort.
那次大屠杀的导火索是一个指控：一个穆斯林暴民对印度教活动家的死亡负有直接责任。这也突出了印度目前所面对的危险：宗教对立紧张关系的升级以及睚眦必报的暴力行为。明年5月全国普选即将举行，这也增加了该地区的危险。印度国民党是该国两大党派中的一个，但现在处于反对党的地位，积极倡导印度教众的权利。印度国民党在选战中常用的战术是指责国会领导的政府在打击恐怖主义方面表现得过为软弱。不过近期这种言论因为一些印度教人肉炸弹的被捕而有所收敛，这些恐怖分子是为了报复”印度圣战者”组织实施的袭击。印度教恐怖主义这一新现象的出现对政府来说如芒在背。

The usual suspects
常规嫌犯

A second danger is that if Indian suspicions again point to a Pakistani involvement, the slow thawing of relations between the two hostile neighbours will revert to the deep freeze. In fact Pakistan’s new president, Asif Zardari, has been going out of his way-and courting controversy at home-to placate India. He has annoyed jihadists by describing Kashmiri militants as “terrorists” (as India has long wanted them to be known). And he has said Pakistan would never be first to use its nuclear weapons. This week it has also emerged that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, the spook network habitually blamed by India for involvement in cross-border attacks, has been revamped. Its “political” arm (previously, in theory, non-existent) is said to have been disbanded. So any official Pakistani involvement would suggest that Mr Zardari and his government are not in control.
第二重危险在于如果印度人再一次将怀疑的矛头直指巴基斯坦人的介入，这对恶邻得来不易的缓和关系将会再度陷入深寒。实际上巴基斯坦的新总统扎尔达里已经竭尽所能的与印度达成和解，但此举却在巴国内引发了论战；他形容克什米尔激进分子形容为”恐怖分子”，该评论是印度方面觊觎以久的结果，却惹恼了巴基斯坦圣战者；扎尔达里还表示巴基斯坦绝不会率先使用核武器。三军情报局是巴基斯坦的间谍网落，该机构经常被印度指责进行跨境袭击，本周该机构的修整动向又浮出水面；同时巴基斯坦的”政治”武装据说已经完成遣散工作，但先前该武装在理论上是根本不存在的。所以任何巴基斯坦的官方介入都会暗示出扎尔达里及其政府已经失去了对事态的控制。

A third danger is one that faces not just India, but the world as a whole: that the attacks in Mumbai mark a serious setback or even turning-point in the battle against al-Qaeda and its clones. The group has been losing ground in some of the Muslim countries where it has been fighting: in Indonesia, for example, where since the Bali bombings in 2002 the extremists have been in retreat; or in Iraq, where the Sunni “awakening” illuminated the resentment many Iraqis felt for the terrorists. Killing fellow Muslims has been the group’s biggest mistake. But countries where Muslims are in a minority may offer terrorists a better target. Many Muslims in such places feel marginalised, pushed to the fringes of society. Attacks there can provoke a backlash, feeding a sense of Muslim beleaguerment for al-Qaeda to exploit. This tactic has already worked in places such as Britain. If it succeeds in India, which has the biggest Muslim minority in the world, the implications for the global struggle against terrorism could be catastrophic.
第三种危险不仅是印度所需要面对的，整个世界都要对之提高警惕：孟买的恐怖袭击事件标志着抗击基地组织及类似恐怖主义组织的斗争受到了一系列的挫折，甚至是出现了不利的转折点。恐怖组织在那些浴血战斗的穆斯林国家中一度失去了一些阵地：以印尼为例，2002年巴厘岛爆炸发生后，那里的极端主义分子已经处于收缩状态；在伊拉克，逊尼派的”觉醒”证明了很多伊拉克人对恐怖分子的憎恨。牺牲穆斯林同胞是这些组织所犯的最大错误，不过那些穆斯林人口处于少数的国家则成为恐怖分子采取行动的有利场所，那里的穆斯林感到自身被边缘化、被迫生存与社会的边缘。在这些地区发动袭击可以引发敌对性反应，灌输穆斯林被围困的感觉让基地组织有机可乘。这个战术在英国等地区得到了很好的检验，印度的穆斯林少数民族数量全球第一，如果基地组织的战术在印度还能成功，那么全球反恐战争为此受到的连累将是灾难性的。

译者：Tidehunter  http://www.ecocn.org/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=15784&extra=page%3D1