America’s nuclear deal with India
美印核交易
Time to decide
当断则断
Aug 28th 2008
From The Economist print edition
There should be no exemption for India from the world’s nuclear rules
全球核规定不应为印度网开一面
IN A dangerous and unstable world, isn’t cementing friendship with an up-and-coming power such as India worth breaking a few rules for? That is the reasoning behind the Bush administration’s championing of a controversial civilian nuclear deal with India, which George Bush and India’s Manmohan Singh struck in 2005. To take effect it now needs only an India-sized hole to be punched next week in the global rules on nuclear trade and then a final nod from America’s Congress.
在现今这个危险而又动荡的世界格局中，为了和印度这样的崛起国家套近乎而违反一些规定，似乎很是值得。这也是布什政府虽然备受争议，但仍然倡导同印度签订民用核技术协议的幕后原因，该协议由布什和曼莫汉•辛格签订于2005年。目前该协议的生效还需要全球核贸易规则在下周为印度破例一次，然后就只差美国国会的首肯了。
The trade restrictions of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) are supposed to apply to countries that, like India, have built bombs rather than sign up to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In return for exempting India from these restrictions, the Bush administration hopes India will be a bulwark against China. Doubters in Congress and opponents abroad have also been lectured on the supposed benefits of bringing India into the “non-proliferation mainstream”.
由45个成员组成的核供应国集团所规定的贸易限制，正应该适用于印度这样已经拥有核弹的国家，而不是那些签订了核不扩散条约的国家。作为获得突破限制条件的交换，布什政府希望印度可以成为对抗中国的防御堡垒。而对于让印度加入不扩散主流群体这一假想结果所带来的好处，无论是国会中犹豫不决的人还是海外的反对者，都得到了训诫。
The deal is being mis-sold on both counts. Some see it as a Nixon-to-China moment: Nixon opened diplomatic relations with Communist China to balance the Soviet Union; doing nuclear favours for India now will help balance a rising China. But India has no intention of picking America’s fights with China. The pending deal has, it is true, persuaded India to back without enthusiasm demands at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN’s nuclear guardian, for Iran to suspend suspect nuclear work. But Indian contacts with Iran, and other unsavoury regimes, remain unhelpfully close. The high-water mark of India’s helpfulness, such as it was, is passing.
但是这个协议在双方都没有买到好。一些人把该举动同尼克松时期的中美关系做类比：尼克松为了制衡苏联而与共产主义中国建立了外交关系；目前在核问题上力挺印度来制衡崛起的中国。但是印度却无意为了美国而挑起和中国的争端。这个选而未决的协议确实令印度有所退缩，因为作为联合国的核问题的监督组织，国际原子能机构没有积极的要求伊朗停止一切疑似核技术工作。而印度与伊朗以及其他一些政权保持着密切的联系，尽管这些政权不受西方欢迎，但是印度对此无动于衷。印度的获助高潮已然逝去。
As for India contributing to non-proliferation, the opposite is happening: the anti-proliferation consensus is being ruptured. For India, an exemption from NSG restrictions on nuclear trade would be an answer to its nuclear prayers: but its military ones, not its civilian ones. India is short of usable uranium. If it could buy foreign fuel for its civilian reactors, it could devote more of the stuff it makes at home to bomb-building. That alone ought to give pause to any government that takes seriously its obligation under the NPT’s Article 1: not to help others in any way with weapons-building.
印度在核不扩散方面的影响是负面的：该协议使防止可扩散的共识正在发生分裂。在印度而言，核供应国集团在交易限制上开放的绿灯是他祷告的福音，只不过受益的是军事用途，而不是民用的。印度没有可用的铀，如果他可以从国外购买到民用反应堆使用的燃料，那么就可以在家里直接把制造出来东西投入到核弹中。仅这一条就应该让那些严格遵守核不扩散条约的政府中止同意该协议的想法，条约第一条就明文规定”不能以任何方式帮助他人制造武器”。
Unlike members of the NSG, India has not only failed to sign the NPT, it has not signed the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty either. It claims to support a treaty to cut off the production of fissile material for bombs, knowing full well that negotiations on that treaty have been stuck for years. And unlike America, Russia, Britain, France and China, the five official nuclear powers, it refuses to cap uranium and plutonium production for military uses. India has agreed to put more civilian reactors under IAEA safeguards-but on the unilateral insistence it can take “special measures” (like tossing inspectors out) if its other demands are not met. These include the uninterrupted supply of foreign uranium fuel and help in building up a strategic fuel reserve.
与核供应商集团的成员不同，印度不光没有签订核不扩散条约，就连全面禁止核试验的协议也没有签订。印度宣称支持某个协议，削减用于制造核弹裂变材料的产量；但是众所周知，那个协议的谈判已经搁置了多年。与美、俄、英、法、中这五个正式的核武器国家不同，印度拒绝停止铀和钚用于军事目的的生产。印度已经同意国际能源组织对更多的民用反应堆进行监管，但是如果他的其他要求没有得到满足，那么就会单方面坚持采取”特殊手段”，例如把观察员扔出去。要求中包括不间断的向印度提供铀燃料以及建立战略性核燃料储备。
India’s purpose is clear. It wants to leave itself the option of more bomb tests in future, while being able to ride out any sanctions-including from America, whose laws would require them-that would follow. Congress may not have noticed, but American officials have been coaching India in avoidance tactics: buy your uranium fuel from others, not us, they suggest, and you’re in the clear.
印度的意图尽人皆知：拥有更多在未来进行核弹测试的机会，同时还要安然度过所有随后可能发生的制裁，包括美国依法作出的制裁决定。也许美国国会还么有意识到，但是他们的官员一直在调教印度如何避免美国制裁的战术：他们建议印度从别人那里购买铀燃料，而不是美国，这样就清白了。
Just say no
他们应该说不
The NSG was set up precisely to stop countries doing what India did to get a start in the bomb business: abusing technology and skills provided for civilian purposes. The group’s ban on trade with countries that break the non-proliferation rules has been the chief underpinning of the NPT regime. Waive the ban and the NSG will have little point. It should refuse to make an exception for India. And so should America’s Congress.
核供应国集团成立的初衷恰恰就是为了防止有人从事印度正在进行的工作：滥用为民用目的而提供的核技术以及核工艺进行核弹研制。集团禁绝同违反核不扩散规则的国家进行贸易，这正是核不扩散条约最重要的基础。放弃贸易禁令会使和供应国集团变得毫无意义，它应该拒绝对印度网开一面，美国国会同样应该对印度说不。
译者：Tidehunter http://www.ecocn.org/forum/viewthread.php?tid=13757&extra=page%3D1