Buttonwood
梧桐树专栏
A Nightmare on Wall Street
华尔街的梦魇
Aug 28th 2008
From The Economist print edition
Why the credit crunch has lasted so long
此次次贷危机为何持续如此之久?
LIKE a Hollywood monster that is impervious to bullets, the credit crisis refuses to lie down and die. The authorities have bombarded it with interest-rate reductions, tax cuts, special liquidity schemes and bank bail-outs, but still the creature lumbers forward, threatening new victims with every step. Global stockmarkets are suffering double-digit losses this year, and credit markets are once again gummed up.
正如好莱坞电影中那刀枪不入的怪物,此次次贷危机不甘就此倒下,走向末路。尽管当局采取下调利率、减免税赋、特别流动性计划及扶持银行这一系列措施对抗这只怪物,但这只怪物依然匍匐走动,而且每走一步,威吓着新的受害者。今年,全球股市已遭受了两位数的损失的同时,信贷市场也再次变得一团糟。
For investors who cut their teeth in the 1980s and 1990s, the persistence of the crisis must be a surprise. Prompt action by central banks, after Black Monday in 1987 (when America’s stockmarket fell by almost 23%), or following the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund, in 1998, suggested it was always worthwhile to “buy on the dips”.
对于那些20世纪八九十年代投资新手而言,这次危机持续时间之长绝对是一个奇迹。在1987年的黑色星期一(当天美国股市下跌了近23%),或在1998年名为长期资本管理的对冲基金轰然垮塌之后,中央银行所采取的即时行动暗示道:在股票下跌时买入总是划算的。
One reason why things are different this time is that there has been a double shock. On top of the decline in house prices and the associated drop in the prices of asset-backed securities, the markets have also had to face a surge in commodity prices. That has constrained central banks from easing monetary policy as much as they might have done, particularly in Britain and the euro zone. Even in America, rates might now perhaps be 1% (as they were in 2003) without the commodity boom.
这次危机和以前不同的一个原因是它会造成双重冲击。除了房价和与之相关的资产担保证券的下跌外,市场还不得不面临物价的疯长。这抑制了央行不能尽可能的发挥宽松货币政策的作用,尤其是在英国和欧元区。甚至在美国,要不是物价的上涨,利率现在可能是1%了,和2003年时的利率一样。
In addition, the combination of the two shocks has created uncertainty about the direction of monetary and regulatory policy. Will the central banks be forced to “do a Turkey” and adjust their inflation targets upward (implicitly or explicitly) to reflect reality? Alternatively, will they crack down so hard on inflation that they force their economies into recession? And will the price of investment-bank rescues be a harsh new regulatory regime that restricts the scope for future credit (and economic) growth? In the face of all this uncertainty, investors can hardly be blamed for being cautious.
此外,这双重冲击的紧密结合使货币和监管政策所能产生的效果具有不确定性。央行会被迫吃螃蟹,上调通胀预期目标(不管是含蓄地还是明确地)以反映现实情况吗?或者,央行会为应对通胀采取苛刻的措施而使经济陷入衰退吗?再或者,为帮助投行脱离困境所付出的代价会成为新的监管体制阻碍未来信贷和经济的发展吗?面对所有这些不确定性,投资者的小心谨慎不足为过。
The way that the crisis has centred on the banking industry also explains its duration. Stephen King, an economist at HSBC, points out that the financial crises of the 1990s were also prolonged, from the savings and loan collapses in America through the Swedish banking rescues to the extremes of Japan’s debt deflation. As Mr King says, “if banks are unable or unwilling to lend, monetary policy doesn’t work so well.”
次贷危机以银行业为中心的方式解读了危机长时间的持续。汇丰银行经济学家Stephen King指出二十世纪九十年代的金融危机也持续了很长时间,从因瑞典银行的”救援措施”造成的美国储蓄和借贷崩溃到日本负债的紧缩,正如Mr King所说”如果银行没有能力或不愿意借出款项,货币政策将不会那么有效运行。”
Worse still, bank problems create a feedback loop with the rest of the economy. When banks get into difficulty, they restrict their lending. That in turn makes life more difficult for companies and consumers, causing them to cut their spending and making it harder for them to repay their debts. That forces further caution on the banks.
更糟的是,银行问题反作用于经济的其他领域。一旦银行陷入困境,它们就会紧缩银根,这反过来会使企业和消费者的日子更加难过,他们不得不减少支出,同样也会使他们更难偿还债务。这又引起了人们对银行的进一步担心。
Recent economic data have highlighted how the gloom is spreading. Neither Germany nor Japan enjoyed a credit boom earlier this decade but both economies are suffering. Business confidence in Germany fell to its lowest level in three years, according to the latest Ifo survey, released on August 26th. “The credit crunch is morphing from an American-centred financial crisis into a global economic crisis,” says David Bowers of Absolute Strategy Research, a consultancy.
近期的经济数据强调了这种担忧是如何扩散开的。近十年来无论德国或是日本的信贷市场都没有得到发展,但它们的经济却都遭受了损失。根据公布于8月26号的经济研究所调查显示,德国的商业信用指数已经跌至近三年的最低点。就职于名为完全战略研究中心咨询机构的David Bowers说到”以美国为中心的金融危机已经引起了全球性的信贷紧缩。”
Another reason why the crisis is lasting so long stems from the nature of the previous boom. Everyone was borrowing money, from homeowners buying houses they could not afford in the hope of capital gains, to investors buying complex debt products with high yields because of the extra “carry”.
次贷危机持续时间如此之久的另一个原因要归咎于前期经济繁荣的本质。那时,每个人都在借钱,从一些是原本买不起房子,为获得资本收益而借钱买房的普通百姓,到因资金富余而购买高收益的复杂债券产品的投资者。
These investors were, directly or indirectly, beholden to the banks. Even when money was borrowed from “the market”, the lenders may well have been hedge funds, conduits or structured-investment vehicles, all of which had themselves borrowed money from banks in the first place. That former wellhead of finance has now run fairly dry.
这些投资者都直接或者间接地从银行借款的。甚至当资金是从市场上借来的,放款机构可能是对冲基金、各种融资渠道或投资机构,但所有这些借来的钱最初也都是从银行借来的。以前的资金源泉现在已经干涸了。
In turn, that explains the absence of bargain hunters, particularly in the debt markets. Investment-grade debt might look attractive on a five-year view, if all you have to worry about is the risk of default. But most investors in that market have a three- or six-month view; they cannot afford for things to get worse before they get better, in case they are forced into a fire-sale of their assets.
反过来,那又解释了投机商为何撤离市场,尤其是债券市场。如果你只需担心违约风险,那么五年期的投资级债券可能看起来很有吸引力。但市场上的大多数投资者只有3至6个月的预期,在情况变好前他们不能接受境况的恶化,以防他们被迫贱卖他们的资产。
So the markets (and the developed economies) are waiting for a catalyst for recovery. Lower commodity prices helped for a while, and may help further if they encourage central banks to cut rates. Evidence of a bottom in the American housing market may also do the trick. But the crisis seems certain to linger into 2009, and could even make it into the following year. Successful horror movies tend, after all, to have several sequels.
因此市场和发达经济体正等待着经济复苏的催化剂。降低物价在短时间内有助于经济恢复,而鼓励央行降低利率则能在长期内发挥作用。如果美国房价见底信号出现,这将同样是经济走好的一个好消息。但是危机看上去势必将持续到2009年,甚至是随后的2010年。毕竟,一部成功的恐怖片,倾向拍几部续集。
译者:all-blue,revised by santclaire http://www.ecocn.org/forum/viewthread.php?tid=13668&extra=page%3D1
from the savings and loan collapses in America through the Swedish banking rescues to the extremes of Japan’s debt deflation.
“从因瑞典银行的”救援措施”造成的美国储蓄和借贷崩溃到日本负债的紧缩”
这句话翻译错了。
美国储蓄和借贷崩溃也进一步促成了瑞典银行的被迫“救援行动”和日本负债的紧缩。
from 表示从何而来,through通过,最后to到达日本。
说明美国的储蓄和借贷崩溃才是根源。这场危机危及到了瑞典的银行业,迫使政府救援银行,然后又危及到了日本。