[2008.08.09] 信用危机：恐惧中过活的岁月

The credit crunch
信用危机

The year of living dangerously
恐惧中过活的岁月

Aug 7th 2008
From The Economist print edition

As the crunch grinds past its first anniversary, central banks’ credibility is still at risk
虽然信用危机已经度过了第一年,但是中央银行的威信还是存在危机

ON AUGUST 9th 2007, after an alarming leap in interbank interest rates, the European Central Bank signalled its readiness to provide the banking system with the liquidity it suddenly lacked. What became known, with irresistible alliteration, as the credit crunch had begun. A year on, the crunch continues. Indeed, recent data suggest that Europe and Japan are flirting with recession. America has so far stood up surprisingly well; but banks there (and elsewhere) are still in pain.
2007年8月9日，银行拆借利率出现预警性骤增后，欧洲中央银行暗示准备针对银行系统清偿能力不足的情况向其提供帮助；于是信用危机以其隆隆的战鼓声引起了人们的关注。一年之后，危机仍在继续中，实际上近期数据表明欧洲和日本正在应对经济衰退。令人惊奇的是美国截至目前为止状况还算不错；但是美国以及美国以外地区的银行仍然处于痛苦的状态中。

Worse, a second shock-higher commodity prices-has made life doubly difficult for central banks. The combination of dearer commodities and a squeeze on credit has presented them with a conflict between their two main tasks: preserving the health of the financial system and controlling inflation.
更糟糕的是由商品价格走高所引发的第二轮冲击波让中央银行的日子更加难过。高昂的商品价格和信用紧缩的叠加突出体现出他们两个主要使命之间的相互矛盾:保持金融系统的健康状态以及控制通货膨胀.

To date, the central banks have just about passed the test. Their willingness to provide liquidity has prevented financial markets from melting down completely, despite some hairy moments. And the recent decline in oil prices may ease their worries about inflation.
到此为止，中央银行勉强通过了测试。虽然经历了一些恐慌时刻，但提供清偿能力的意愿已经阻止了金融市场的全面崩溃。同时国际油价近期的走低也许可以减轻他们对于通胀的担忧。

But there have been many embarrassments along the way. The financial system was not as robust as most regulators thought. Banks had not shed risk altogether; it was hidden off their balance-sheets. The British tripartite system of oversight was ineffectual in the Northern Rock crisis. Inflation has been well above target rates in Britain and the euro area and outside the comfort zone of America’s Federal Reserve.
但是一路走来已经是窘境不断。金融体系的健康程度已经不象大多数管理者想象的那样。银行早已不再共同抵御风险，而是掩藏其各自的资产负债表。英国三方监管体系在英国抵押银行危机中已经失去了效力。通胀率已经大大超过了英国和欧盟区的目标水平，并且已经离开了美联储的适宜范围。

Worst of all, perhaps, is the perception that central banks have acted out of a desire to rescue their “friends” in the financial sector. Steelworkers and coalminers have to face grim economic reality and see their companies liquidated; bankers, it seems, do not. As Nouriel Roubini, an American economist, has remarked, this smacks of “socialism for the rich”.
最糟糕的也许是金融领域内对中央银行的观念，人们认为其行为体现不出挽救朋友的意愿。钢铁工人和煤矿工人不得不面对公司破产这一残酷的经济现实；而银行的境地似乎不致于此。正如美国经济学家Nouriel Roubini评论的那样，已经有些”富人社会主义”的味道了。

The reason for saving a big financial institution that gets into trouble is the economic havoc its failure can cause. The historically minded need no
reminding of the Great Depression-least of all Ben Bernanke, the Fed’s chairman, an expert on the subject. It seems plausible that, even if the risk of catastrophe is slight, no chances should be taken. To borrow the title of a popular book: shoot black swans on sight.
挽救主要金融机构，使其远离麻烦的原因是为了避免其崩溃所引致的大破坏。这种富有历史背景的想法无需大萧条来提醒，至少对于这个问题的专家，美联储主席Ben Bernanke是无需提醒的。按理来说，即使灾害风险较小，也不应冒险；但借用一本畅销书的题目来说，机不可失，失不再来。

We are all Keynesians again
我们又都回归凯恩斯理论了

The problem is that trigger-happy intervention also has its drawbacks. It has long been accepted that retail depositors should be protected, to maintain their faith in the financial system. But ten years ago the Fed helped organise the rescue of Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund (although no public money was involved). This year it went further and gave guarantees to Bear Stearns, an investment bank with no retail depositors. Last month it played its part in shoring up Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the twin quasi-private giants of the American mortgage market. If financial institutions are deemed too big and too complex to fail, their managers will have an incentive to make them big and complex.
问题在于随意的干预总体现出障碍性，长久以来人们一直以为出于稳定小额储户对金融系统信心的考虑，他们应该受到保护。但是十年前，联储帮助组织了对”长期资本管理”的援救，这是一个对冲基金，没有公众资金的介入。今年联储对Bear Stearns这个完全没有小额储户的投行进行了更加深入的帮助–对它进行担保。上个月，联储又支持了美国抵押信贷市场的孪生巨子，Fannie Mae 和 Freddie Mac。如果金融机构因为规模大、运作复杂而不可以倒闭，那么他们的管理层就会因为这个原因而使之变得巨大而复杂。

All this is reminiscent of the history of Keynesian economics. John Maynard Keynes explained how a sudden drop in investment could lead to a long-lived slump, because prices, wages and interest rates would not adjust enough to encourage fresh spending. The solution was for governments to provide the demand needed to return to full employment. By the 1960s and 1970s, Keynesian demand management was being used to try to avoid any kind of downturn. The result was an expansionary bias in policy and, eventually, inflation.
所有这些都是对凯恩斯经济学的历史回顾。他的理论解释了投资的突降如何导致经济的长期暴跌：因为物价、工资和利率无法同步做出足量调整从而刺激新鲜消费。解决之道是政府采取一切手段来实现就业充足。20世纪60-70年代，凯恩斯需求管理理论被使用来避免低迷时期的出现。其结果是政治上的极度偏见和最终的通胀。

The “no bank left behind” policy of central banks has not yet led to the kind of inflation seen in the 1970s. But cutting interest rates as a first response to any distress in the financial sector has helped to blow bubbles in asset prices-dotcom stocks in the late 1990s, house prices in the 2000s. And it has led to a speculative mentality in financial markets, demonstrated by the importance of trading to investment banks’ profits. Why not take risks, if you know that central banks will intervene only in falling, not rising, markets?
中央银行”不放弃任何一家银行”的政策还没有导致任何类似于70年代的通胀。但是金融领域以削减利率为表现的困境初期反应已经制造了房产价格泡沫–包括90年代的IT股价和2000年的房屋价格。为什么不冒险（投机）呢，如果你知道中央银行只会在（市场）衰退时进行干预，而不会在（市场）衰退时进行干预。
The idea of giving central banks independence was that they would take decisions from which politicians would shrink. The central banks’ credibility depends on being prepared to do two unpopular things: raising interest rates, despite the economic pain, and letting financial institutions fail.
给予中央银行更独立的地位是为了让他们在政客犹豫不决的时候做出决定。中央银行的信誉就是建立在时刻准备做出两件不受欢迎的决定的基础上：不顾经济苦难而提高利率，以及放手让部分金融机构崩溃。

With interest rates that independence is (or should be) easy to maintain. Rescues are harder: public money benefits some firms and not others, and political pressure is easier to exert. Alan Greenspan, the previous Fed chairman, has one answer: a new, separate body to deal with bank rescues (see article). The central bankers would be consulted, of course, but the decision on whether to use taxpayers’ money has to rest with elected politicians. In practice, this could be hard to achieve, but he has identified one principle. Central banks’ credibility should be focused where it is most needed, on controlling inflation. That credibility was too hard-won to be tossed away.
有了利率武器，就应该可以保持住相对独立的地位。但进行救助则更加艰难：公众资金的受益者不是别人，而是一些公司；因此政治压力比较容易发挥影响作用。联储前主席格林斯潘曾经有一个答案:成立一个全新而独立的机构来应对银行的援救问题。中央银行家们可以作为顾问，但是否使用纳税人资金的决定应该留给选举出的政客来作出。在现实中这也许很难实现，但是他定义出一个原则：央行的威信应该集中在最需要的地方–控制通胀。这个威信得来实属不易，不应该就这么牺牲掉。

译者：Tidehunter    http://www.ecocn.org/forum/viewthread.php?tid=13239&extra=page%3D1