[2006.07.13][Special]Russia: Richer, bolder—and sliding back


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Special Report


Richer, bolder—and sliding back

Jul 13th 2006 | NALCHIK
From The Economist print edition

The G8 leaders meeting in St Petersburg this weekend will find Vladimir Putin’s Russia assertive, oil-fired and authoritarian
本周在圣彼德堡举行的G8首脑会晤将昭示出弗拉基米尔·普京统治下的俄罗斯是个刚愎自用、石油驱动和独裁专制 [1] 的国度

  SHOES from Lobb’s, the poshest boot-maker in London, were not available in Yekaterinburg until Igor Markin opened his shop last year. It sits on the edge of a park that once belonged to the tsars, not far from where the last of them was murdered. Because of its defence industries, Yekaterinburg was a closed city for much of the Soviet era. In the 1990s it was notorious, even by Russian standards, for its gangsters. These days, says Mr Markin, Yekaterinburg’s highest-rollers often spend $50,000 or more in his store.
  总部位于伦敦的制靴商Lobb’s [2] ,是专做奢侈型鞋子的品牌,过去从未在俄罗斯的叶卡特琳堡开辟销路(或者可以翻成过去从未涉足俄罗斯的叶卡特琳堡的市场),直到伊格尔·马尔金(Igor Markin)去年在该市开店,这种局面才得以改观。该店坐落在一家公园的周边地带,过去这里是属于罗曼诺夫家族(沙皇家族)的领地,离末代沙皇被谋杀的地点不远。由于叶卡特琳堡的国防工业是其一大特色,因此在苏联时期的大半岁月中该城与外界接触寥寥。上世纪90年代,即便是按照俄罗斯的标准来看,该城也因为其猖獗的黑帮活动而名声狼籍。据马尔金称,如今叶卡特琳堡的大款们经常来他的店消费,而且出手阔绰,营业额时常能超过50,000美圆。


Admirers of President Vladimir Putin, who plays host to the G8 summit in St Petersburg this weekend, argue that the new wealth so conspicuous in Moscow has spread to other parts of Russia too. They are right. In Yekaterinburg, over 1,400km (nearly 900 miles) from the capital, others besides Mr Markin’s clientele are prospering. Old buildings have been spruced up; restaurants, hotels and supermarkets are opening. So, soon, will the final adornment of any upwardly mobile city: an IKEA. The traffic jams may soon rival Moscow’s. Most of the gangsters have died, fled, gone to jail or into politics. Local industry, now partly civilian, is sucking in workers from all over Russia. More and more people are visiting America and Europe. Compared with the 1990s, says Svetlana Garipova of the municipal government, it is “absolutely another country”.
  弗拉基米尔·普京总统的崇拜者们本周在圣彼德堡尽地主之宜筹办(或者直接翻成主办也可以)G8峰会,认为在莫斯科取得的显著经济成就也扩展到了俄罗斯的其他地方。他们是正确的。在距首都超过1,400公里(接近900英里)的叶卡特琳堡,除开马尔金的客户增多之外,其他事物也在蓬勃发展。老旧建筑翻修/修葺一新;餐馆、旅店和超市陆续开张。很快,与这经济飞跃相映成趣的最后修饰就将粉墨登场:宜家家居。该市的交通堵塞也将能够与莫斯科的一决高下。大部分黑帮已销声匿迹,死的死、逃的逃、身陷囹圄/锒铛入狱抑或是步入政坛。当地的工业,如今部分已是制造民用产品的厂家,吸收了来自俄罗斯各地的工人。越来越多的人有幸能赴美国和欧洲参观。在市政府供职的斯维特拉娜·加里波娃(Svetlana Garipova)告诉本报,这与90年代比起来,“完全是判若两国。
  For many Russians, life is indisputably better than in 1999, when, after a decade of coups, wars and economic catastrophe, Boris Yeltsin bequeathed the presidency to Mr Putin. Mr Putin can boast to his guests, in fact, that life for many of his countrymen is better than ever before in their nation’s history.
  对于许多俄罗斯人来讲,如今的日子比起1999年的时候,有了无可争议的提高。当年,经历了十载的政变、战祸和经济灾难,鲍里斯·叶利钦(Boris Yeltsin)把总统的席位交付给了普京。的确,普京可以向他的来宾们夸耀:在他的治理下,俄罗斯国民的生活水平较之国家历史上的任何时期都要来得好。

  This achievement rests partly on a virtue not previously associated with Russian governments: strict macroeconomic management. Mr Putin seems to regard foreign debt as a sort of national insult, and is paying most of it off. Inflation, at 9.1%, is high by Western standards but low by Russian ones. Alexei Kudrin, the finance minister, attributes the strong growth of recent years mainly to the new political stability brought about by Mr Putin.
  这样的成就部分缘于俄罗斯政府的功劳,而这点过去鲜有提及:严格的宏观经济调控。普京似乎将外债视为国耻,因此正在偿还其中的大半。9.1%的通货膨胀率依西方标准而言较高,而以俄罗斯的尺度衡量则较低。阿列克谢·库尔德林(Alexei Kudrin),俄政府的财政部长,将近年来强劲的经济增长势头主要归结为普京恢复的政治稳定。

  But the success needs qualification. One blemish is that though a Russian middle class has begun to emerge, it is almost matched in size—about a quarter of the population, say some—by the number of Russians still living below the poverty line. All in all, as Mr Kudrin acknowledges, Russia is only just recovering the standard of living that it enjoyed in 1990.

  An hour’s drive from the neon of central Moscow are villages in which living conditions are primitive. An inconspicuous urban underclass lives in squalor. Russia still has more poor white people than any other country, though their number diminishes each year. No wonder: with male life expectancy below 59, the population shrinks by about 750,000 a year.

  It should also be noted that Mr Putin has been lucky, indeed exceptionally so. As sceptics like to point out, his formidable popularity rating, in percentage points, almost matches the price of oil, in dollars per barrel (now about $74). Officials in Yekaterinburg say the city’s prosperity does not depend on oil and gas, but they undoubtedly contribute to the local boom. So it is with Russia as a whole.

  But neither popularity nor petro-prosperity has strengthened Mr Putin’s zeal for economic reform. Indeed, his early commitment has waned as the new money has gushed in, leaving Russia precariously dependent on the oil price. About $77 billion has been put aside into a rainy-day fund, but—much to Mr Kudrin’s anxiety—the pressure to spend some of it is rising.

  Another cause for concern is that Russia’s growth has in some ways come despite, rather than because of, Mr Putin’s policies. These have included the destruction of Yukos, once the country’s foremost oil firm. Yukos’s boss, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, incurred the Kremlin’s wrath by, among other things, buying votes in parliament. He is now in a Siberian prison camp—“for political reasons”, according to Igor Shuvalov, a remarkably candid Kremlin aide. “Once you behead someone,” he says, “you give a good example [to Russia’s other tycoons] of how to behave.” Those “oligarchs” not in prison or exile are indeed politically quiescent.
  另一个让人担心的理由是俄罗斯的经济增长在某些方面并非得益于普京的政策,而是与其无关。这些例子包括了搞垮尤科斯公司,后者过去曾是该国首屈一指的石油公司。尤科斯的老板,米哈伊尔·霍多尔科夫斯(Mikhail Khodorkovsky)除开其他行径 [3] ,由于其在议会里收买议员而招致了克里姆林宫的怨恨。他如今“因为政治原因”在西伯利亚的战俘营[4] 中服刑——伊格尔·舒瓦洛夫(Igor Shuvalov),一位相当直率的克里姆林宫内助理如是告诉本报。“一旦你对某人‘实施斩首’”他说,“通过杀鸡儆猴(警告俄罗斯其他大亨),你可以告知对方要规规矩矩。”那些没有身陷囹圄和流亡海外的“寡头”的确在政治上都选择了“沉默是金”。(明哲保身)

  Foreign investors, spooked at first by Yukos’s misfortune, have forgiven if not forgotten. But the damage has been lasting. In Russia, the episode affirmed, power still counts for more than the law. As in the days of the tsars, property is held only at the discretion of the Kremlin. (Weak property rights, and the state of the courts, says Mr Kudrin, are big economic problems.)
  那些开始担心尤科斯不幸遭遇会殃及自身的外国投资者,从本来惊慌失措到原谅(我个人认为forgive在这里翻成饶恕、或者容忍会更好——译者注)了这一(打击寡头的)行径,即便他们难以忘却这一幕。但该事件造成的恶劣影响(个人认为照字面翻译为损害、危害就一点味道和内涵都没有了——译者注)却是经久不散/持久的。在俄罗斯,这出插曲再度昭示出权力远比法律来得重要。如同沙皇统治时期那样,拥有的财富不过是任凭克里姆林宫的处置。库尔德林称,虚弱的/不牢固的财产权,以及法院的地位/情况,[5] 都是巨大的经济问题。

  Another legacy of the affair is the state’s growing role in the energy industry, partly through Gazprom, a state-run gas giant, and partly through Rosneft, the state oil firm that acquired Yukos’s main asset via a rigged auction in 2004. Big companies in other industries, such as carmaking, have also been brought under state control. This trend, says Anatoly Chubais, the architect of Russia’s 1990s privatisations, “will not bring any positive results for the Russian economy.” As one tycoon puts it, greater state control might not matter if the state were Norway; but in Russia, it means lower efficiency and output.
  该事件另外的后续影响是国家一方面通过国营燃气巨擘——俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司(Gazprom),另一方面依靠国有石油公司——俄罗斯国有石油公司(Rosneft),在能源行业所起的作用越来越大。2004年俄罗斯国有石油公司通过非法拍卖获得了尤科斯的主要资产。其他行业的大公司,诸如汽车制造业,也已经被收归国有。阿纳托利·楚贝斯(Anatoly Chubais),俄罗斯90年代私有化的设计师称,这种趋势“不会给俄罗斯的经济带来任何积极成果。”如同一位大亨所阐述得那样,如果是挪威的话,那政府对经济更大的控制没有什么不良后果;但是在俄罗斯,这就意味着低效率和低产出。

More rot, and fewer people to stop it

  The campaign against Yukos encouraged—and may have been motivated by—a scourge that Mr Putin vowed to confront: corruption. The bandits may be quieter in places like Yekaterinburg, but the pay-offs they once extracted now accrue to corrupt bureaucrats instead. Hardened Russians generally divide officials into two categories: the utterly corrupt and the partially corrupt. The security services are rumoured to run all manner of criminal activities; the army is a cesspit of graft. Mystifying deals and decisions suggest that the money trail runs all the way to the Kremlin. Occasional anti-corruption purges and arrests look more like score-settling than genuine bids to clean the stables.
  The biggest blots on Mr Putin’s record, however, lie not in economic affairs but in other policies, especially those concerning civil and political freedom. Under Mr Putin, rising incomes have not been accompanied by the political liberalisation often thought to be prosperity’s corollary. In the formulation of Grigory Yavlinsky, a now-marginalised liberal politician, Mr Yeltsin took mistaken steps in the right direction—towards democracy. Mr Putin has taken correct steps in the wrong direction—towards an authoritarian petro-state. The president’s aides like to argue that, for every seemingly anti-democratic measure he introduces, analogies can be found in Western countries. What counts, however, is the overall picture. This is clear, and depressing: Russia today has little or no claim to be a democracy, not even the shabby, inadvertent kind of democracy it was becoming under Mr Yeltsin.
  然而,普京政绩的最大污点不在于经济事务,而是涉及其他领域,特别是那些关乎公民自由和政治自由的政策。在普京的统治下,收入的提高并未伴随着政治自由主义的出现,后者被认为是经济繁荣的必然产物。根据格里高利·雅夫林斯基(Grigory Yavlinsky),一位如今被边缘化了的自由派政客的阐述,叶利钦朝着正确的方向——朝向民主,迈出了错误的步伐,而普京则是朝着错误的方向—朝向一个独裁主义的石油国家,迈出了正确的步伐。总统的幕僚认为普京每一次看似反民主的举措,在西方国家都能寻找到类似的情况。然而真正重要的是总体形象。这点很清楚,而且也很让人沮丧:今天的俄罗斯鲜有宣称或者干脆不宣称自己是民主国家,即便是在叶利钦时期那种粗糙的、“无心插柳柳成荫”式的民主。

  As well as suborning the justice system, the campaign against Yukos deterred Russia’s businessmen from financing the Kremlin’s political opponents. Anyone who might conceivably represent a political threat,however slight, is today likely to face court proceedings, tax inspections and, if he chooses to start an electoral campaign, an array of obstructions (meetings banned, electricity switched off, etc).

  Both houses of parliament have been neutered, and new rules for political parties, and for elections, seem designed to keep them that way. United Russia, the only party that matters, has no ideology other than blind loyalty to the Kremlin. In some ways and places, it operates much like the old ruling party: to get certain jobs, it is said in Yekaterinburg, you need a party card. (“Whatever party we try to create,” an ex-prime minister of Russia once remarked, “we always end up with the Communist Party.”) Mr Putin has invented a new body,
called the public chamber, to give people a say in politics, forgetting perhaps that parliament is meant to do that.

  Non-governmental organisations that concern themselves with subjects such as human rights face harassment. After the recent introduction of onerous new obligations, they are likely to face more. And, apart from a few Moscow-based newspapers, the media are mostly supine.

  The state, or Kremlin-friendly businesses, have taken over various television stations and other assets. Radio stations that broadcast American-financed programmes are the latest to be squeezed. Across much of Russia most people get their national news only from television, and Russian television’s political coverage dwells largely on the president and his ministers and is almost entirely uncritical. In some regions, truly independent journalists suffer assault and murder. Elsewhere, they merely face unemployment.

  Mr Putin announced in 2004 that regional governors, hitherto elected, were instead to be appointed by him. The sleaze and criminality of many regional politicians made this seem almost sensible—until Mr Putin’s appointments began. Now the arrangement is clear: in return for basic fealty, suitable election results and political calm, appointed governors may do largely as they please.

  An extreme version of this contract applies to Chechnya, the most troublesome of all Russia’s regions. The Kremlin has fought two bloody wars there, the second of which helped put Mr Putin in the Kremlin.The place is now run by Ramzan Kadyrov, an erratic 29-year-old rebel turned Chechen prime minister whom Mr Putin has taken to his heart—and with some success, it can be said.
  这种“合同交易”的极端版本适合描述车臣的情况,俄罗斯所有疆土中最大的麻烦策源地。俄联邦军[6]在那已经打过两场血腥战争,其中的第二场帮助普京入主克里姆林宫。如今车臣由29岁的拉姆赞·卡德罗夫(Ramzan Kadyrov)管辖,他过去曾经是一名见风使舵的叛军,后来成为了车臣的总理,普京将他收为心腹——并且可以说取得了一定成功。

Better news from Chechnya

  The news this week of the death of Shamil Basayev, Russia’s terrorist-in-chief (see article), will certainly put an extra spring in Mr Putin’s step in St Petersburg. But even before Mr Basayev’s demise, it was clear that life in Chechnya was improving. Reconstruction money may still be disappearing, but roads and buildings are being repaired. Though they still come under frequent attack, Russian troops no longer fight big battles with separatist guerrillas. Sergei Ivanov, Russia’s defence minister, says many of the foreign mercenaries who once stiffened the resistance have decamped to Iraq. In Grozny, the capital, people can again go out at night.
  本周沙米尔·巴萨耶夫(Shamil Basayev),俄罗斯悬赏捉拿的头号恐怖分子的死讯肯定能使普京在圣彼德堡迈出的步伐格外昂扬。但即使是在巴萨耶夫殒命前,车臣的生活水平得到了提高就是显而易见的了。重建资金也许还会不翼而飞,但公路和建筑得到了修复。尽管它们依旧遭到频繁的攻击,俄军再也不用与分离主义游击队展开大规模战役了。谢尔盖·伊万诺夫(Sergei Ivanov),俄罗斯的国防部长,声称许多曾经一度使抵抗运动白热化的外国雇佣军如将活动地点转移到了伊拉克。在车臣首府格罗兹尼,人们又能在晚上外出了。
  But with Chechnya, too, there are shortcomings to set against the improvements. One is that Chechnya’s stability rests on one man, Mr Kadyrov, and he could be a dubious prop. Mr Kadyrov has dabbled with Islamism, stands accused of horrific atrocities and is orchestrating
his own cult of personality. Some say that skirmishes take place between federal troops and Mr Kadyrov’s, though Mr Ivanov denies it.
  The second difficulty is that the violence once concentrated in Chechnya is infecting the entire north Caucasus. Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria in the foothills of the Caucasus mountains, illustrates this deterioration. Its broad boulevards and lush parks seem peaceful, but the bullet holes are still visible on the government buildings attacked by about 150 armed men last October 13th.

One bloodbath, two stories
  There are two versions of what happened that day. According to the relations of the 92 attackers who died, it was not an act of terrorism but an “armed revolt”. For years, they say, the locals had been detained, tortured and humiliated by the security services because of their interpretation of Islam. Mosques were closed, and jobs lost, until, as Valery Khatazhukov, a local activist, puts it, “Only weapons were left.” Afterwards, it is said, the police arrested anyone they fancied, guilty or not.
  关于那天发生的事,有两个版本的解释。根据在进攻中丧生的92名武装人员的身份关系来看,这不是一起恐怖主义活动而是一次“武装起义”。他们称,多年来当地人因为他们对伊斯兰教的理解而遭到安全部门的拘留,折磨和羞辱。清真寺被关闭,工作也丢了。如今,如同当地的一名积极分子瓦雷利·哈塔朱可夫(Valery Khatazhukov)所说的那样,“只能采取暴力方式了。”在此之后,据说警方想逮捕谁就逮捕谁,不管有罪还是无罪。
  The other version, advanced by (among others) Mufti Anas Pshikhachev, the region’s official Muslim leader, is that some of the insurgents were paid to take part, while others were advocates of a pan-Caucasian Islamic state who were in league with Mr Basayev. Some even say the fighters, who seemed to have little or no military training, expected Mr Basayev’s forces to join them.
  另外一种版本的解释是由该地区官方穆斯林领袖,伊斯兰法学家阿纳斯·普什卡切夫(Anas Pshikhachev)提出的,事件的起因是一些武装人员被收买参与了该次行动,而其他的则倡导建立一个与巴萨耶夫联合一致的泛高加索伊斯兰国家。一些人甚至声称这些似乎未曾有过军事训练经历的战士,期望巴萨耶夫的手下能加入他们。

  Violence has flared elsewhere in the north Caucasus since October. In Ingushetia, where Mr Basayev was killed, shootings, explosions and even aerial bombardment have been almost incessant. Murders are frequent in Dagestan, in parts of which Islamic sharia law is enforced. All this, believe many locals, happens to a plan, designed to secure money or power for officials. More likely, no one is in control. As in Nalchik, events proceed from a murky but combustible mix: separatism, grudges, vendettas, territorial disputes, a history of war and mass deportation, and growing Islamic extremism. The problem, says the mufti, is that, after 70 years of Soviet atheism, religious ignorance has let extremism take hold. To all this can be added government brutality and pervasive corruption, which provides insurgents with weapons, lets them move round freely and, by strangling the local economy, guarantees a stream of recruits.

  Mr Basayev’s death may help. But probably the only real remedy is for local people to have a say in their own fates: in other words, democracy. Instead, as a prominent Nalchik businessman puts it, the Kremlin trusts local strongmen to keep things quiet and, “No one asks any questions.” Even in Russia few people take much interest in the north Caucasus. If it continues on its present ominous course, however, they will have to.

  Mr Putin used the most heinous of Mr Basayev’s outrages, the attack on a school in Beslan in North Ossetia in September 2004, as a pretext for scrapping the election of governors. Beslan also seemed to provoke a new tone in his foreign policy: Mr Putin fell back on classic anti-Western language, blaming unnamed foreign powers, motivated, he said, by unease at Russia’s nuclear status. Later that year came the Kremlin’s meddling in the presidential election in Ukraine, when Mr Putin publicly backed the fraudulent loser. Unable to grasp that other countries might work to different rules, the Kremlin saw the “orange revolution” as a coup, paid for by foreigners. Mr Putin’s early commitment to integration with the West, it began to seem, like his commitment to democracy, had been a mere tactic, not an objective.
  2004年9月,巴萨耶夫下令袭击北奥塞梯共和国(North Ossetia)别斯兰市一所学校的恐怖活动,是其犯下的最为可耻的卑劣暴行,而这一点,成为普京取消州长选举制的口实。别斯兰人质事件似乎也为其外交政策增添了一种新基调:普京重新操起过去那种反西方的论调,未点名地批评了一些大国,普京称它们对于俄罗斯的核力量耿耿于怀,从而暗中勾结车臣非法武装的分离主义行径。[8] 翌年,克里姆林宫又插手了乌克兰的总统选举,当时普京公开支持竞选中舞弊的失利一方——雅努科维奇。虽然对于他国选择自己发展道路的自由无可奈何,但普京将“橙色革命”视作为一次由外国人出资策划的政变。普京先前所做的要与西方融合的承诺,开始显得跟他宣称拥抱民主的承诺一样,只是一个缓兵之计,而并非真正的长远目标。

  As he has grown into his presidency, and as the oil price has soared, Mr Putin’s true philosophy has become clearer. He is not, as is often alleged, a neo-Soviet ruler: there is little trace of communism left in the Kremlin. The creed of the ex-KGB officers who make up much of his inner circle is better described as Chekism, which takes its name from the first Soviet secret police, the Cheka. Its basic tenet is that Russia’s destiny is to be a great power, a greatness that must be fostered in the face of Western attempts to undermine it. “They understand that Russia is growing now, becoming stronger,” says the Kremlin’s Mr Shuvalov of Russia’s critics. So they “use any possible chance to criticise”.

  The principal arena for the confrontation with the West has been the ex-Soviet states of Russia’s “near abroad”, in which Mr Putin has defended what he sees as Russia’s interests with ruthless pragmatism.Despicable but friendly regimes in Uzbekistan and Belarus are supported. Wayward ones in Ukraine and Georgia are punished. The manipulation of gas supplies has become a weapon in this contest. But Russia’s policy in the Middle East, and its flirtation with China, are also part of the quest for great-power status. Dmitri Trenin, of the Carnegie Moscow Centre, argues that Russia has now left the Western solar system and is busily creating its own.
  俄罗斯与西方角力的主要“竞技场”是那些前苏联境内的俄罗斯“近邻”国家,普京以无情的实用主义捍卫他视作俄罗斯在该地区的利益,乌兹别克斯坦和白俄罗斯的卑劣政权因为亲俄得到了俄罗斯的支持,乌克兰和格鲁吉亚因为倔强的离心主义倾向遭到惩罚。在这场争夺中,操纵燃气供应成为了一件有利武器。而俄罗斯的中东政策,以及它与中国的亲密关系,也是其追求大国地位的具体表现。卡内基莫斯科中心的迪米特里·特列宁(Dmitri Trenin) [10] 认为俄罗斯如今已摆脱了西方主导的体系,并且正忙于塑造其自己的体系。

The burden of empire
  Russia’s curious path under Mr Putin—assertiveness and paranoia in foreign policy, centralised yet weak government—can perhaps be explained best by an old truth, that Russia is more an empire than a state, its rulers haunted by the fear that their domain will fall apart. Plenty of evidence, such as the widespread admiration for Stalin, suggests that many Russians share Mr Putin’s evident belief that authoritarianism is the way to hold the place together. If that ancient conviction is right, and Russia is constitutionally unsuited to democracy, many of his failings are forgivable. To be upbeat about Mr Putin, in other words, is to be downbeat about Russia s future.
  俄罗斯在普京统治下奉行的让人琢磨不透的发展路线——外交政策中的刚愎自用和满腹狐疑,集权但又孱弱的政府——可以借助一个古老的事实来对其作出合理解释,即俄罗斯不是现代意义上的国家 [11],而是一个帝制国家,对疆土分崩离析的担忧始终萦绕在俄罗斯统治者的心头。有充足的证据表明,例如对斯大林的广泛崇拜,暗示出许多俄罗斯人支持普京的明确信仰——即独裁专制 [12] 是唯一能力保国土完整的出路。如果这种始自远古、确信不疑的观念是正确的话,那么从宪政角度来讲民主体制在俄罗斯是“水土不服”的,俄罗斯所犯下的许多错误就是可以宽恕的。对普京保持乐观,用其他话来讲,就是对俄罗斯的前途充满悲观。
  On the other hand, most ordinary Russians are woefully ill-informed about their past, as well as their present. Optimists hope that Mr Putin will prove to be merely a temporary coda to totalitarianism. They hope that the economic trends he has helped to create will eventually counteract, rather than reinforce, the political ones, and that Russians will become better informed and more assertive. Unfortunately, in a country where elections are only a way to
legitimise choices made in the Kremlin, it is Mr Putin who will decide who and what follow him, if he leaves office, as he is supposed to, in 2008.


[1] authoritarian——政治学标准的翻法应该是威权/权威主义的,为了通俗易懂,斟酌之后还是选择了独裁专制这个翻法,但后文中出现totalitarian一词,专指极权主义。

[2] Lobb’s——Lobb(男式)鞋店—地点:伦敦 该店在维多利亚女王时代就有了,Lobb皮鞋店一如既往地秉承了手工制造皮鞋皮靴的传统,其顾客当中不乏当今英国王室成员。为鞋帽奢侈品中的名牌。

[3] 商业诈骗和偷税漏税——译者注

[4] 过去苏联时期关押政治异己、罪犯、德国战俘等等,如今依然沿用,国内囚犯在其中服刑,这里的战俘营,看似平常,个人认为有一语双关之意,暗示霍氏在与普京的权力角逐中败北,成为普京的“俘虏”——伊者注

[5] 俄罗斯的法院在与行政权力和立法权力角逐的过程中经常败下阵来,因为其是三权分力最弱的机构,美国宪政学者、开国元勋之一的亚历山大·汉密尔顿曾在其著作《联邦党人文集》中说过,司法机关无钱无剑,天生是三个部门中最弱的环节,而根据各民主国家的宪政实践经验来看,司法机关的确是三权分立中的最弱的一极,在一些新兴的,刚刚起步进行民主化建设的国家——还尚未完全是民主国家尤其如此,其缺少法治、司法机构孱弱的弊病特别突出,俄罗斯是一个典范;而除开权力不济之外,俄罗斯法院更是腐败严重,法院工作人员经常与利益团体勾结,戕害社会公正,玷污司法名誉,当然这不是俄罗斯的特色,中国也有,只是一直讳莫如深,媒体不加报道罢了,近年来法院腐败、司法腐败的暴光趋势有所上升——译者注

[6] 英语中也有所谓的借代修辞手法,通常用一个标志性建筑或象征来替代一个政权或权力,抑或是机构,比如the White House,白宫,象征美国最高行政权;the Pentagon,五角大楼,象征美国国防力量,No.10, Downing Street 唐宁街10号的英国首相府,象征英国的最高行政权,这里的the Kremlin,也就是代替俄罗斯政府、俄联邦军的意思——译者注

[7] Kabardino-Balkaria 俄罗斯西南部的共和国,位于大高加索山脉北侧。——译者注

[8] 美国和西方一些国家在反恐问题上采取双重标准,不仅不将俄罗斯的车臣非法武装视作恐怖主义组织,反而支持这一组织危害俄国家安全的行为。这点反映出政治实用主义与意识形态之间的权衡(trade-off),美国支持车臣恐怖主义势力,是出于均势的考虑,希望这个组织打乱俄罗斯崛起的阵脚;而美国911之后一直打着打击恐怖主义的旗号到处发动所谓的反恐战争,事实上是一种意识形态的考虑,美国在对待车臣恐怖主义势力的时候,集中体现了其意识形态让位于均势政策的外交原则。这点上,以色列也是个很好的例子,伊朗一直叫嚣要把以色列赶到大海里去,但在两伊战争中以色列还是暗中向伊朗提供了导弹,这在常人看来愚蠢的决定只有一个解释:即均势政策迫使以色列这么做,以色列宁愿离其远的“反以大户”伊朗拥有导弹打击离其近更近的伊拉克,因为后者从均势角度来看,对以色列国家安全的威胁更大。这就是国家在制定外交政策中,权衡均势和意识形态所作出的理性抉择。

[9] (秘密警察契卡Cheka,俄语为ЧЕКА,职能是肃清反布尔什维克主义的运动,布尔什维克政权得到巩固后,契卡被OGPU——前苏联国家政冶保卫总局所取代,后者就是NKVD——苏维埃秘密警察和克格勃的前身)

[10](Dmitri Trenin is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and director of studies at the Carnegie Moscow Center.His research mainly covers such domains as russian security studies, so far he has published many academic treatises on such authoritative academic periodicals as the Washington Quarterly, the author here lists 2 of his works which is in PDF format and can be downloaded from the internet.  Russia and Global Security Norms, by Dmitri Trenin,http://www.twq.com/04spring/docs/04spring_trenin.pdf and Less Is More,by DmitriTrenin,http://www.twq.com/01summer/trenin.pdf

[11] 之所以作者要将state翻成现代意义上的国家,是因为state这个词是近代才逐渐出现的一个词,是象征现代民族国家体系从过去王权君主制国家体系脱胎、分离出来的历史产物,是人类社会历史进步的表现,跟过去由empire主导的世袭的、封建的王权国家是一个对比,因此为了跟后文empire对应,state原本蕴涵的政治学原理就应该被表露出来——译者注

[12] 这里不同于上文中的state,没有必要把authoritarianism权威主义这个学术概念翻译出来,独裁专制就可以了——译者注  俄罗斯历来就有独裁专制的文化,人民尝尽了外敌入侵,颠沛流离的苦痛,渴望有一个强有力的君主式人物来一统俄罗斯辽阔广袤的疆土,结束分裂动荡的局面,带给人民稳定的生活,而并不太在意能有多少独立自主的选择权。这也就解释了为什么俄罗斯的老百姓宁愿要普京给他们带来不自由的繁荣,却不稀罕叶利钦时期自由的无政府主义乱世,许多分析家总以国土辽阔为出发点来解释一些国家的集权专制特征,但他们的理论却不能解释为什么国土同样辽阔的加拿大和美国等却成为了民主国家,关于东方专制主义传统这一点,大家可以参阅美国历史学家卡尔·魏特夫的著作《东方专制主义》——译者注

“[2006.07.13][Special]Russia: Richer, bolder—and sliding back”的7个回复

  1. I found your site on google blog search and read a few of your other posts. Keep up the good work. Just added your RSS feed to my feed reader. Look forward to reading more from you.

    – Sue.

  2. I found your site on technorati and read a few of your other posts. Keep up the good work. I just added your RSS feed to my Google News Reader. Looking forward to reading more from you.

    Mike Harmon

  3. 作为普通读者,我个人对某句话的不同译法兴趣不大,更觉得在某句话或者某个词后面加括号提出建议的做法严重影响阅读体验。我认为最终呈现在读者面前的应该是一篇经过翻译者们内部商讨修改过的通顺的没有修改注释之类东西的文章。

  4. 非常喜欢脚注,不喜欢看的可以跳过,对英语翻译感兴趣的同好可以学到许多东西,支持!~可惜最近的双周刊都没有脚注了……


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