[2008.06.28] 热钱涌入中国：焦躁不安

Capital inflows to China
热钱浪涌中国

Hot and bothered
焦躁不安

Jun 26th 2008 | BEIJING
From The Economist print edition

Despite strict capital controls, China is being flooded by the biggest wave of speculative capital ever to hit an emerging economy
尽管对外汇管制严格,中国正承受着迄今为止针对新兴经济体的规模最为庞大投机资本浪潮的冲击

A POPULAR game this summer among watchers of the Chinese economy is to guess the size of speculative capital or “hot money” flowing into the country. One clue is that although China’s trade surplus has started to shrink this year, its foreign-exchange reserves are growing at an ever faster pace. The bulk of its net foreign-currency receipts now comes from capital inflows, not the current-account surplus.
今年夏天，在中国经济观察家们中最流行的一个游戏就是猜测流入中国的投机资本或者说”热钱”的规模。一个迹象就是尽管中国今年的外贸顺差已经开始减少，但是中国的外汇储备正已前所未有的速度增长。大多数净的外汇来自于资本的流入，而不是经常帐户下资本的盈余。

According to leaked official figures, China’s foreign-exchange reserves jumped by $115 billion during April and May, to $1.8 trillion. In the five months to May, reported reserves swelled by $269 billion, 20% more than in the same period of last year. But even this understates the true rate at which the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has been piling up foreign exchange.
据官方披露数据显示，中国的外汇储备在四五两个月里增加了1150亿美元，总计达到1.8万亿美元。截止五月份的前五个月，中国外汇储备膨胀了2690亿美元，比去年同期增长20%。即使这些数据仍然比那些央行实际已经增加的外汇储备所得的真实数据低。

Logan Wright, a Beijing-based analyst at Stone & McCarthy, an economic-research firm, has done some statistical detective work to make sense of the figures. The first problem is that reported reserves exclude the transfer of foreign exchange from the PBOC to the China Investment Corporation, the country’s sovereign-wealth fund. The reserve figures have also been reduced in book-keeping terms this year by the PBOC “asking” banks to use dollars to pay for the extra reserves that they are now required to hold at the central bank. Adding these two items to reported reserves, Mr Wright reckons that total foreign-exchange assets rose by an astonishing $393 billion in the first five months of 2008 (see chart), more than double the increase in the same period last year.
斯通麦肯锡经济研究公司北京办事处的分析师罗根莱特开展了一些统计研究来探究这些数据背后的真相. 首要问题就是报告中所披露的外汇储备数额并不包括从中国人民银行向中国投资有限责任公司（中国国家主权财富基金，简称”中投”）转移的外汇金额。另一个问题是这些数据由于簿记条款而被减少了，今年央行命令各商业银行使用美元来支付额外的储备，而这些储备被要求留在了中央银行。在考虑到这两个因素后，Wright先生估计今年前五个月总的外汇储备增加了惊人的3930亿美元（如图），这比去年同期增长的两倍还多。

China’s trade surplus and foreign direct investment (FDI) explain only 30% of this. Deducting investment income and the increase in the value of non-dollar reserves as the dollar has fallen still leaves an unexplained residual of $214 billion, equivalent to over $500 billion at an annual rate. Some economists use this as a proxy for hot-money inflows. But some of it may reflect non-speculative transactions, such as foreign borrowing by Chinese firms. Mr Wright therefore estimates that China received up to $170 billion in hot money in the first five months of 2008. This far exceeds anything previously experienced by any emerging economy.
中国贸易顺差和外商直接投资（FDI）仅仅能解释这一数据的30%。扣除投资收入和非美元储备价值(美元储备在不断减少)的增加，仍然有2140亿无法解释的盈余，而以此计算一年则将超过5000亿美元。一些经济学家把这些无法解释的外汇流入称之为热钱。但是其中一些可能并没有投机交易，比如说中国公司的外汇借款。因此，Wright先生估计08年前五个月流入中国的热钱达到了1700亿美元。这一数字远远超过了以前任何一个新兴国家。

Michael Pettis, an economist at Peking University’s Guanghua School of Management, reckons that speculative inflows during that period were perhaps well over $200 billion, because hot money also comes into China through companies overstating FDI and over-invoicing exports. Foreign firms are bringing in more capital than they need for investment: the net inflow of FDI is 60% higher than a year ago, yet the actual use of this money for fixed investment has fallen by 6%. Some of it has been diverted elsewhere.
北京大学光华管理学院经济学家Michael Pettis认为同期流入中国的投机资本也许已经超过2000亿美元，因为热钱同样通过高估的外商直接投资（FDI）和出口环节进入中国。外国公司带来比他们实际需要更多的资金：今年的FDI净流入比一年以前要高60%，而这些钱中实际用于固定资产投资的比去年降低6%。可见其中一些已经被转移了。

It is one thing to deduce how much money is coming in. It is another to work out where it is going and how it gets past China’s strict capital controls. The stockmarket, which continues to plunge (see article), is no home for hot money. Some has gone into property. The lion’s share is in bog-standard bank deposits. An interest rate of just over 4% on yuan deposits compared with 2% on dollars, combined with an expected appreciation in the yuan, offers a seemingly risk-free profit for those who can get money into China.
推断出进入中国的热钱规模只是一方面，问题的另一方面是找出这些钱的流向和这些钱是如何通过中国严格的外汇管制而进入的。持续下跌的股市肯定不是热钱的流向。其中一些可能流向了资产市场。最大的份额可能留存在银行。由于人民币的存款利率是4%，美元的利率是2%，加上人民币的升值预期，因此把钱存入中国银行就提供了一个无风险的获利机会。

It comes in via various circuitous routes. Big Western investment funds which care about liquidity would find it hard to move money into China, although rumours abound of hedge funds that are investing money through Chinese partners. Trade and investment offers a big loophole for Chinese and foreign firms. Resident individuals can use the $50,000 annual limit for bringing money into China from abroad-many also use their friends’ and relatives’ quotas. Another big loophole lets Hong Kong residents transfer 80,000 yuan ($11,600) a day into mainland bank deposits.
这些热钱通过各式各样的路径迂回进入中国。尽管谣传说大量对冲基金通过其在中国的合作方投资于中国，但是西方那些关注流动性的大型投资基金则很难进入中国。对外贸易和投资为中国和外国公司提供了很多机会。内地常住居民可以利用50000美元的外汇限额把钱从境外带入中国。很多人还让其亲戚或朋友帮忙。另一个机会就是利用香港居民每天可以向大陆银行存入80,000元人民币（11,600美元）。

The government is trying to crack down, but that risks shifting the activity towards underground money exchangers. And if the government were to increase its monitoring of FDI and trade flows, the extra bureaucracy could harm the real economy. China needs to reduce the incentive for destabilising capital inflows, rather than block the channels.
中国政府正在试图控制这种情形，但是担心将这种活动转移到地下钱庄的风险。如果政府加强对通过FDI和贸易途径流入热钱的监管，则可能对现实经济造成伤害。中国政府需要减少这种阻止热钱流入的敏感性，而不是堵塞这个渠道。

Massive hot-money inflows present two dangers to China’s economy. One is that capital could suddenly flow out, as it did from other East Asian countries during the financial crisis a decade ago and Vietnam this year. China’s economy is protected by its current-account surplus and vast reserves, but its banking system would be hurt by an abrupt withdrawal.
巨额的热钱流入对中国经济将造成两方面的伤害。第一个是在发生金融危机时热钱可能突然流出，就像十年钱的东亚一些国家和今年的越南一样。中国巨额的外汇帐户盈余和外汇储备可以保护经济，但是中国的银行可能会由于大量资金的突然撤离而受损。

A more immediate concern is that capital inflows will fuel inflation. The more foreign capital that flows in, the more dollars the central bank must buy to hold down the yuan, which, in effect, means printing money. It then mops up this excess liquidity by issuing bills (as “sterilisation”) or by lifting banks’ reserve requirements. But all this complicates monetary policy. China’s interest rates are below the inflation rate, but the PBOC fears that higher rates would attract yet more hot money and so end up adding to inflationary pressures. The central bank has instead tried to curb inflation by allowing the yuan to rise at a faster pace against the dollar-by an annual rate of 18% in the first quarter of this year. But this encouraged investors to bet on future appreciation, exacerbating capital inflows. Since April the pace of appreciation has been much reduced, in a vain effort to discourage speculators.
一个更直接的担心是大量资金的流入可能会加剧通货膨胀。外资流入越多，央行需要回购更多的美元以此来维持人民币的汇率，而这反过来又会加剧流动性。然后央行再发行大量票据或者通过提高商业银行的准备金率要求来抹干超额的流动性。但是所有这些都将使中国的货币政策更加复杂。中国的利率是低于通胀率的，但是央行担心更高的利率会吸引更多的热钱流入，从而加大通胀压力。通过使人民币对美元以较快速度升值的方法可以降低通胀（今年第一季度人民币升值18%），然而央行却拒绝这样做。但是这将鼓励投资者赌人民币会升值，从而又加剧热钱流入。尽管四月份人民币的升值速度已经减缓，但是这根本无法阻止热钱的流入。

Mass sterilisation
大幅降低流动性

 Some economists argue that the problems caused by hot money have been exaggerated. After all, the PBOC has so far succeeded in sterilising most of the increase in reserves. Inflation, at an annual rate of 7.7% in May, has also started to decline, and the impact of last week’s rise in fuel prices is likely to be offset over the next couple of months by falling food-price inflation.
一些经济学家认为热钱流入产生的问题被夸大了。毕竟，到目前为止央行成功的抹干了外汇储备增加而引起的流动性。在通胀方面，5月份的通胀率为7.7%，这一数据已经开始下降了，而且未来几个月粮食价格的下降基本可以弥补上周燃油价格上升带来的影响。

The snag is that money-supply growth would explode without sterilisation, which is now close to its limit. It is becoming very costly for the central bank to mop up liquidity by selling bills, so it is now relying more heavily on raising banks’ reserve requirements (the PBOC pays banks only 1.9% on their reserves, against over 4% on bills). Since January 2007 the minimum reserve ratio has been raised 16 times, from 9% to 17.5%. But it cannot climb much higher without hurting banks’ profits. To curb future inflation, China therefore needs to stem the flood of capital.
一个困难如果央行不采取措施抹干流动性（而现在已经接近极限了），货币供给的增长就会太快。通过发行央行票据来抹干流动性的成本也会越来越高，所以现在央行更多的只能依靠提高商业银行的准备金率（中央银行支付给商业银行仅仅1.9%的利率，而发央票的成本则是4%）。从07年1月以来，存款准备金率经过16次提高，已从9%上升到17.5%。但是，如果再提高准备金率，则有可能使商业银行的利润受损，为了控制未来的通胀，中国需要坚决堵住巨额热钱的流入。

One solution would be a large one-off appreciation of the yuan so that investors no longer see it as a one-way bet. This, in turn, would give the PBOC room to raise interest rates. The snag is that the yuan would probably have to be wrenched perhaps 20% higher to alter investors’ expectations, and this is unacceptable to Chinese leaders, especially when global demand has slowed and some exporters are already being squeezed.
一个解决办法就是让人民币大幅升值，这样就能使投资者不再单赌人民币升值。这反过来将会给央行更大空间来提高利率。问题是只有人民币升值20%以上才能使投资者改变对RMB的升值预期，而这对中国的领导人来说是不可接受的，特别是当下全球需求减少，一些出口商的利润已经被压榨很多。

This implies that monetary policy will remain too loose. The longer that the torrent of hot money continues and interest rates remain too low, the bigger the risk that underlying inflation will creep up.
这也意味着央行的货币政策仍将宽松。与此同时，热钱流入和维持低利率的时间越长，潜在的通货膨胀风险也就越大。

译者：jyjnl   http://www.ecocn.org/forum/viewthread.php?tid=12332&extra=page%3D1