Jun 5th 2008
From The Economist print edition
The European Union may find dealing with the Middle Kingdom trickier than it expects
IN THIS Olympic summer, expect to hear a lot about the century of China’s rise and America’s decline. That sounds like good news for the European Union, and all who dream of a “multipolar” order in which European wealth counts as much as American military might. China’s rulers say they want economic development and a peaceful world in which no“hegemon” can throw its weight around. (Just do not ask too much about China’s rising defence spending, or its contempt for freedoms that the EU holds dear.) Right on cue, two new publications have appeared, examining deepening ties between the EU and China—and what they may mean for America.
有望在此次奥林匹克夏天听到很多这样的说法：中国在本世纪崛起而美国则衰落。对于欧盟和所 有“多极”秩序崇尚者来说，这是个好消息：在这样的秩序里欧洲的财富和美国的军事力量相当。中国的统治者说他们需要的是经济的发展和一个没有“霸权”的和 平世界。（别对以下两点纠缠太多：中国持续增长的国防开销，或是它对自由的藐视—欧盟则对自由珍视有加）。恰在此时，两份新的出版物出现了，他们调查了中 欧之间日益深化的关系—以及这对美国可能意味着什么。
“Can Europe and China Shape a New World Order?” asks a pamphlet from the Centre for European Reform (CER), a London-based think-tank. It urges EU leaders to make the case to China for a world based on rules and multilateral co-operation. American policymakers are the target of “China-Europe Relations”, a report from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington,which warns them to pay more (or even some) attention to burgeoning EU-Chinaties that could, if mishandled, cause a transatlantic “rift over China”.
“ 中欧能塑造新的世界秩序吗？”伦敦一个名为“欧洲改革中心（CER）”的智囊机构在其出版的一本小册子中提出了这样的问题。书中督促欧盟领导人向中国表明 这样的想法：建立一个基于规则和多边合作的世界。美国的决策者变成了《中欧关系》攻击的靶子，《中欧关系》是来自华盛顿的“国际战略研究中心 （CSIS）”的一份报告，它提醒美国决策者将更多的注意力集中到不断加强的的中欧关系上，并指出如果对该问题处理不当将会导致美欧关系因中国而产生裂 隙。
Europe and China do have things in common. Many Europeans are “rather relaxed” about America losing its status of unchallenged global superpower, says the CER report, with nice understatement. The EU is already China’s largesttrade partner, with two-way flows topping E300 billion ($440 billion) in 2007 (with the balance overwhelmingly in China’s favour). As an exporter of manufactured goods, China should share Europe’s interest in world economic governance and harmonised regulations—unlike, say, resource exporters such as Russia, which could sell gas and oil even in a lawless world.
中欧确实有共性。CER的报告含蓄的指出，很多欧洲人对美 国正在丧失其无法挑战的超级大国地位感到“很欣慰”。欧盟已经是中国最大的贸易伙伴，双边贸易额在 2007年达到了3000亿欧元（4400亿美元）（中国有绝对优势的贸易顺差）。作为制造业出口国，中国必须和欧洲一道分担全球经济治理及其与之配套的 规则。中国和俄罗斯等资源出口国不同，后者即使在毫无规则法纪的世界里照样可以出售燃气和石油。
China and Europe do not see each other as a military threat. America maintains troops and security alliances all around China’s rim, and would be expected to defend Taiwan in the event of attack from the mainland. Most Europeans barely know that Taiwan exists, and when their governments do mention that embattled island, it is to chide it for “provoking” China with dangerous notions like democracy. Although in theory China, Europe and Americaare determined Iran should not go nuclear, China and some European governments often seem keener on trading with Iran than in curbing its weapons ambitions.
中欧没有互相视为军事上的威胁。美国在中国周边驻扎部队并设有安保同盟，并且大陆 攻台时美国预计要防卫台湾。大部分欧洲人几乎不知道台湾的存在，当他们的政府确实提那个麻烦的岛屿，那也是斥责台湾用民主之类的危险观念去“挑衅”中国大 陆。虽然在理论上中国、欧洲和美国反对伊朗搞核武器，但是中国和一些欧洲政府更热衷于与伊朗进行贸易而不是遏制其发展核武的野心。
There is another common area. Whereas many Americans have in recent years seen the “war on terror” as an existential fight that overshadows all else, the Europeans and Chinese talk about terrorism as just one item in their leaders’ in-trays. Even a love of talking unites mandarins from Beijing and Eurocrats from Brussels. The EU now has 27 sectoral agreements and “dialogues” with China(with three more on the way), dealing with everything from human rights to co-operation in space.
还 有一个共同的地方。当这些年美国人把“反恐战争”视为盖过一切、生死有关的斗争之时，欧洲人和中国人仅仅把恐怖主义看做他们领导人文件簿里的一个平常事而 已。即便是出于对“对话”的偏爱也让北京的官僚和布鲁塞尔的欧盟官员联系紧密。现在欧盟与中国之间有27个部门协定和“对话”（有3个以上正在进行），处 理从人权到空间合作的各种问题。
So should America be worried? In a word, no.It is true that China talks about multilateralism a lot, and under outside pressure has been a bit more willing than it was to put pressure on pariah states such as North Korea, Myanmarand Sudan.But multilateralism means different things to Chinese and Europeans. At a recent two-day meeting of European, American and Chinese foreign-policy types,the Chinese made clear that sovereignty and stability trump all other concerns. Europe, in contrast,is founded on the veryidea of pooled sovereignty.
美国应该担忧吗？一个字，不。中国的确大谈多边主义，并且在外界压力下它已经比过去多点意愿向流氓国家例如朝鲜、缅甸和 苏丹施压。但是多边主义对于欧洲和中国意义并不相同。最近为期两天的会议展示了欧、中、美的外交政策类型，中国明确指出主权和稳定压倒一切。与此对照，欧 洲是建立在多个国家联合的主权之上。
European attitudes to China could change quite quickly.Take the Olympics. European protests against a Chinese-organised torch relay provoked deep anger in China(and the nationalist tone of that anger caused matching dismay in Europe). Once the games begin, Americawill probably be knocked off the top of the medal tables by China. Thatwill be a shock to American pride. But if Chinese delight turns to nationalistswagger, that risks turning European stomachs (just as surely as victory chantsof “U-S-A, U-S-A” did in previous games).
欧洲人对中国的态度可能很快改变。例如奥运会，欧洲人反对中共组织的火炬传递激起了中国的愤怒 （愤怒发出的民族主义腔调导致欧洲同样的震惊）。一旦奥运会开始，美国可能被中国取代奖牌第一的位置，这将是对美国人自豪感的一个打击。但是如果中国人的 高兴转变成充满民族主义的狂妄自大，这可能让欧洲人倒胃口（就像美国人在以前的奥运会胜利时高喊：“U-S-A”确实造成的效果）。
A far more substantial falling-out between Europe and China could be in store because of climate change. If terrorism has been seen by some Americans as an existential threat, climate change has arguably acquired the same status in Europe. And as tensions across the Atlantic have shown, people who feel their existence threatened find it hard to forgive others who disagree. The next American president is likely to be far more co-operative over tackling climatechange than George Bush. But China’s position is ambivalent: it is committed to tackling global warming, amid soaring carbon emissions, but it is also a developing country, with much growing to do (see article).
中欧真正的争吵可能存在于气候变化的问题。如 果美国人视恐怖主义为现实的威胁，气候变化在欧洲多少占有同样的地位。欧美的紧张已经显示，感到他们生存受到威胁的人们很难原谅那些意见相左的人。下一任 美国总统可能不会像布什那样在处理气候变暖的问题上那样（与中国）合作了。但是中国的位置进退两难：它承诺处理全球变暖，减少高涨的碳排放，但是它仍然是 发展中国家，还需要大步发展。
Whose carbon is it anyway?
European countries, led by manufacturing powers suchas Germany, France or Italy,are already spoiling for a carbon-tinged trade fightwith China.An EU deal to reduce carbon emissions is due to be agreed later this year, and it will impose big costs on European industry. At a summit in March there were demands for action against imports from countries that do not impose binding limits on carbon: some called for “green” import tariffs, others for making foreigners buy EU emissions permits.
德国，法国 或者意大利等制造业大国领导下的欧洲国家，已经憋足了劲想与中国干一场贸易战。预计今年晚些时候欧盟将达成一个旨在减少碳排放的协议，这将大大增加欧洲工 业的成本。三月召开的一个峰会要求对那些没有对碳排放加以限制的国家采取抵制行动：有些人主张收取“绿色”进口关税，另一些人主张让外国人购买欧盟的排放 许可。
Yet Chinese voices offer a counter-argument. If China is emitting ever more carbon, that is partly because it has become the workshop ofthe world. A hefty chunk of Chinese emissions (estimates of 30% or more arebandied about) is “embedded” in goods that are exported, often by multinational companies. In other words, many Chinese factories are really emitting European(or American) carbon. The likely response from EU leaders is not hard to guess: if that is European carbon, then those must have been European jobs.
然而中国发出了抗议的声音。如果中国继续排 放更多的二氧化碳，那部分原因是因为它已经变成了世界工厂。中国碳排放的大块头根植于它的出口货物（估计有30% 或更多），很多来源于跨国公司。换句话说，很多中国的工厂排放欧洲（或美国）的二氧化碳。不难猜测欧盟领导人可能做出的反应：如果那是属于欧洲的碳排放， 那么就一定要欧洲人自己搞定。
Put globalisation, jobs and climate change into the same dispute, and you have the makings of a nasty trade fight. Before too long, Europeans may miss the days when American “hyperpower” was all they had to worry about.