[2008.07.19] 基地组织的全球圣战:怎样在伊斯兰世界赢得战争

Al-Qaeda’s global jihad
基地组织的全球圣战

How to win the war within Islam
怎样在伊斯兰世界赢得战争

Jul 17th 2008
From The Economist print edition

In the long run, al-Qaeda will be defeated by Muslims, not foreigners. But the West can still help
若计长远，打败基地的不是外国人，而是穆斯林。但西方仍可大力支援。

AMERICA’S “global war on terrorism”, now in its seventh year, has gone on longer than the second world war. Will it ever end? Optimists believe some kind of victory is in sight: Iraq is improving; al-Qaeda has been unable to stage a big attack in the West in three years; and terrorists have shown little sign of using weapons of mass destruction. Jihadists face an ideological backlash, even from radical “brothers” who support jihad but disagree with killing Muslims.
美国的 “全球反恐战争”，现在已到了第七年，耗时超过二战。这场战争会不会永无休止？乐观主义者相信，某种意义上的胜利已经摆在眼前：伊拉克形势渐渐好转，基地在三年内都未对西方进行大规模的反攻，恐怖分子没有要使用大规模杀伤性武器的任何迹象。圣战分子面临意识形态的溃败，甚至连最极端的”哥们儿”也有了异见。这些”哥们儿”支持圣战，但是不赞同杀害穆斯林。

Welcome as al-Qaeda’s setbacks may be, the world should not be complacent. As our special report in this issue explains, the threat is likely to last for decades. One reason is that al-Qaeda, though weaker in Iraq, has created a new sanctuary in Pakistan’s tribal belt. Another is that al-Qaeda’s ideology has spread far and wide thanks to the internet and ease of travel. A third is that anti-Americanism remains powerful across the Muslim world. Only a tiny proportion of the world’s billion or so Muslims need to take up jihad to create serious trouble.
世界或许可以为挫败基地而欢呼，但绝不能自满。正如我们本期的特别报道中所说的那样，基地的威胁很可能持续好几十年。理由一，基地的势力虽然在伊拉克有所削弱，但却在巴基斯坦的部落带里建立了新的避难所。理由二，借助于互联网和便捷的旅游，基地的意识形态散播得越来越广。理由三，反美心态在穆斯林世界依然强烈。近10亿穆斯林当中一小部分人就足以轩起圣战，制造大麻烦。

That is particularly true because al-Qaeda is so nebulous and its violence, unlike that of earlier nationalist or sectarian terrorists, is so unrestrained. The days when the Irish Republican Army telephoned warnings of its bombs, and at times apologised for killing bystanders, seem quaint in an age of human-guided bombs seeking to maximise bloodshed.
基地分子隐身暗处，无法无天，完全不同于早期的民族主义分子和宗派恐怖分子。以前，爱尔兰共和军打通电话，警告要投放炸弹，又不时为炸死无辜平民而道歉。今天，基地组织为了尽量扩大法伤亡人数，不惜使用人体炸弹。曾经那个时代与今日的血腥是多么格格不入啊。

In the 19th century anarchists mainly assassinated rulers; in the 1970s terrorists typically killed tens of people; and by the 1980s and 1990s hundreds died in bombings. On September 11th 2001 al-Qaeda killed nearly 3,000 people. If it had chemical, biological or radiological weapons or, less likely, nuclear ones-all big “ifs”, admittedly-it would use them.
19世纪，反政府主义者大多是暗杀统治者；20世纪70年代，恐怖分子象征性地杀害几十个人；20世纪80和90年代，几百人丧生炸弹。2001年9月 11日，将近3000人丧生于基地分子之手。他们如果有化学武器、生物武器、放射性武器，或是几率更小的核武器，种种可怕的武器，毋庸置疑，只要有，他们就会使用。

For global jihadists the reward is in paradise, so life is cheap. They do not seek realistic political gains, but dream of restoring the mythologised caliphate that was abolished by Ataturk in 1924. Al-Qaeda has woven many strands of grievance into a simple single narrative: Islam is under attack from all sides; America, the West, the Jews (along with puppet Arab leaders and treacherous Shias) are to blame; it is the duty of every Muslim to fight them; and Muslims who object are apostates. Thus is mass murder justified as a defence of Islam.
对全球的圣战分子而言，上了天堂才会有回报，所以生命是下贱的。他们并不追求现实的政治利益，而是发梦要复兴神话中的伊斯兰皇权，这一皇权在1924年就被土耳其之父（凯末尔）废除了。基地将千丝万缕的怨恨编织为一个简单的说法：伊斯兰四面受敌；美国、西方和犹太人，还有阿拉伯的傀儡领导和变节的什叶派，都应受到谴责；每一个穆斯林都有责任与他们作战；反对圣战的穆斯林就是背信弃义。正是如此，大肆屠杀堂而皇之地成了捍卫伊斯兰之战。

How to confront the menace? Al-Qaeda must be denied victory, denied sanctuary and denied the ability to organise attacks. Regardless of the rights and wrongs of Western intervention, America must not leave Iraq over-hastily and will need to shore up its forces in Afghanistan. In time, though, the West should draw back from combat in favour of more discreet assistance. Al-Qaeda seeks to attack the “far enemy”, America, because the “near enemy”, the region’s governments, are hard to fight. The West should seek to invert this equation. It must encourage and help weak governments, such as Pakistan’s, to extend their writ and deny the terrorists a haven. International intelligence co-operation must be strengthened.
怎样才能对抗这样的威胁？必须让基地尝不到胜利，找不到栖身之地，失去组织袭击的能力。不论西方的介入是对是错，美国都不能过于草率地离开伊拉克，并且还需要在阿富汗保持武力，虽然西方迟早都会从战场中退出，以给予更周全的帮助。基地企图袭击”远敌”美国，是因为”近敌”–地方政府–不容易对付，西方当要扭转这一局面。西方必须鼓励和帮助弱小的政府，比如巴基斯坦总统，来扩大他们的权利，让恐怖分子找不到安身之处。并且要加强国际情报合作，打击恐怖分子。

All this will mean supping with less-than-savoury figures. But the West must not lose sight of its most compelling idea: democracy. The greater struggle against jihadists is in the realm of ideas. Al-Qaeda must be denied the claim to be defending Muslims or to speak on their behalf. Jihadists say democracy is sinful “man-made” law, but Muslims everywhere seize the right to choose their leaders when given the opportunity.
这一切意味着要亲近那些不太让人愉快的人物。但是西方不能忘记自己要传播的最重要的理念：民主。与圣战分子更大的斗争在于意识形态。必须让基地不能再口口声称是在保护穆斯林，必须剥夺他们代表穆斯林的权利。圣战分子把民主说成是罪恶的、”人为的”法律，但是只要有机会，世界各地的穆斯林无一不争取选择自己领导人的权利。

Democracy, though, is neither an instant nor complete solution. Elections can heighten sectarian tensions, and may produce weaker or more anti-Western governments. It becomes discredited if it is seen as an imposition, or if democracies use torture. Nevertheless, it offers the best hope of moderating those who use Islam as a weapon of protest. Authoritarian regimes, even if friendly, should be nudged towards reform.
然而，民主，既不是权宜之计，也不是万全之策。选举会加剧派系矛盾，选举出来的政府可能会更无能，或是更反西方。如果人们觉得民主是被强行扣在他们头上，亦或民主国家实施迫害，人们就会渐渐不信任民主。然而，民主带来的最大希望，是它能让那些将伊斯兰当作盾牌的人找不到站不住脚跟。同时，民主也将促成独裁政府改革，哪怕独裁者亲和善政。

In Pakistan America invested all in its military ruler, Pervez Musharraf, but his support collapsed. Islamists who are not violent, like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, should be able to contest free elections. In Turkey, secularists are wrong to try to ban the Islamist-tinged ruling party, AKP (see article). Preventing moderate Islamists from gaining power at the ballot box only encourages extreme ones to seek it by violence.
在巴基斯坦，美国把所有砝码压在军事独裁者穆沙拉夫身上。但是穆沙拉夫的支持已经不复存在了。那些非暴力的伊斯兰分子，如埃及的穆斯林兄弟会，应当可以角逐自由选举。在土耳其，世俗主义者试图禁止有伊斯兰人参与的党派（AKP）参政，这是错误的。阻止伊斯兰温和派在选举获得实权，只会激起伊斯兰极端分子暴力夺权。

Some lump together all forms of Islamism as a deadly enemy, akin to fascism and communism. A more accurate analysis, and a better strategy, would be to disaggregate the problems. The rhetoric of the “global war” on terrorism only strengthens global jihad. As the West learns the limits of force, it is Muslims, not foreign soldiers, who will defeat al-Qaeda.
有人把所有伊斯兰教义都混为一谈，视其为死敌，如同法西斯和共产主义。若能更明智地分析，用更好的战略，问题将会得到化解。”全球反恐战争”的措辞反会助长全球圣战的势力。西方也看到了，有些问题不是武力能解决的，可以打败基地的，不是外国士兵，而是穆斯林人民。

Yet foreigners do still have a role to play in what is, at its core, a violent contest within Islam. A useful move would be to make a greater effort to extinguish some of the fires of radicalism, such as the conflicts over Palestine and Kashmir. But diplomacy, like democracy, is no panacea. Muslim resentment of the West has a complex pathology, dating back to the Spanish reconquista in medieval times; that is hardly something that can be undone. Still, it is worth addressing real grievances.
然而，在伊斯兰世界的激烈较量中，外国人仍有重要的作用。一次有力的行动将会大大打击极端主义的气焰，就如处理巴勒斯坦和喀什米尔的冲突那样。然而，外交，与民主一样，并不包治百病。穆斯林对西方的反感成因复杂，要追溯到中世纪西班牙基督教王国驱逐穆斯林的时期，也就是摩尔人入侵西班牙后的11年。穆斯林的反西方情绪很难根除。但是，为消除真正的怨恨而付出努力仍是值得的。

Six excellent ideas
六条妙计

In an internet video in September 2007 Abu Yahya al-Libi, a prominent al-Qaeda leader, mockingly gave the West six tips to wage ideological warfare: highlight the views of jihadists who renounce violence; publicise stories about jihadist atrocities against Muslims; enlist Muslim religious leaders to denounce jihadists as heretics; back Islamic movements that emphasise politics over jihad; discredit and neutralise jihadist ideologues; and play up personal or doctrinal disputes among jihadists. These would indeed be good starting-points.
2007年，一个有名的基地领袖阿布•亚哈•阿立比（Abu Yahya al-Libi）在网络录像上，不无嘲讽地给了西方六条打意识形态战争的建议。第一，着重宣传放弃暴力的圣战分子的观点；第二，公布那些圣战分子对穆斯林施暴的故事；第三，团结穆斯林精神领袖，来谴责圣战分子是叛教；第四，支持那些强调政治手段胜过圣战的伊斯兰运动；第五，败坏圣战支持者的名声，并让他们传为中立；第六，挑拨圣战分子内部的个人或政见争端。这六条建议倒真不失为入门良策。

译者：Sissy    http://www.ecocn.org/forum/viewthread.php?tid=12811&extra=page%3D1