[2009.04.08] Mission: possible 可能完成的任务

 

The IMF
国际货币基金组织Mission: possible
可能完成的任务

Apr 8th 2009
From The Economist print edition

 

The IMF has been promised lots more money and has a new sense of purpose. But reform is still needed—especially if it is to win the trust of emerging economies

国际货币基金组织承诺了提供更多的资金，其目的性也更加强烈。但是，改革仍势在必行——尤其是如果它想赢得新兴经济体的信任的话。

Illustration by Belle Mellor
Belle Mellor供图

AS RECENTLY as last October the International Monetary Fund seemed to be sliding towards terminal irrelevance. For several years, emerging economies had been making fewer and fewer demands on its rescue services (see chart 1). They were awash with private flows—and many of them had been building up vast reserves of their own for a rainy day. Even as the world sank into a financial crisis, there was scant demand for the roughly $250 billion in the fund’s coffers. The talk at the fund’s headquarters was less about its role in sorting out the global financial crisis than about whether it had one. Budget cuts forced it to persuade some staff to take early retirement.

就从去年10月开始，国际货币基金组织似乎最终变得不重要了。几年以来，新兴经济体对IMF的援助要求得越来越少了（见图一）。这些国家私人资本流动泛滥，其中很多国家已经建立了巨量外汇储备以备不时之需。即便时全球陷入金融危机的时候，对IMF资金的需求也大约只有区区2500亿美元。相对于在摆脱全球危机过程中IMF应扮演何种角色的话题，在IMF总部举行的会谈更多则是讨论IMF是否自身也发生了财政危机。由于预算削减，IMF被迫劝服一些员工提前退休。

唯一一个没贷款的
IMF全体成员在外信贷
一般资金账户：十亿单位特别提款权
*不含向低收入国家提供的扶贫贷款，该数字自1984年以来的平均值为45亿单位特别提款权

The IMF is no longer at the margins. At a press conference in London after the G20 summit on April 2nd, its managing director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, could barely contain his delight when he said of the meeting’s communiqué that “each paragraph, or almost each paragraph—let’s say the important ones—are in one way or another related to IMF work.”

IMF辉煌不再了。在4月2日伦敦20国峰会的新闻发布会上，IMF执行董事多米尼克•斯特劳斯-卡恩（Dominique Strauss-Kahn）提到会议公报时欣喜之情溢于言表，称“每一段，或者说几乎是每一段——或者说重要的段落——或多或少都与IMF事务有关”。

The leaders of the world’s biggest rich and emerging economies decided in London that the IMF should both have more resources and play a broader role in the world economy than in the past. They said that the fund’s resources were to be increased by $500 billion to $750 billion, and that it would be allowed to issue $250 billion-worth of its own quasi-currency, the Special Drawing Right (SDR), to ease liquidity in emerging and developing economies (see article). The G20 also expects the IMF to ensure “candid, even-handed, and independent surveillance” of big economies and their banks, of the impact of their policies on others and of risks facing the global economy.

在伦敦，世界最大的富国和新兴国家的首脑认为，与过去相比，IMF应该拥有更多资源，在世界经济中应该发挥更广泛的作用。他们说，IMF的资源将增加5000至7500亿美元，并且获准新发行价值2500亿美元的“IMF货币”——特别提款权（SDR），以在新兴经济体和发展中国家改善流动性。20国集团也希望IMF能够确保“坦率、公平、独立地监督”富国及其银行，关注其政策对他国的影响，审视全球经济面临的风险。

Cynics will argue that the summiteers trumpeted the strengthening of the fund because this was the one substantive thing they were able to agree on. They made no new promises on co-ordinated budgetary stimulus, for example, and the details of what the G20 will do for trade finance remain uncertain (see article). Even so, it is indisputable that the G20 meeting confirmed a steady rise in the IMF’s star in recent months. It has recently overhauled its lending schemes, along with the conditions attached to its loans, and already begun providing funding that looks more like crisis insurance than its usual loans for countries that have got into trouble. China and Russia have even talked about making it the issuer of a global reserve currency to replace the dollar.

犬儒主义者会争辩说与会者极力鼓吹巩固IMF地位是因为这是他们能够一致同意的唯一的实际行动。比如，在拿出一致经济刺激方案，他们并没有做出新的承诺，在贸易融资方面20国集团如何行动的细节也仍不明确。即便如此，20国会议在最近几个月内巩固提高了IMF的地位，这一点是毋庸置疑的。它最近改革了贷款计划，中国和俄罗斯甚至谈到让其发行一种全球性储备货币以替代美元。

But what matters for the world is not the fortunes of the institution itself so much as its ability to execute the tasks it has been assigned. For that the IMF must show intellectual leadership in debates about the global economy; it will need the right tools to tackle the problems it identifies; and it will have to acquire the legitimacy to ensure that its diagnoses and recommendations are taken seriously. Its ability to do all this will depend on what is done to address the root causes of the fund’s former marginalisation. This means tackling still unresolved questions about the supply of resources to the IMF, the way it lends that money to governments in need, the demand for loans from emerging economies and the way the fund is governed.

供给与需求

In essence, the approach of the past few months has been to address the supply side of the IMF’s problems by ensuring that lack of funds will not hold it back. But tackling the demand side is just as important—and governments have been understandably reluctant to ask for help.

相比这个机构自身的前途来说，它执行其被指派的任务的能力，对全世界才是真正要紧的。就这一点来说，IMF必须在全球经济的大讨论中表现出其智慧的领导能力，它需要恰当的工具来解决它识别出的问题，它必须获得合法性以确保它的诊断和建议得到重视。它完成上述任务的能力取决于如何解决其之前被边缘化的根本问题。这意味着要处理如何向IMF提供资金、IMF如何向有需要的政府贷款、新兴国家的贷款需求以及如何管理资金这些仍未解决的问题，

Start with the fund’s $500 billion of extra resources, the centrepiece of the G20’s announcements. This is not entirely new, and where it will all come from is not clear. Only a $40 billion loan from China, still not confirmed by the Chinese government, was unknown before the summit. Another $200 billion comes from adding two lots of $100 billion already promised by Japan, whose government signed an agreement with the IMF in February, and the European Union. That leaves $260 billion to find. Some has been trickling in: Canada has offered $10 billion and Norway $4.5 billion. America is expected to provide $100 billion. Contributions from Saudi Arabia and other emerging economies are also expected.

从G20公告的要旨——IMF额外获得的5000亿美元资金说起。这并不全是新增的，而且资金从何处来也不明确。只有来自中国的400亿美元贷款在会上才知道，但这笔贷款还未得到中国政府的确认。另有2000亿美元，来自日本和欧盟各自已经承诺的1000亿，而日本在二月份就和IMF签订了协议。这样还剩下2600亿美元。有一些是零零星星的，加拿大提供了100亿美元，挪威提供了45亿美元。美国预期会提供1000亿美元。沙特阿拉伯和其他新兴国家也有望做出一些贡献。

Despite doubts about the extent and novelty of these new resources, the fact remains that the IMF has more money available. Even without it, the fund still had about $150 billion left to lend this year. So what explains the widespread agreement that the fund needed bulking up urgently?

尽管这些新的资金来源的范围和“新颖度”存在疑问，IMF获得了更多可用资金也是事实。即便没有这些新增资金，IMF今天仍有大约1500亿美元剩余资金可供放贷。那么，为什么普遍认为IMF要立即系好安全带呢?

Part of the reason that the IMF needs more money is the flight of private capital from emerging economies. The Institute of International Finance, a bankers’ group, expects capital flows to emerging economies to be 80% lower than in 2007. This means that many more will have to turn to the IMF (or other official sources) to avoid drastic cuts in domestic spending. In addition, the fund wants to provide crisis insurance to large emerging economies suffering a temporary loss of liquidity but with basically sound policies.

IMF需要更多资金，部分是因为私人资本从新兴国家出逃。国际金融研究所（The Institute of International Finance），这是一个银行家团体，它预计新兴经济体的资本流要比2007年低80%。这意味着更多国家要转向IMF(或其它官方来源)求助。另外，IMF想为正在承受暂时流动性不足但基本面政策健全的大的新兴经济体提供危机保险。

Rather than negotiate a loan once a country is already in dire straits, the IMF would offer a contingent line of credit. This would have none of the policy strings attached to the usual IMF loans. The country would not have to draw down the line of credit unless it needed to; but the credit’s existence would give investors confidence in its ability to ride out the storm.

IMF提供一种前瞻性的信贷限额，而不是等一个国家陷入窘迫才与它商谈贷款。这也不会附加任何IMF常规贷款附带的政策条件。获得限额的国家不是必须贷到接近限额，除非它自己需要；但授信的存在会使投资者有信心能够经受得住风暴。

The first such arrangement, of $47 billion, has been requested by Mexico under a new IMF programme, the Flexible Credit Line (FCL). Although it is not yet known how popular the scheme will prove, it is clear that the fund could not credibly claim to want to support other countries on such a scale unless it had much more money. The Mexican package, if drawn down, would take one-third of what the fund had left to lend this year.

墨西哥已经通过一个新的IMF项目，弹性信贷限额FCL（the Flexible Credit Line），申请第一笔此类贷款，金额为470亿美元。虽然还不确定这个计划能否受到欢迎，有一点却是确定无意的：除非拥有更多资金，否则IMF也不能令人信服地声称希望为其他国家提供如此大规模的支持。墨西哥的信贷限额如果用尽的话，将会消耗IMF今年剩余贷款资金的三分之一。

Even more important, the creation of a beefier but gentler IMF will give emerging economies a credible alternative to the practice of building up enormous foreign-exchange reserves. Many countries have done this in the past decade to protect themselves against fluctuations in capital flows or commodity prices. Given the opportunity to insure with the IMF, countries should have less need to insure themselves with vast reserves or to arrange large bilateral swap lines. When emerging economies have reserves worth several hundred billion dollars each, the IMF could not possibly have provided a credible alternative to self-insurance with a kitty of no more than $250 billion.

更重要的是，建立一个更强大但更温和的IMF,会给新兴经济体在进行巨量外汇储备以外，提供一个值得信赖的选择。在过去十年中，为了保护自己免受资本流动和商品价格的波动影响，储备了大量外汇。如果获得了被IMF保险的机会，各国应会降低通过建立巨量外汇储备或签订大额双边互换合约限额来进行自我保险的需要。如果每个新兴经济体都持有价值数千亿美元的储备，IMF就不可能在自我保险以外以仅仅2500亿美元的一笔资金提供一个可靠的选择。

Supply and demand

从本质上说，过去几个月的做法是通过确保资金的短缺不会阻止计划进行，来试图解决IMF问题的供方，但是处理好需方也同样重要——可以理解，政府一向都是不愿开口求助的。

Because countries usually approach the IMF only when they are in deep trouble, the fund attaches demanding conditions to its loans. These typically include cuts in budget deficits, often by slashing public expenditure, or increases in interest rates. An IMF loan has thus become shorthand for austerity, making politicians who turn to it (and the fund itself) unpopular. Markets, too, tend to treat even a rumour of an imminent call on the IMF as a sign that matters have spun out of control. As a consequence, countries avoid the fund until they have run out of options. This was much in evidence with Pakistan, one of the early borrowers from the fund in the current crisis (for the full list, see chart 2). The country scrambled to arrange bilateral bail-outs, approaching China and Saudi Arabia before finally turning to the fund.

常常是只有当一个国家陷入极度困境的时候，它才向IMF求助，因此，IMF在其贷款之上附加一些苛刻的条件。这些条件通常包括削减预算赤字或加息，其中削减预算赤字常常通过降低公共支出实现。因此，IMF贷款成了抠门儿的代名词，使得寻求IMF贷款（和向IMF求助）的政客不受欢迎。同样，市场也趋向于甚至是把一个即将拜访IMF的谣传作为形势已经失控的信号。结果，各国除非走投无路，都躲着IMF。这在巴基斯坦尤其明显，它是在当前危机下第一批IMF的借款人（详细名单请见图二）之一。巴基斯坦在向IMF借款以前，火急火燎地接近中国和沙特阿拉伯，安排双边救市。

 

屈膝求贷
IMF项目贷出款项，单位：十亿美元
                                 占GDP百分比
罗马尼亚（2009.03）    17   （看图估计数值）
乌克兰   （2008.11）    16   （看图估计数值）
匈牙利   （2008.11）    15.5（看图估计数值）
巴基斯坦（2008.11）    7.5  （看图估计数值）
白俄罗斯（2009.01）    2.5  （看图估计数值）
拉脱维亚（2008.12）    2.5  （看图估计数值）
冰岛      （2008.11）    2     （看图估计数值）
乔治亚   （2008.09）    1     （看图估计数值）
阿美尼亚（2009.03）    0.5  （看图估计数值）
塞尔维亚（2009.01）    0.5  （看图估计数值）
来源：IMF

None of this means that the fund should avoid imposing conditions when mismanagement has led a country into crisis, or that it is about to stop doing so. But the political and market stigma attached to the very name of the fund could hinder its ability to act as an insurer. Governments are unlikely to want crisis insurance from the IMF if they believe that voters and investors will desert them.

这些都不代表IMF不应该在一国由于治理不善而陷入危机时附加条件，或者它以后不再这样做。但是由于跟IMF这个名字联系在一起而在政治上或市场上失面子，可能会妨碍IMF作为保险人的功能。如果政府认为选民和投资者会抛弃他们的话，他们不太可能想要接受IMF的危机保险。

The IMF’s awareness of this problem is clear from the careful design of its new insurance instrument, the FCL, which replaced the Short-Term Liquidity Facility introduced by the fund last October. That attempt to help well-run countries found no takers. According to Alejandro Werner, Mexico’s deputy finance minister, his country was attracted not just by the flexibility and size of the new facility, but also by the fact that the IMF consulted emerging economies while designing the programme to ensure that it met their needs.

IMF对此问题的认识，从它对其新保险工具FCL的精心设计上可见一斑，FCL取代了IMF去年十月引入的短期流动性便利工具。这一旨在帮助运行良好的国家的便利工具无人问津。据墨西哥财政部副部长Alejandro Werner说，吸引墨西哥的不仅是新便利工具的弹性和规模，也有这一事实的帮助：IMF在设计这一项目时征询了新兴经济体的意见，确保他们的需要得到满足。

Although Mexico’s response to the FCL is a good sign, the stigma of borrowing from the IMF remains a concern. Asked about his country’s interest in the programme, Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, replied “with a lot of pride…that Brazil needs no money from the IMF.” Asian economies are particularly wary of the fund after what many consider to be its botched rescues in the crisis of 1997-98. The governor of Indonesia’s central bank said on April 6th that political considerations are likely to preclude an approach to the IMF under the new scheme.

虽然墨西哥队FCL的反应是一个好征兆，从IMF贷款有失这仍然是一个顾虑。当巴西总统Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva被问到对这一项目是否感兴趣时，他答道“巴西非常自豪不需要IMF的钱”。在很多人认为在1997-98亚洲金融危机中的援助非常失败之后，亚洲国家对IMF特别谨慎。印度尼西亚央行行长4月6日说政治考虑可能阻碍在新体制下向IMF求助。

The shame of borrowing from the IMF may also make it harder for the fund to develop its new job as insurer in order to reduce global imbalances. Eswar Prasad, a former head of the IMF’s China unit now at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think-tank, has an ambitious idea that would see the fund charge premiums for supplying crisis insurance. Mr Prasad proposes premiums that vary according to countries’ economic policies. Countries following policies that drove up global risks (either by running huge surpluses or deficits) would have to pay more, much as premiums for car insurance depend on a driver’s past safety record. This would allow the IMF to use its insurance function explicitly to tackle global imbalances.

羞于向IMF借款也可能使IMF为降低全球不平衡性而行使保险人的新职能变得更加困难。现就职于Brookings Institution 的前任IMF中国组组长Eswar Prasad，很有希望看到IMF为提供危机保险收取保费的抱负。他提议保费根据各国的经济政策而变化。施行提高全球风险（要么是巨额盈余，要么是巨额赤字）政策的国家必须要付出更多，就像汽车保险的保费取决于驾驶者历史的安全记录一样。这将使得IMF更加显性地使用其保险人职能解决全球不平衡问题。

Yet this, too, is a hostage to the fund’s reputation. An almost visceral dread of having to approach the IMF, especially after the Asian crisis, was at least partly responsible for the enormous build-up of reserves to begin with. Mr Prasad acknowledges this, saying that “the main emerging markets are going to remain wary of relying on the IMF for emergency financial support until they are convinced that the leopard has really changed its spots.”

但这也会受到IMF名声的影响。尤其是在亚洲金融危机之后，对接近IMF产生恐惧情绪， 一开始这至少是建立巨额储备的部分原因。Mr Prasad承认这一点，他说“在IMF真正改变本性之前，主要的新兴市场都会继续对依赖其给与紧急财务支持保持谨慎”。

Running (from) the fund

掌舵（藏躲）IMF

Emerging economies may dread the IMF; developed ones disdain it. Rich countries have never been receptive to its criticisms of their policies or responsive to its suggestions. The attitudes of both rich and poor are influenced by who runs the fund and for whom it speaks.

全民的投票权

Even quota reform, hard though it is, need not be impossible. Mr Prasad has an innovative idea about how quotas could be adjusted to the realities of the global economy. He suggests shrinking all existing quotas by 20%, so that a country that at the moment has 10% of the votes would have 8%. Then the 20% of quotas freed up could be auctioned, with an upper limit (say 14.9%) on any country’s share. In effect, this would give more voice in the IMF to those who want it most, giving them a greater stake in its success.

新兴国家可能惧怕IMF,发达国家则蔑视IMF。富国从不接受IMF对他们政策的批评，也不搭理它的建议。富国和穷国的态度都受到谁管理IMF和IMF替谁说话的影响。

Emerging economies do not trust the IMF because they do not think they have enough say in it. Rich countries, which have the bulk of power within the institution, do not take it seriously. And the fund, ever aware of who holds the purse strings, is “excessively hesitant in talking to rich countries about faults in their policies,” according to Raghuram Rajan, a former chief economist of the IMF and a professor at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business (and author of this week’s Economics focus).

新兴国家不信任IMF，因为他们觉得他们没有足够的话语权。富国掌握这个机构的大权，不拿它当回事。芝加哥大学布斯商学院教授（the University of Chicago Booth School of Business）、前IMF首席经济学家（也是本周《经济学聚焦》的作者）Raghuram Rajan说，IMF一直清楚谁掌管着财政大权，所以“在同富国谈论他们的政策过错时过分犹豫”。

The balance of power in the IMF is reflected in the votes of its member countries. These are broadly aligned with countries’ “quotas” or shareholdings, which after several rounds of reform are still largely a legacy of the global distribution of economic might at the end of the second world war. Even after the proposed change to vote shares, Brazil, with 1.72% of the votes, will have less weight than Belgium, with 1.86% (see table 3). Together, European countries will still have more than 30% of the votes and America will have nearly 17%. The G20 wants the IMF to implement the most recently agreed quota changes by October, and to bring the next round of quota reform, scheduled for 2013, forward to January 2011. But a more ambitious quota reform, to bring about a significant change in power, will involve arduous negotiations: larger shares of the votes for big emerging economies will mean smaller shares for rich ones. Without such a shift or some creative thinking, it is hard to see the fund winning more legitimacy among emerging economies.

IMF内部权力的平衡反映在成员国的投票权上。大体上，投票权与各国的“配额”或者说股权保持一致，经过几轮改革之后，仍遗留了二战结束时经济权力的全球分配。即使在提议改革投票权份额之后，拥有1.72%份额的巴西，权重仍低于拥有1.86%份额的比利时（见表3）。欧洲国家仍将共同占有超过30%的投票权，美国则将持有将近17%。20国集团希望IMF将最近刚刚达成一致的配额变化在10月前生效，并将原定于2013年的下一轮配额改革，提前到2011年1月。但一次将掀起重大权力调整的更加激进的配额改革，意味着艰苦的谈判：新兴大国投票权份额的增加就意味着富国份额的降低。没有这样的调整或一些创新的想法，是很难看到IMF在新兴经济中赢得更多合法性的。

不公平吗？
IMF投票权
        份额（按百分比计）
          现在     计划
美国   16.77  16.73
日本     6.02    6.23
英国     4.86    4.29
法国     4.86    4.29
中国     3.66    3.81
俄罗斯  2.69    2.39
比利时  2.09    1.86
印度     1.89    2.34
韩国     1.38    1.36
巴西     1.38    1.72
来源：IMF

One idea, which would be relatively easy to put into practice, would be to loosen Europe’s grip on the appointment of the IMF’s managing director. (The head of the fund’s sister institution, the World Bank, is by convention an American.) The G20’s commitment to ensure that “the heads and senior leadership of the international financial institutions should be appointed through an open, transparent, and merit-based selection process” is clearly a nod in this direction. This is not the same as choosing the bosses “irrespective of nationality”, as demanded by the finance ministers of Brazil, China, India and Russia when they met last month. But Mr Rajan says that even the weaker commitment by the G20 leaders makes him “fairly certain that the next selection process will not be a closed one.” The IMF, he says, will have to try fairly hard to give the appearance of change. At the very least, non-European candidates will have to be seen to be seriously in the running, even if a European ends up with the job.

一个简单可行的办法是放松欧洲对任命IMF执行董事的掌控（该组织的兄弟机构，世界银行的行长，按惯例是一个美国人）。20国集团促进“国际金融组织的首脑和高管应通过一个公开、透明、以德服人的选拔过程任命”的承诺，显然是对这个方向的一个肯定。这与巴西、中国、印度和俄罗斯财长上月会面时要求选拔领导人应“不问国籍”不同。但Mr Rajan说即使是20国领导人更无力的承诺也让他觉得下一次不会是一次封闭的选拔。他说，IMF必须努力做出改变的姿态。至少，非欧洲候选人将必须出现并认真参加竞选，即便最后还是欧洲人当选。

There is no shortage of ideas for reforming the fund’s governance. An IMF-appointed committee headed by South Africa’s finance minister, Trevor Manuel, reported to the fund on March 24th. It recommended a cut in the percentage of votes needed for the fund’s most important decisions from 85% to 70-75%. The existing threshold amounts to a veto for America, with its 17% share. Reducing it to 70% would have removed another source of emerging-country discomfort. The G20’s communiqué did not mention the idea.

改革IMF的管理方式绝不缺少想法。一个由IMF任命的以南非财长Trevor Manuel为首的委员会3月24日向IMF做了汇报。它建议IMF最重要决议的赞成票比例要求由85%降至70-75%。现在的门槛意外着拥有17%投票权的美国拥有一票否决权。降至75%将会摒除另一个新兴国家的反对。20国峰会公报没有提到这一点。

Nor did the G20 refer explicitly to another idea from Mr Manuel’s committee: to create a supervisory IMF council consisting of finance ministers and central-bank governors, which would provide a forum for co-ordination and strategic decisions crucial to global stability. According to Mr Rajan, this would take strategic decisions out of the hands of bureaucrats and entrust them to people with greater political legitimacy. He also argues that the importance of repeated and regular interaction at a high political level should not be minimised. It would make it easier for emerging and rich countries to discuss policy more openly and frankly than they can now. But the G20 did not go beyond an oblique reference to the need for “greater involvement of the fund’s governors in providing strategic direction to the IMF.”

20国集团也没有正式提到Mr Manuel的想法：建立一个由各国财长和央行行长组成的监管委员会，为合作和对全球稳定至关重要的战略决定提供一个论坛。据Mr Rajan说，这将使战略决定权从官僚手中转交给具有更高政治合法性的人负责。他还说，高政治水平的定期互动不应当被降至最低水平。这会使得新兴国家和发达国家比现在更坦诚更公开地商讨政策。但G20只是拐弯抹角地提到“让行长更多参与到为IMF提供战略指引上来”的需要。

Votes for all

配额改革虽然艰难，也并非不可能。关于如何根据全球经济现实情况调整配额，Mr Prasad有个独具创造性的想法。他建议全部现有配额削减20%，这样一个现在有10%投票权的国家将保留8%。然后腾出来的20%可以进行拍卖，并设定每个国家的配额上限（比如14.9%）。实际上，由于份额的提高，这将会在IMF内部给那些最渴望的国家更多话语权。

All these ideas recognise the importance of making the IMF an institution that reflects the changes over the years in the global economy. It will soon have the necessary firepower to act credibly both as a lender in a crisis and a provider of insurance against one. It has shown some nimbleness by rethinking the way it lends in order to meet the needs of large emerging economies better.

所有这些想法都认识到使IMF成为一个反映多年全球经济变化的机构有多重要。它很快就会获得必要的火力，既作为一个危机中的贷款人，又作为一个提供危机险的保险人，发挥可靠的作用。为了更好地满足新兴大国的需要，它通过重新考虑贷款方式，已经展现了一些敏捷的头脑。

Nevertheless, there is still a long way to go before the fund becomes an institution that is both trusted by the emerging world and respected by the rich, and is therefore a venue for effective multilateral financial co-operation. Without further changes to the way it functions and is run, it may find itself beset by some of the same underlying problems that were pushing it to the margins before the crisis brought it back. And it may be unable, in spite of its much fuller coffers, to make a serious dent in the problems of the global economy.

不管怎样，要使IMF变成一个既被新兴国家信任，又被发达国家尊重的组织，还有很长的路要走，因此建立一个有效的多边金融合作论坛也还需要很长时间。不在运营和管理方式上作出改变，IMF可能会发现它仍被一些同样的根本问题困扰，正是这些问题把它推向了边缘，直到这次危机又把它带回到人们的视线当中。否则，虽然钱柜更满了，但它大概不能在全球经济问题上结结实实地咬上一口。

译者/amatchboy: http://www.ecocn.org/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=18583&page=1