Carrots dressed as sticks 披着大棒外衣的胡萝卜政策

Designing rewards
设计奖励
Carrots dressed as sticks
披着大棒外衣的胡萝卜政策
Jan 14th 2010
From The Economist print edition
An experiment on economic incentives
经济激励试验
PEOPLE are contrary creatures. A man may say he would not pay more than $5 for a coffee mug. But if he is told that the mug is his, and asked immediately afterwards how much he would be willing to sell it for, he typically holds out for more. Possession, it appears, lends things an added allure.
人是一种矛盾的动物。一个人可能声称他最多只愿为一个咖啡杯付上5美元。但当他被告知这个咖啡杯是他自己的，并被询问期望以多少价钱卖出时，他一般情况下所要的价钱肯定比5美元更高。由此可见，人们对某物的拥有赋予了该物更高的价值。

This makes little sense in the world of standard economic theory, where the value of something depends on what it is. But it can be explained by behavioural models in which the value people attach to objects is affected by what they already have, and people abhor losses more than they like equivalent gains.
这在标准的经济学理论中站不住脚，在标准理论中，物品的价值取决于它是什么。但是这种现象可以通过行为模型来解释，在行为模型中，人们对于物品价值的判断受到他们已有物品的影响，而且人们对于损失的反应往往比等价的利得的反应要大的多。

In a new paper Tanjim Hossain of the University of Toronto and John List of the University of Chicago explore a real-world use of these insights. The economists worked with the managers of a Chinese electronics factory, who were interested in exploring ways to make their employee-bonus scheme more effective. Most might have recommended changes to the amounts of money on offer. But Mr Hossain and Mr List chose instead to concentrate on the wording of the letter informing workers of the details of the bonus scheme.
多伦多大学的丹极-侯赛因和芝加哥大学的约翰-李斯特在他们的新文章中探讨了这个观点在现实世界中的应用。这两位经济学家以一家中国电子制造厂的经理作为研究样本，这些经理人正致力于如何使得他们员工奖金机制更加有效。大多数人的观点是增加能够支出的奖金的数量。但是侯赛因和李斯特认为应该在给员工奖金方案细节的通知信的措辞上下功夫。

At the beginning of the week, some groups of workers were told that they would receive a bonus of 80 yuan ($12) at the end of the week if they met a given production target. Other groups were told that they had “provisionally” been awarded the same bonus, also due at the end of the week, but that they would “lose” it if their productivity fell short of the same threshold.
其中一组工人在一周（的工作）开始时获知，如果他们能够完成既定的生产目标，则在周末将获得80元人民币（约合12美元）的奖励。另外一些工人在一周的开始就得到了同样数字的“临时性”奖金，但是如果到周末，他们的工作没有达到和前面的那些工人相同的目标，这些奖金将被收回。

Objectively these are two ways of describing the same scheme. But under a theory of loss aversion, the second way of presenting the bonus should work better. Workers would think of the provisional bonus as theirs, and work harder to prevent it from being taken away.
客观上说，有两种方法来描述同一种方案。但是基于对损失厌恶的理论来说，第二种奖金方案更能激励员工。员工们会认为这个“临时”的奖金是归他们所有的，并且更加努力的工作来防止奖金被收回。

This is just what the economists found. The fear of loss was a better motivator than the prospect of gain (which worked too, but less well). And the difference persisted over time: the results were not simply a consequence of workers’ misunderstanding of the system. Economists have always been advocates of using carrots and sticks. But they may not have emphasised appearances enough. Carrots, this research suggests, may work better if they can somehow be made to look like sticks.
这就是经济学家们所发现的。对于损失的恐惧相对于利得的前景（这种方法也有效，但是效用不如前者）来说，是更有利的激发因素。这种差别始终存在：以上所得出的结果不仅仅是由于员工对于奖金系统的认知误差所引起的。经济学家们一直以来都是胡萝卜政策（奖励政策——译者注）和大棒政策（惩罚政策——译者注）的拥护者。但是他们没有对于政策的表象给予足够的重视。这个研究的结果说明，如果给胡萝卜政策披上大棒的外衣的话，可能会更加有效。
译者：tinawang