Trade and the world economy
贸易与世界经济
Fare well, free trade
别了,自由贸易!
Dec 18th 2008
From The Economist print edition
With the global economy facing its worst recession in decades, protectionism is a growing risk
全球经济正面临数十年来最严重的衰退,贸易保护主义的风险开始抬头
THIS Christmas the world economy offers few reasons for good cheer. As credit contracts and asset prices plunge, demand across the globe is shrivelling. Rich countries collectively face the severest recession since the second world war: this week’s cut in the target for the federal funds rate to between zero and 0.25% shows how fearful America’s policymakers are. And conditions are deteriorating fast too in emerging economies, which have been whacked by tumbling exports and the drying-up of foreign finance.
这个圣诞节里,世界经济让人们兴高采烈的理由屈指可数。信贷缩减,资产价格跳水,全球的需求正在萎缩。发达国家集体面临二战以来最严重的衰退:本周下调联邦基金利率目标区间至0-0.25%表明美国的决策者有多么恐慌。新兴市场国家的情况也在快速恶化,出口下滑和境外资金干涸让这些国家筋疲力尽。
This news is bad enough in itself; but it also poses the biggest threat to open markets in the modern era of globalisation. For the first time in more than a generation, two of the engines of global integration-trade and capital flows-are simultaneously shifting into reverse. The World Bank says that net private capital flows to emerging economies in 2009 are likely to be only half the record $1 trillion of 2007, while global trade volumes will shrink for the first time since 1982.
全球经济衰退的消息本身就够糟糕了,但它还给全球化时代的自由市场带来了最大的威胁。这是近三十年来首次,全球经济的两大引擎–贸易和资本流动–同时反转逆行。世界银行表示,2009年流入新兴市场国家的净私人资本可能只有2007年的一半,07年的记录是1万亿美元;与此同时,全球贸易量也将自 1982来出现首次缩减。
This twin shift will force wrenching adjustments. Countries that have relied on exports to drive growth, from China to Germany, will slump unless they can boost domestic demand quickly. The flight of private capital means emerging economies with current-account deficits face a drought of financing as well as export earnings. There is a risk that in their discomfort governments turn to an old, but false, friend: protectionism. Integration has less appeal when pain rather than prosperity is ricocheting across borders. It will be tempting to prop up domestic jobs and incomes by diverting demand from abroad with export subsidies, tariffs and cheaper currencies.
两者同时逆转将催生出一些扭曲的调整措施。从中国到德国,这类依赖出口来拉动经济增长的国家将出现增速下滑,除非它们能快速启动内需。私人资本的逃逸意味着经常帐户赤字的新兴市场国家同时面临投资和出口收入的干涸。风险便出现了:痛苦不安的政府向一位虚伪的老朋友求助–保护主义。当跨境交易带来的痛苦超过繁荣时,贸易融合的吸引力大大减少。依靠出口补贴、关税和货币贬值将国外需求转移到国内来,能够同时支撑国内就业和提高收入,这很有诱惑力。
The lessons of history, though, are clear. The economic isolationism of the 1930s, epitomized by America’s Smoot-Hawley tariff, cruelly intensified the Depression. To be sure, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its multilateral trading rules are a bulwark against protection on that scale. But today’s globalised economy, with far-flung supply chains and just-in-time delivery, could be disrupted by policies much less dramatic than the Smoot-Hawley act. A modest shift away from openness-well within the WTO’s rules-would be enough to turn the recession of 2009 much nastier. Incremental protection of that sort is, alas, all too plausible.
然而,历史的教训历历在目。20世纪30年代,以美国斯姆特-霍利关税法为典型代表的经济孤立主义严重加剧了大萧条。诚然,世界贸易组织(WTO)和其多边贸易规则正是针对这类贸易保护主义的一道壁垒。但是在全球化的今天,供应链遍布世界各地,货物能够即时送达,危害程序比斯姆特-霍利关税法小的多的法案就可以破坏全球经济。只需要适度的闭关,而且还不违背WTO的规则,就足以让2009年的衰退严重得多。唉,诸如此类的加强贸易保护的做法看起来实在是很合理。
Fair-weather free-traders
自由贸易主义者,同享乐,不患难
In many countries politicians’ fealty to open markets is already more rhetorical than real. In November the leaders of the G20 group of big rich and emerging economies promised to eschew any new trade barriers for a year and to work hard for agreement on the Doha round of trade talks by the end of December. Within days, two of the G20 countries, Russia and India, raised tariffs on cars and steel respectively. And the year is ending with no Doha breakthrough in sight.
在许多国家,政客们对自由市场的忠诚更像是虚浮的废话。在11月召开的G20峰会上,20国集团的发达国家和新兴市场国家领导人均承诺,在未来一年内不设置任何新的贸易壁垒,力争12月底前在多哈回合谈判上达成一致。仅仅几天之后,G20的两大成员国–俄罗斯和印度分别提高了汽车和钢铁的进口关税。年底将近,尚未看到任何多哈回合谈判取得突破的迹象。
As economies weaken, popular scepticism of open markets will surely grow. Among rich countries, that danger is greatest in America, where grumbles were heard long before recession set in. The new Congress, with bigger Democratic majorities, has a decidedly less trade-friendly hue. Barack Obama’s campaign rhetoric left an impression of a man in two minds about trade, which he has since done nothing to dispel.
一旦经济开始疲软,流行的对自由市场的怀疑论必然日渐增长。在发达国家里,美国的危险最甚,早在它进入衰退前就已经出现这类抱怨了。在民主党拥有大多数席位的新国会里,确定无疑地缺失偏好自由友好贸易的色彩。巴拉克•奥巴马在竞选时的能言巧辩给人留下了在贸易政策上摇摆不定的印象,迄今为止他还没有采取任何措施来消除这一印象。
Now that their exports are faltering, emerging economies too may become less keen on trade. The WTO’s rules allow them plenty of scope: after two decades of unilateral tariff-cutting most of their tariffs are well below their “bound” rates, the ceilings agreed in the trade club. On average they could triple their import levies without breaking the rules.
既然出口正在萎缩,新兴市场国家对贸易的热情也可能在减少。WTO的规定留给这些国家相当大的余地,经过20年的单边削减关税,大多数国家的关税水平都低于约定税率(bond rates),即贸易谈判达成协议的关税上限。平均来说,新兴市场国家能够在不违背世贸组织规定的情况下,将进口关税提高三倍多。
Handouts to the ready
对症下药
Politicians from Washington to Beijing are being pressed to help troubled industries, regardless of the consequences for trade. A bail-out of Detroit’s carmakers, whatever its final extent, will be a discriminatory subsidy. As China’s exporters go bust by the thousand, industries from textiles to steel have been promised handouts and rebates. Subsidies will beget more subsidies: Nicolas Sarkozy, France’s president, says that Europe will turn into an “industrial wasteland” if it too does not prop up its manufacturers. They will also invite retaliation. With China’s bilateral trade surplus at a record high even as America’s economy slumps, Congress will not take kindly to Beijing’s bolstering of its exporters.
从华盛顿到北京,政客们都承受着施救陷入困境的产业的压力,而不顾对贸易产生的后果。不管最终的救助范围有多大,美国政府对底特律汽车制造商的救助都是一种变相的补贴。在中国,数以千计的出口厂商倒闭破产,政府承诺对纺织、钢铁等行业给与救济和退税优惠。补贴会招致更多的补贴:法国总统尼古拉•萨科齐就表示,欧洲如果不支持其制造业,将会变成一块”工业荒原”。补贴还会招致报复。在中美双边贸易中,即使美国经济已经开始衰退,中国的贸易顺差仍创下历史新高,美国国会势必不会善意对待北京政府支持其出口商的做法。
Exchange-rate movements could also prompt protectionist responses. Chinese officials have said publicly that they will not push down the yuan, and their currency has risen in trade-weighted terms. However, it did slip against the dollar in late November. Viewed from America, China still seems to be following a cheap-yuan policy. A Sino-American trade spat is all too plausible.
汇率变动也能引起贸易保护主义者的回应。中国官方曾公开表示将不会主动贬值,而以贸易加权汇率指数来衡量,人民币已经有所升值。但是,人民币兑美元汇率在11月底确实下滑了。在美国看来,中国似乎仍将坚持低价人民币的政策。一场中美贸易争战的爆发也实在是很合乎情理。
Add all this together and it is hard for a free-trader not to worry. So what is to be done? The first requirement is political leadership, especially from America and China. At a minimum, both must avoid beggar-thy-neighbor policies. Second, a conclusion of the Doha round would help. A deal would reduce the risk of broader backsliding by cutting many countries’ bound tariffs-and it would establish Mr Obama’s multilateral credentials. Third-Doha deal or not-is greater transparency. A good recent idea is that the WTO publicise any new barriers, whether or not they are allowed by its rules.
考虑到以上种种,自由贸易主义者很难不去担忧。那么,能做些什么呢?首先要求的是政治表率,尤其是美国和中国。最起码要避免采取以邻为壑的政策。其次,多哈回合谈判的结果会有所帮助。协议中削减许多国家的约定税率会减少更大范围退步的风险,而且还将建立起奥巴马所言的多边信任状。第三,无论多哈回合谈判达成协议与否,都需要进一步透明化。最近有一个很好的观点,即WTO公布任何一项新的贸易壁垒,不管其是否在WTO规则允许范围之内。
The best insurance against protectionism, however, is macroeconomic stimulus. Boosting demand at home will reduce the temptation to divert it from abroad. By historical standards policymakers are acting aggressively, as the Federal Reserve did this week. But the effort is unevenly, and poorly, distributed. Emerging economies from which capital is fleeing have little room to boost spending. Some creditor countries (notably Germany) are holding back on fiscal stimulus, while the world’s biggest borrower (America) is acting the most boldly. A bigger push to boost domestic demand in creditor countries coupled with more help, through the IMF, to cushion cash-strapped emerging economies would ease the world economy’s adjustment and brighten the prospects for free trade. In the 1930s protectionism flourished largely because of macroeconomic failures. That must not happen this time.
无论如何,对付贸易保护主义最保险的措施还是宏观经济刺激。拉动内需能减少将国外需求转移进来的诱惑。参照历史标准,决策者们表现得相当激进,譬如本周美联储的举动。但这种努力被不均衡地甚至是可怜地分散掉了。资本抽逃让新兴市场国家提振消费的余地很小。一些债权国,特别是德国,对财政刺激一直在犹豫;世界上最大的债务国–美国,却表现得最为大胆。债权国采取更积极的措施来拉动内需, IMF给与资金枯竭的新兴市场国家帮助其缓冲,这两者的配合将会减弱世界经济调整的难度,也能让自由贸易的前景更加光明。20世纪30年代,贸易保护主义盛极一时正是因为宏观经济上的失败。这一次,历史切不可重演。
译者:kahlen http://www.ecocn.org/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=16181&extra=page%3D1
diverting demand from abroad ——文中2次出现。个人认为,这不是指将国外的需求转移到国内,而是将别国的进口商吸引过来。否则,何须补贴和贬值?
好译文
The translation is very beautiful,I give my best regards to translater。
diverting demand from abroad. 我就是看到这句话觉得有些不对才来这里看看其它人是如何理解的. 比较同意2楼HANA的观点.
I couldn’t be better!
恩。毕竟“国外的需求转移到国内”本身逻辑就不对。
translator is good, but i only regard it as a reference, sometimes it’s much easier to get what it means from the original english version.
i am most grateful for your selfless donation
It will be tempting to prop up domestic jobs and incomes by diverting demand from abroad with export subsidies, tariffs and cheaper currencies.
人们会很想通过出口补贴、关税和货币贬值,转向国外需求,以保证国内就业和收入。
摘自English Digest Feb.2009
近期来看,出口还是中国经济增长的最大引擎
57