Europe’s financial crisis
欧洲金融危机
The spectre that haunts Europe
徘徊在欧洲的幽灵
A bail-out for Greece will not be the end of the euro area’s fiscal troubles
对希腊的救助绝非欧元区国家财政困境的终结
Feb 11th 2010 | From The Economist print edition
AS FINANCE ministers from the European Union gathered in Brussels for a two-day “informal” summit on February 11th, there was only one topic on the agenda: how best to help Greece avoid defaulting on its debts while, at the same time, reassuring bond markets that other euro-area countries with big budget deficits, such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain, were still safe bets.
2月11日，来自欧盟区各国的财长们齐聚布鲁塞尔进行了为期两天“非正式”的高峰会议，这次会议的议程只有一个：如何更好地帮助希腊，使之避免出现拖欠债务的危局；与此同时，给债券市场打气，证实其它欧元区国家如爱尔兰，葡萄牙和西班牙等，虽然预算的赤字高企，仍然是可以放心的投资对象。
As The Economist went to press, only the basic elements of a possible backstop for Greece had emerged. Pride is at stake, so it will be a “European solution”, with the IMF limited to an advisory role. It will be a joint effort led by France and a somewhat reluctant Germany, the country with the deepest pockets. Berlin frets that a rescue will only encourage further profligacy.
当本期《经济学人》交付印刷时，只出现了一些援助希腊的初步迹象。这次救援行动将是一个“欧洲人自救的项目”，国际货币基金组织在其中仅限于咨询作用，目的就是要保住欧洲人的脸面。这是一个由法国和德国牵头的联合行动，德国虽然家底最厚，但有点不情愿出头。柏林担心对希腊的救援行动只会起到鼓励其它国家大手大脚花钱的效果。
Acting in concert limits the political fallout that comes from rescuing countries. It helps put pressure on Greece for more reforms and cuts in public spending as conditions of the bail-out. But the need for co-ordination makes it hard to act decisively, and leaves bond markets nervous. Funding will be limited, perhaps just enough to help Greece meet its immediate obligations (euro 20 billion of its debts fall due in April and May). Help may take the form of a guarantee on refinancing bonds or an outright purchase of those bonds by Greece’s rescuers.
协调一致的行动限制了救援国施加的政治影响。它使希腊感受到更大的压力，不得不进行更多的改革和削减公共开支措施，这些行动也是此次救援的附带条件。但是，协调行动使得救援措施拖泥带水，这导致了债券市场的不安情绪。此次发行债券的限额或许只够帮助希腊偿还即将到期的债务（4-5月到期的200亿欧元的债务）。此次救援采取的方式可能是对再融资债券进行担保，或者由救援国直接购买这些债券。
There is talk that one reason to keep the IMF out is that its chief, Dominque Strauss-Kahn, may be a rival to President Nicolas Sarkozy in the French elections in 2012 (see article). If Europe snubs the IMF, it may eventually need to set up a clone—a European Monetary Fund—to deal with future funding crises. That idea has little support for now, it seems. The ad hoc response to the Greek crisis may partly reflect a fear that a formal set-up with a staff, budget and the ability to raise funds in capital markets would be too close to a fiscal union for many countries to stomach.
有种说法认为国际货币基金组织没有参加此次救援行动的一个原因是其总裁多米尼克•斯特劳斯-卡恩，他很可能在2012年的法国大选中成为萨科齐总统的竞争对手（见链接的文章）。如果欧洲要冷落国际货币基金组织，它最终可能需要成立一个类似的机构——欧洲货币基金组织，以应付将来可能出现的债务危机。但似乎现在没有人支持这种设想。应付此次希腊危机的临时性措施也许部分反映了某种戒备心理，他们担心会出现一个有经费和人员，能够在资本市场上筹集资金的机构，这太像是一个财政同盟了，而这一同盟是许多国家所不愿见到的。
For some, the rescue of Greece marks a new wave of the global financial crisis. The first was about the solvency of banks; this one is about the solvency of sovereign countries. Yet Greece’s public-finance problems were brewing long before the rich world’s banks started to falter. When it joined the euro in 2001, its public debt was already more than 100% of GDP. Despite a long boom spurred by low interest rates inside the euro, Greece did little to tackle its persistent deficits.
对于一些人来说，此次希腊救援行动标志着又一波全球金融危机的到来。第一波金融危机涉及到银行的偿付能力，而此次危机关系到主权国家的偿付能力。然而，希腊的公共财政问题远在富裕国家的银行危机开始之前就已经积累。当它在2001年加入欧元区时，其公共债务已经超过GDP的100％。尽管在欧元区低利率政策的推动下获得了长期的经济繁荣，但希腊政府对于其持续的赤字预算采取了完全放任的态度。
After its new government admitted, last October, that its budget shortfall would be 13% of GDP, more than twice previous forecasts, Greece’s cost of borrowing started to pick up. Bond investors were further unnerved by the revelation that Greece’s debt had been understated by keeping unpaid bills off the books. With the country’s credibility shot, even the tough austerity programme announced earlier this month could not rally confidence.
去年10月希腊新一届政府承认，其预算缺额将达到国内生产总值的13％，是以前预测的两倍多。希腊的借贷成本不断攀升。根据走漏的消息，希腊政府将到期未还的债务不计算在其债务额中，其实际债务要超过公布的数额，这使债券投资者们进一步感到不安。由于该国的信誉度下降，即使本月早些时候公布了严厉的的紧缩开支计划也无法恢复投资者的信心。
Talk of a bail-out brought some calm to financial markets, though there is a risk that the lack of detail may trigger fresh paroxysms. The yield on ten-year Greek bonds fell below 6% the day before the EU gathering: in late January it had risen above 7%. The euro, which had been falling steadily against the dollar, perked up a bit.
欧盟拟议救援的谈论使金融市场产生了些许平静，然而由于缺乏操作细节，存在可能引发新的债务危机的危险。在欧盟财长聚会前一天，10年期希腊债券市场定价已下降到6％以下，而去年1月下旬该债券市场定价超过了7％。欧元对美元的不断贬值对此起到了一些作用。
Some euro-crats (and more than a few people in Greece) feel the euro zone has been picked on by speculators. They point out that its debt burden is no worse than in other parts of the rich world. The OECD reckons public debt in Britain and America will be higher than in the euro zone by 2011, as a proportion of GDP. The problem for the euro area is that it has trouble-spots, like Greece, with worse than average finances, and no means (until now) to tap the credit of their thriftier brethren.
不止是一些希腊人，一些欧共体官员也认为，欧元区的现状是投机商们捣乱的结果。他们指出，希腊的债务负担并不比其它富裕国家和地区更严重。经合组织估计，以债务占GDP的比例计算，到2011年英国和美国的公共债务将超过欧元区国家。欧元区的问题是，它有如希腊这样的问题点，其金融状况要劣于欧元区的平均值，并且到目前为止都没有很好的使用其更节俭的兄弟国家提供的信贷资金。
Even that may be too kind a comparison. Bond investors have worried most about countries with big borrowing needs adding to an already high stock of debt. In future, they may fret more about the longer-term prospects for GDP growth. Sluggish economies cannot sustain a big debt burden for ever; and the euro-zone countries with the most bloated debt burdens also face severe obstacles to growth. Fixing public finances is just the beginning of a much-needed programme of reforms.
这样一种比较也许是过于宽厚了。债券投资者们最担心的是那些债台已经高筑还需要大规模举债的国家。今后，他们可能更多地关注这些国家GDP增长的远景。疲软的经济不可能长期支撑沉重的债务负担，而欧元区债务负担最重国家同时也遇到了经济增长的强大阻力。调整公共财政只是迈出了迫切需要的改革的第一步。
译者：dqzxf
如想与译者本人对该文进行切磋，请到如下链接：http://ecocn.org/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=31077&extra=&page=1