Weapons inspection 武器核查

Tony Blair and Britain’s Iraq inquiry

托尼•布莱尔和英国之对伊战争调查

Weapons inspection

武器核查

Jan 14th 2010
From The Economist print edition

The right questions to ask the former prime minister

正确提问前首相

THERE have already been so many inquiries into the Iraq war (including one in the Netherlands that this week judged the invasion to have been illegal), and it was all so long ago, that many people thought the latest British probe, under Sir John Chilcot, would prove pointless. In fact it has already been informative, not least because some of the soldiers, spooks and diplomats who have given evidence have grown franker since retirement. On January 12th Sir John’s panel questioned Alastair Campbell, formerly the government’s main spin doctor. His testimony was a telling rehearsal for the imminent appearance of the star witness: his old boss, Tony Blair.

算上本周在荷兰将对伊战争归结为“非法入侵”的调查，对伊战争调查已进行过很多次了。很久以前，还有许多人认为这场由约翰•柴考特爵士坐镇的英国的对伊战争调查最终会是一场空。但事实上，调查已经取得了大量丰富的信息。这主要是因为一些提供证词的士兵、情报人员和外交官在退休后更为坦白。1月12日，约翰爵士的调查委员会对政府的前高级幕僚阿拉斯代尔•坎贝尔进行了质询。坎贝尔的证词也为即将接受质询的主要证人——他的前领导托尼•布莱尔，做了个铺垫。

Despite his nominal job description, Mr Campbell helped to construct and purvey the controversial case for war. “Nobody was really saying that Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction [WMD],” he observed this week. That is true. Saddam’s record of making and using such weapons, the hunches of UN inspectors and the fact that the dictator continued to frustrate them and act guilty until the very end all made it seem that he still retained some WMD.

虽然并非职责所在，坎贝尔仍参与促成了倍受争议的对伊战争。他本周说：“没有人说过萨达姆•侯赛因没有大规模杀伤性武器。”诚然，萨达姆有制造和使用此类武器的“记录”，联合国调查人员的直觉，以及这位独裁者直到最后都不与配合并犯下种种的恶行，这一切都让人以为他仍然拥有大规模杀伤性武器。。

But there are weapons and there are weapons. The nuclear kind is by far the most terrifying; and the evidence presented by Britain and America that Saddam was actively and rapidly pursuing a nuke has come to seem especially dodgy. When they question Mr Blair about WMD, Sir John and his colleagues should concentrate on nuclear weapons—and in particular on the government’s assertion that Saddam might develop one “in between one and two years”. These nuclear allegations, which helped Mr Blair call the threat from Iraq “serious and current”, need further probing.

但是有军队的地方就会有武器。核武器显然是最为可怕的武器，因此英美提供的 “萨达姆正积极迅速地获取核武器”的证据就显得尤其危险（原诡诈）。在调查委员会就大规模杀伤性武器质询布莱尔时，约翰爵士和他的同僚们应该着重于“核武器”——特别是政府对萨达姆有可能在“一至两年内”制造出核武器的断言。这些有关核武器的断言（布莱尔曾凭此称伊拉克威胁是“严重而紧迫的”）值得深入调查。

A second focus should be on how raw intelligence was changed. Mr Blair described as “extensive, detailed and authoritative” intelligence that was, in fact, patchy and old; he described conclusions that were speculative as “beyond doubt”. At the inquiry, Mr Campbell drew a distinction between shifting lines and paragraphs in dossiers and actually fabricating intelligence. Again, fair enough; and it would be futile for the inquiry to try to prove outright lying in Mr Blair’s statements about WMD. Their focus should be subtler: on his government’s negligent approach to the sources of its claims, its failure to confess uncertainty and its urge to overstate.

第二个应着重关注的是：原始情报是如何被篡改的。布莱尔曾将那些拼凑而成的旧情报称之为“多方面、详细且权威的”，并将疑点重重的论断描述为“毋庸置疑的”。在质询中，坎贝尔曾指出移动档案中的文字及段落与伪造情报是不同的。那么，好吧，要立即通过布莱尔在质询中关于大规模杀伤性武器的陈词来证明情报是伪造的只能是徒劳。委员会应关注更为微妙的事件：布莱尔政府对形成其论断的资料采取的草率行径，否认不确定性并且急于夸大事实。

Beyond doubt

毋庸置疑？

There is also a string of outstanding questions about the conduct and aftermath of the war. For instance, why did some British troops seem not to have been fully equipped for the task? Indeed, why did the Treasury, overseen by the man who was then chancellor of the exchequer, Gordon Brown, fail to put its money where Mr Blair’s mouth was? (Mr Brown himself has dubiously been excused from testifying until after Britain’s pending general election.) Another concern is the increasingly vexed issue of when, precisely, Mr Blair committed British forces to the invasion—and whether he simultaneously said different things to George Bush and the British public. And why did he enter the war without much assurance that the Americans had a plan for post-war reconstruction?

对于这场战争的行为及后果还有许多悬疑，比如：为什么一些参战的英国部队似乎没有齐全的装备？确实，在戈登•布朗就任财政部财政大臣期间，为什么不以实际行动力挺布莱尔？（对布朗的质询被推迟在即将进行的英国大选之后也令人生疑。）另一个引起持续争议的问题是：布莱尔究竟是什么时候决定派英国部队入侵伊拉克的，面对乔治•布什和英国公众他是否有两套截然不同的说法？为什么他还没确定美国是否有战后重建方案，就贸然参与对伊战争？

These worries have not arisen because of a petty dispute between Mr Blair and his critics in the media—as Mr Campbell seemed to argue at the inquiry this week. They are important because Saddam turned out not to have any WMD, and because the post-war occupation of Iraq has been disastrous (and for Britain, militarily humiliating). And they are not merely historical curiosities. The unravelling of the case for war, and the calamities of its aftermath, have discredited politicians in the eyes of many Britons, and may inhibit the country’s future foreign policy, not to mention the cost in blood and treasure. Mr Blair’s turn at the inquiry may be the last, best chance to explain those mistakes and allay some of the anger they provoked—if he is asked the right questions.

本周，坎贝尔在质询中申辩：未有这方面的担忧是缘于布莱尔与其批评家在媒体的一次小争论。但这些问题却至关重要，因为萨达姆被证实并没有任何大规模杀伤性武器，而对伊的战后占领却损失惨重——英国在军事上为此蒙羞。这些问题不只是历史的噱头，对伊战争的揭晓以及战后的灾难，使许多英国人都认为政治家是不可信的，这很可能会羁绊英国以后的外交政策，且不说战争引起的死伤及国库损耗了。要平息他们所挑起的公愤，对布莱尔的质询也许就是最后的，也是最好的机会了——如果问到了点子上的话。

译者：mabel.jie